Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Main Page". Fri, 04 Jul 2008 0:30:01 +0000 Fri, 04 Jul 2008 0:30:01 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:16:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25259 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25259 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 through part of FY2008 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $524 billion (75%), OEF about $141 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (4%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of April 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.1 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.3 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:14:11 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25258 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25258 The Gaza Strip is currently undergoing a humanitarian crisis which includes the widespread denial of economic, social and cultural rights. This humanitarian crisis has been precipitated by sanctions imposed on the Gaza administration by both Israel and Western countries and Israel’s closure of Gaza’s border crossings which amounts to a blockade on the territory. This position paper describes violations of the human right to water and sanitation in Gaza that have been caused or exacerbated by the sanctions and blockade in the period from January 2006 to the present. Due to financial and economic sanctions, the blockade preventing spare parts from entering Gaza and the fuel restrictions, water provision has been intermittent in certain areas for a number of months, with some people facing cuts of up to eighteen hours per day. Rising levels of poverty have also meant that many households are struggling to pay for clean drinking water and can no longer afford the cost of emptying their septic tanks, leading to the overflow of sewage which threatens public health. This already dire situation is rapidly deteriorating. Since January 2008, due to a lack of fuel, the Gaza Power Generating Company has had to cut the power supply, leaving Gaza’s 1.5 million people with daily power cuts of up to eight hours reducing access to drinking water, especially for those who live in high rise buildings which require electricity to pump the water to higher levels. On 20 January 2008, the Gaza power plant was shut down and Gaza City was plunged into darkness. The Coastal Municipal Water Utility, the water service provider in Gaza, recently announced that if fuel did not arrive by 22 January 2008, the water and sewage systems of one and a half million people would cease to operate. This could cause a massive health crisis and the outbreak of water-borne disease. On 21 January 2008, the Palestinian Water Authority acknowledged that 40 percent of the houses in the Gaza Strip had no running water and the following day reports emerged that sewage was flooding the streets. SOURCE: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:07:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25257 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25257 With the recent political changes that have taken place in Nepal, it is only natural to look to the future with hope for beneficial changes and the quick and successful institutionalization of a Democratic Republic. In the past, Nepal has received national and international criticism regarding its failure to comply with its human rights obligations and has been accused of not having the necessary political will to address the numerous cases of human rights violations, including torture. The deep-rooted culture of impunity is posing a serious threat to the on-going peace process. Perpetrators of human rights violations are promoted by the political system and are not brought to justice. Nepal has responded to these accusations, especially on torture, by quoting its domestic legislation, the Torture Compensation Act of 1996 (TCA), claiming that this Act places Nepal in compliance with its international obligations. However, a brief examination of this law shows that not only does it fail to meet international standards by neglecting to criminalize the act of torture, but it also is not adequately addressing the needs of the victims of torture it was enacted to assist. SOURCE: Advocacy Forum Advocacy Forum Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:04:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25256 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25256 When did violence first begin in the region we now know as Indonesia? Indeed it is difficult to determine this. However, in the collective memory of Indonesians, particularly the Javanese, discussions on violence and political intrigue will often refer to the case of Tunggul Ametung and Ken Arok in Java. There are other cases from other kingdoms of the day, however this is the most famous. In the 13th century, when Tunggul Ametung was in power in Java, an intriguing incident took place at the palace of Tumapel. Ken Arok, one of the palace guards known for his history of committing robbery, murdered Tunggul Ametung and walked away from the murder while Kebo Ijo, another palace guard, was punished after being falsely accused of the murder (Saini, 2000:12-13). Violence was not only recorded in Java but also in other kingdoms at the time, including Aceh. Before the Europeans came to the archipelago, rulers and even locals were already familiar with the term which foreign observers call “amok”, such as the case in Banten in 1648, when a person ran amok in the market and murdered several people. It seems, however, that the incidents of violence which took place before the arrival of the Europeans were caused either by the elites or by the citizenry, and thus cannot be described as systematic or state-based violence. SOURCE: Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity // University of Oxford Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity // University of Oxford Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:00:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25255 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25255 Central America has the reputation of being a violent region with high crime rates, youth gangs, drug traffic, and ubiquitous insecurity. Politicians, the media, and social scientists in and outside the region often claim that the societies are in complete agreement with their judgment of the situation and that all society members are calling for law and order and social segregation. Focusing on Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the paper analyzes the social perception of violence and crime. On the basis of essays written by secondary school students and interviews with citizens from all walks of life in the three countries, the paper points out how elite arguments on violence and crime are translated into everyday life, and what society members suggest be done to deal with these problems. The sources prove that there are noticeable hegemonic discourses on violence and crime in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Simultaneously, a majority of the respondents call for social and integrative solutions rather than the so-called “iron fist.” The repressive trend in Central American policies therefore does not necessarily receive the presumed affirmation asserted by many authorities on and in the region. SOURCE: German Institute of Global and Area Studies German Institute of Global and Area Studies Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:58:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25254 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25254 In the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 raids on New York City and Washington D.C., the Western media thundered damnation at the governments of the United States and its allies for having failed to take seriously the growth in post-Cold War national security threats from transnational Islamist groups. The media mercilessly attacked the “group-think” of Western governments for their continued focus on threats from nation-states—Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, etc.—and their on-again, off-again concern with the threat from al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies. The media’s bottom-line was accurate: The fall of the Berlin Wall had not been recognized by Western governments as the end of reliable peace under the umbrella of Mutually Assured Destruction and that the 9/11 attacks made it plain that the relatively peaceful, largely predictable Cold War-era was over for good. The media’s post-9/11 argument was an essential wake-up call to those wielding power in the West, but it appears, in retrospect, to have been ineffective. Washington and many of its allies continue to focus on nation-state threats—witness the war in Iraq and the apparently nearing war with Iran—while addressing the transnational Islamist threat symbolized by al-Qaeda half-heartedly as if they had time to end the threat at their leisure. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:56:49 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25253 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25253 In an interview with Italian newspaper Il Tempo, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani stated that “the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] is not a terrorist organization.” Barzani also added that “if the PKK rejects Turkey’s commitment to hold talks with it, the PKK can be then considered as terrorist” (Il Tempo, June 21). Peyamner, the official media organ of Barzani’s political party (the Kurdistan Democratic Party—KDP), did not report on his statements, although the other main Iraqi Kurdish political party (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—PUK) did post a story containing the interview (PUKMedia, June 22). Naturally, Turkish media immediately picked up on Barzani’s statement (Hurriyet, June 23; Today’s Zaman, June 24; Milliyet, June 24). This was not the first time that KRG President Barzani refused to characterize the PKK as a terrorist group. As recently as October 2007, Turkish newspapers reported on an interview Barzani gave to CNN in which he made almost identical statements, emphasizing that he did not see the PKK as a terrorist organization, but “if in order to solve the [Kurdish] problem Turkey proposed a peaceful path and the PKK rejected this, then I would agree that the PKK is a terrorist organization. At the moment, however, this is not the case” (Radikal, October 22, 2007). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:55:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25252 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25252 In the last few years the British government has imprisoned, exiled or deported most of Britain’s most high-profile jihadist preachers such as Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri and Abdullah Faisal. In 2006, it also passed laws prohibiting the “glorification” of terrorism to prevent new preachers from gaining similar prominence. However, as a range of fresh plots and convictions show, these measures have not yet halted jihadist recruitment. Within the last two years, several groups of would-be terrorists have been convicted of planning to kidnap and behead British Muslim soldiers in Birmingham, join jihadis in Pakistan and carry out terrorist attacks in the UK. Other cases currently being heard by courts or awaiting trial include alleged plots to bomb several trans-Atlantic airliners and set off bombs in restaurants. The growing evidence that many of these plotters have often been radicalized within the last two years suggests that extremists in the UK have adapted to anti-terrorism measures rather than being silenced by them. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:55:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25251 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25251 Approximately a year has passed since the outbreak of violence between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the armed Islamist group Fatah al-Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in Northern Lebanon; and yet—one year later—the situation in the camps is far from being stable. On the contrary, episodes of violence have spread to the Ain al-Hilweh camp, and the conflict has broadened to include other Salafist factions, such as Jund al-Sham, or Asbat al-Ansar (Daily Star [Beirut], June 17). In the past few months fighting has resumed in the Ain al-Hilweh camp, the largest Palestinian camp in Lebanon, located near the southern city of Sidon. Accordingly, Ain al-Hilweh—traditionally a foothold of Fatah and the former operating base of Yasser Arafat in the 1980s—is now increasingly under the control of Islamist groups (Ya Libnan, June 15). Among such factions, one of the most active has certainly been Jund al-Sham. Jund al-Sham, literally “the Army of Greater Syria,” is a splinter group of Asbat al-Ansar, a Salafist movement founded in the late 1980s by Palestinian cleric Shaykh Hisham Shreidi in the northern camp of Nahr al-Bared. This takfiri group is mostly Lebanese, although it includes some Palestinian fighters (Naharnet, May 31). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:54:05 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25250 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25250 Iraqi radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has issued a statement describing a new strategy for attacking Coalition forces (alkufanews.com, June 13). The statement follows a year of intense military pressure against his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and a series of confusing and sometimes contradictory decisions. The hard-line cleric, who has not been seen in public for months, issued orders to reorganize his militia into a civilian branch and a small but select armed wing commissioned to fight Coalition forces. Only three months earlier al-Sadr had announced his retirement and admitted failure in his efforts at “liberating Iraq” (see Terrorism Monitor, May 1). Muqtada’s statement was proclaimed in the mosques by his aides during the weekly prayer of his followers on Friday, June 13 (almanar.com, June 13). A written copy—signed the previous day—was published on a pro-Sadr web site: “Everyone knows that we will not abandon the resistance against the occupiers until liberation or death, but you individuals in Jaysh al-Mahdi should know, and this is an obligation on you, that the resistance will be restricted to a group which will be authorized by a written statement by me soon. Those will be people with experience, management, awareness and sacrifice. They would have a prior permission—firstly from the religious ruler through their appointed command and secondly from the supreme command—through secret and private structures. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:53:13 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25249 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25249 A great deal of debate surrounds the factors driving the brand of radical Islam in the Middle East that inspires some individuals to commit acts of violence. A recurring theme in extremist discourse is opposition to incumbent authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. For radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, unwavering U.S. support for the autocracies that rule Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region tops a list of grievances toward what amounts to pillars of U.S. foreign policy in the region. In addition to al-Qaeda, however, most Muslims in the Middle East also see these regimes as oppressive, corrupt and illegitimate. Authoritarian regimes in the region are also widely viewed as compliant agents of a U.S.-led neo-colonial order as opposed to being accountable to their own people. Ironically, having realized that most of al-Qaeda’s leaders and foot soldiers received their start in radical opposition politics in their home countries, including U.S. allies Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the United States identified the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East as a critical factor in the spread of radicalization in its call for greater political liberalization and democratization in the region after the September 11 attacks. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:51:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25248 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25248 The Security Council this morning renewed the mandate for a period of six months until 31 December 2008 of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which has supervised the ceasefire between Israel and Syria since 1974. Unanimously adopting resolution 1821 (2008), the Council called for the implementation of its resolution 338 of 1973, which required immediate negotiations between the parties with the aim of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In conjunction with the adoption of today’s resolution, a statement was also read out by Zalmay Khalilzad of the United States, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council in June, reiterating that tension would remain until such a just and lasting peace could be reached. In his latest report on UNDOF (see background), Secretary-General Ban Ki‑moon recommended the extension of the Force, noting that, while the situation in the Golan Heights has been “generally quiet” and Israel and Syria had even conducted indirect peace talks, the overall region remains tense. Mr. Ban also drew attention to nearly $15 million in unpaid assessments for UNDOF’s funding. SOURCE: United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:49:42 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25247 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25247 Extending by 18 months the mandate of the current New York-based Monitoring Team concerned with overseeing Council-imposed sanctions against members and/or associates of Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden and the Taliban, the Security Council this morning provided “clear and fair procedures” for the maintenance of the Consolidated List of persons to whom those sanctions apply. Unanimously adopting resolution 1822 (2008) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Council decided that all States should apply a combination of sanctions described in resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002), including the assets freeze, travel restrictions and the arms embargo. The Council directed the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), with the assistance of the Monitoring Team, to make accessible on its website publicly releasable reasons for listing the individuals or entities concerned. The country where the listed individual or entity was believed to be located and the country of which a listed person was a national should notify or inform the individual or entity of the designation together with the publicly releasable reasons. By other terms of the resolution, the Council directed the 1267 Committee to conduct a review of all names on the Consolidated List by 30 June 2010 in order to ensure that the List was as accurate as possible, and to confirm that listing remained appropriate. It further directed the Committee, after completion of the review, to conduct an annual review of all names that had not been reviewed in three or more years. SOURCE: United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:46:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25246 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25246 As the U.S. military engagement entered its sixth year in mid-March, Iraq finally seemed in many ways to be turning a corner toward stabilization. Even jaundiced journalists were conceding that the military surge, which had taken effect by the summer of 2007, was significantly helping security. Whole neighborhoods had returned to a more normal commercial and social life. Terrorist acts were way down, with multiple-fatality bombings dropping by more than two-thirds from their peak in the bloody year of 2006. With the change in American force levels and military strategy, the average daily death toll of Iraqis dropped from more than 100 a day to 20. The improvement was palpable. Iraqi police and military deaths fell from a peak of 300 in April 2007 to 110 in February 2008. Deaths of U.S. soldiers also dropped sharply, from more than 100 per month in late 2006 and early 2007 to under 40 per month in late 2007 and early 2008. But these casualties still were painful losses. American troops continued to suffer wounds, both physical and psychological; 600 –700 Iraqis were dying every month; and the violence in Iraq had declined only to the still-serious level of insecurity that prevailed in 2005. SOURCE: Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:44:51 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25245 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25245 There seems to be a growing, renewed animus against Israel. Arun Gandhi, grandson of the purported humanist Mohandas Gandhi, thinks Israel and Jews in general are prone to, and singularly responsible for, most of the world ’s violence. The Oxford Union took up the question in January of whether Israel even has a right to continue to exist. Our generation no longer speaks of a “Palestinian problem” but rather of an “Israeli problem.” So perhaps it is time for a new global approach to deal with Israel and its occupation. Perhaps we ought to broaden our multinational and multicultural horizons by transcending the old comprehensive settlements, road maps, and other arrangements when dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, a dispute that originated with the creation of Israel. Why not simply hold an international conference on all these issues—albeit in a far more global context, outside the Middle East? The ensuing general accords and principles could be applied to Israel and the West Bank, where the number of people involved, the casualties incurred, and the number of refugees affected are far smaller and far more manageable. SOURCE: Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:42:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25244 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25244 The slow growth of Africa over the period since independence is now understood as being partly attributable to poor governance. Until the 1990s the predominant African political system was autocracy. As Besley and Kudamatsu (2007) show, while in some contexts autocracy has produced good economic performance, in Africa it has consistently been dysfunctional. During the 1990s many African autocracies were replaced by democracy, most dramatically in the region’s largest society, Nigeria. Given the dismal record of autocracy, there was a reasonable expectation that democracy would achieve both accountability and legitimacy, and thereby both improve economic performance and reduce proneness to political violence. However, the record of elections in Africa and other recent low-income democracies is not encouraging. Kudamatsu (2006) measures government performance by infant mortality and shows that, in Africa, elections produce no improvement except in the rare instances in which the incumbent is defeated. Collier and Rohner (2008) find that, below per capita income of $2,750, democracy significantly increases proneness to civil war and various other manifestations of violence, and Collier and Hoeffler (2008) find that in resource-rich economies such as Nigeria, electoral competition worsens economic performance unless combined with strong checks and balances. SOURCE: Centre for the Study of African Economies Centre for the Study of African Economies Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:39:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25243 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25243 The increasing acceptance of the protection responsibilities of states towards the populations on their territory was highlighted at the 2005 World Summit, where Member States universally affirmed the concept of the “responsibility to protect” (RtoP). However, this significant development has not been matched by comparable progress in enhancing international machinery or national will to insure that the failures to protect of recent decades will not be repeated. To address some of these challenges, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG), Professor Francis Deng, and the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General (SASG) working on RtoP, Professor Edward Luck, held a policy roundtable in Stellenbosch, South Africa, that brought together over thirty policymakers, experts, and practitioners from the UN, regional organizations, governments, and civil society to consider the conceptual, institutional, and policy challenges posed by their mandates and by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s determination to “operationalize” RtoP within the UN system and to turn the Member States’ “words into deeds.” The roundtable was jointly convened by the International Peace Institute, New York (where Professor Luck is Senior Vice President and Director of Studies), the Office of the SAPG, and the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town. SOURCE: International Peace Academy International Peace Academy Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:36:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25242 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25242 In "The Price of the Surge" (May/June 2008), Steven Simon correctly observes that the Sunni turn against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), known as the Sunni Awakening, has been a key factor in security progress during the period of "the surge." Simon is also on point when he notes that the Awakening, which began before the surge, was not a direct consequence of additional U.S. troops. But although Simon gets much of the past right, he ultimately draws the wrong lessons for U.S. policy moving forward. Rather than unilaterally and unconditionally withdrawing from Iraq and hoping that the international community will fill the void and push the Iraqis toward accommodation -- a very unlikely scenario -- the United States must embrace a policy of "conditional engagement." This approach would couple a phased redeployment of combat forces with a commitment to providing residual support for the Iraqi government if and only if it moves toward genuine reconciliation. Conditional engagement -- rather than Simon's policy of unconditional disengagement -- would incorporate the real lesson from the Sunni Awakening. SOURCE: Center for a New American Security // Foreign Affairs Center for a New American Security // Foreign Affairs Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:35:05 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25241 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25241 After a three-month futile courtship with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah of the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and other jihadi organisations, the Pakistani Government headed by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has ordered a clean-up operation in the Khyber Agency and South Waziristan of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the Swat Valley. The operation started on June 28, 2008, in the Khyber Agency. While the resumed clean-up operation in South Waziristan and the Swat Valley is meant to put down recrudescence of jihadi terrorism by the TTP and the TNSM, which is a member of the TTP, the new clean-up operation in the Khyber Agency is designed to put down inter-sectarian, inter-tribal and inter-Mullah clashes, which have already caused a large number of deaths in the Khyber Agency and are threatening to spread to Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP. The Khyber Agency, which is adjoining Peshawar, has been seeing increasing attacks by local tribal jihadi groups on convoys carrying oil and other essential supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group South Asia Analysis Group Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:33:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25240 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25240 If one is required to evaluate India’s record in its counter-terrorism efforts in one word, the answer has to be “mixed”, but that would not do justice to the issue. India is widely accepted to be the most affected country from “terrorism” (according to the current wide definition of the word), in terms of casualties, duration of the challenges, types of terrorism (and their causes) etc.; and its counter-terrorism responses have necessarily been varied. Each of these requires to be evaluated separately and I shall make a quick effort. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group South Asia Analysis Group Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:33:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25239 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25239 Years back when I was a young officer in the Regiment of Artillery, our regiment moved from New Mal in Eastern India to Deolali in Western India. On the day of our departure we trooped into the railway station with our trucks, baggage, stores and all the men at 6 am in the morning. Our special train was scheduled to leave at 11 am. We sweated in the heat in the roofless station but the train earmarked for us was nowhere in sight. The hapless station master could do nothing. Around one pm we were informed the train would be placed by 5 pm. It came at 7 pm and we were kept busy loading it for next three hours because we were told the train would leave by 10 pm. But it did not even when the clock struck twelve. I was the train duty officer and ran around trying to find the railway staff that had vanished. Around 12 am I collared the station master in his house. “The train is ready for a long time to leave, sir,” he said. I was furious; “then why doesn’t it leave,” I thundered brimming with military efficiency. He walked over to the station and told me, “sir, train is there, but power has not come.” My uni-polar military brain could not understand the term ‘power’. “What ‘power’ do you mean?” I asked. He said “sir, you call it the engine, we call it power - the one that pulls the coaches, that has not arrived.” By the time ‘power’ came, a new dawn was on the horizon and we reached our destination two days late. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group South Asia Analysis Group Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:31:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25238 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25238 Transitional justice refers to a range of approaches that may be used to address past massive human rights violations. Transitional justice mechanisms include international tribunals, reconciliation commissions and truth-seeking measures. In recent years their importance and visibility increased due to gross human rights violations associated with armed conflicts in different parts of the world. While the crimes committed in Srebranica and Rwanda shocked the public opinion and paved the way for establishment of international judicial bodies, the peaceful transition in South Africa drew attention to its Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a possible model for seeking peace and justice through non-judicial means. So what is the added value of Transitional Justice for coming to terms with the past and building just and peaceful societies? The author reviews some past experiences and models of Transitional Justice and points to their weaknesses and strengths. As the main achievements she cites the international tribunals’ contribution to the development of jurisprudence in some areas of international criminal law and the delivery of justice in a manner impossible for local courts in post - war countries; as their weaknesses, the perception of delivering the “winners` justice” and rather limited involvement of populations from the affected countries. She also provides sets of recommendations as to how to improve the effectiveness of reconciliation commissions established in post-conflict countries, in the context of the United Nations peace operations. SOURCE: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:26:25 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25237 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25237 The 1992 Agenda for Peace was a landmark development in the conflict management field, but it did also produce side-effects. The UN, AU, EU and others have developed conflict management capacities that have encouraged the bureaucratic compartmentalization of the 4Ps across different units and departments. This report introduces an integrated conflict management model that is, instead, focussed on the multi-dimensional (political, security, socio-economic, rule of law and human rights) nature of conflict systems, and the need to coherently combine the collective efforts of a wide range of internal and external actors to build momentum towards peace. The report argues that, in the AU context, such an integrated confl ict management model would be more effective and efficient than the existing 4Ps model. The AU, being smaller, newer and more open to further development and capacity building than the UN and EU, has a better chance of breaking free from the inadequacies of the bureaucratic 4Ps model, and adopting an integrated conflict management model. SOURCE: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:19:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25236 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25236 This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations. SOURCE: RAND Corporation RAND Corporation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:15:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25235 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25235 In the lead-up to Nigeria’s April 2007 national and presidential elections, numerous signs emerged of growing popular discontent with the national political system and indications that the 2007 elections would mirror the violence of 2003. The shadow of the 2003 elections hung heavily over the country, while the 2007 electoral process faced a number of challenges. Problems with voter registration raised concerns about disenfranchisement, whether intentional or not. The efforts of Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to modify the Constitution to enable him to run for a third term drew accusations of authoritarianism. Tensions between the north and the south of the country persisted, as they have for years, and reflected the normal tendency of increasing in an election year. Growing unrest in the Niger Delta brought a rise in violent incidents and kidnappings. Although not as violent as many had predicted, the elections exacerbated political divides due to widespread accusations of fraud from voters and national and international observers alike. The elections did little to resolve the political tensions in the country. SOURCE: Small Arms Survey Small Arms Survey Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:13:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25234 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25234 Political thought in Sudan generally avoids the issue of reform, since the very notion falls short of the political and developmental ambitions the country has harboured since independence, in 1956. This paper examines Sudan's system of governance and its attitude to reform. Sudan has a governance system which does not necessarily use crude repressive methods, but rather a well-measured carrot and stick approach that helps them do both, manage and entrench the current political vacuum in the country. The security services are the most modern and well-run institution in the country, as well as the richest, given its open-ended budget that knows no parliamentary or legal accountability. It is therefore able, more than any other government or partisan institution in the country, to control every aspect of civil service and society and thus play, to a certain extent, the traditional role that armies usually play in Arab politics. SOURCE: The Arab Reform Initiative The Arab Reform Initiative Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:01:19 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25233 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25233 This issue of FMR aims to help bring the crisis of forced displacement of Burmese people back into the international spotlight. With the ‘Saffron Revolution’ of September 2007, Burma was catapulted into the centre of international attention. It was briefly headline news as people monitored the regime’s response and watched for hints of progress towards democracy and the restoration of rights. With little action on either front (and no visible resurgence of violence or protest), interest has since waned. The September protests, led by Buddhist monks, were sparked by a sudden increase in oil prices which had a serious impact on the already impoverished population. After a few days, the government violently ended what it called the “disruption of stability”. Governments around the world condemned the crackdown and the UN Secretary-General sent Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari to negotiate with the Burmese rulers. At the same time, however, China and Russia used their right of veto in the UN Security Council to block discussion of matters which they considered to be internal to Burma, no ‘threat to international security’ – and therefore outside the mandate of the Security Council. SOURCE: Forced Migration Review Forced Migration Review Thu, 03 Jul 2008 14:54:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25232 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25232 On December 17, 2007, eighty-seven countries and international organizations met in Paris and pledged to provide $7.4 billion over three years to the Palestinian Authority (PA), an amount far in excess of any previous level of U.S. or European aid to the Palestinians. The conference participants justified the aid as a means of providing "immediate support to the entire Palestinian population," and as a reward intended to strengthen those Palestinians who favor peaceful coexistence with Israel. In the midst of the effort in Paris to bestow unprecedented sums of foreign aid on the Palestinians, there was little discussion of the unintended consequences — often deadly ones — of previous aid regimens. The recent history of foreign assistance shows a distinct correlation between aid and violence. Perhaps aid itself does not cause violence, but there is strong evidence that it contributes to a culture of corruption, government malfeasance, and terrorism that has had lethal consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians over the past decade. SOURCE: Middle East Institute Middle East Institute Thu, 03 Jul 2008 14:53:10 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25231 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25231 Conversion to Islam among native Europeans is on the rise. Many converts live at peace within their native societies; some convert only for marriage, and reject neither contemporary culture nor Europe's Judeo-Christian values. A minority, however, embraces radical interpretations of Islam and can pose a security risk. The involvement of Muslim converts in recent terrorist attacks has raised concern in Europe about these "converts to terrorism." While intelligence agencies and security services track international communications and guard borders, such homegrown terrorists pose just as potent a threat to the security of Western democracies. European security services and politicians remain unprepared to handle this growing phenomenon. In Europe, there is very little hard data on conversion to Islam due to the difficulty of gathering proper statistics. Because Muslim communities usually have an informal structure and no formal clergy, most do not keep records. In France, for instance, state agencies do not record citizens' religious affiliations; to do so, French officials say, would counter France's commitment to secularism. In German registration offices, Muslim residents are included in a pool of "diverse religious affiliations."German converts apparently account for only a small portion—between 12,000 and 100,000—of Germany's total Muslim population of 2.8-3.2 million, which itself comprises less than 4 percent of the total population of Germany. In 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior commissioned a study from the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv Deutschland (ZIIAD) to determine the number of converts, but amid suspicion over the ZIIAD's methodology, discounted as exaggerated its findings and ended its relationship with the institute. SOURCE: Middle East Institute Middle East Institute Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:25:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25230 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25230 This article addresses the global environment, with a specific focus on U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) Area of Operations (AOR), and it contemplates the question: How can we avoid losing the next generation to Violent Extremists (VE)? It focuses on Islamic VEs, both Sunni and Shi’ia, addresses the Human Terrain and seeks to identify individual’s personal motivations. This article does not state official USCENTCOM policy or opinions. Today, the United States’ primary national security challenge centers around a problem that, should we “get it wrong,” will have transcendent implications. Terrorism and violence have plagued humankind throughout history, but now the world finds itself at yet another critical juncture. The terror challenge is the nexus of a multiplicity of issues that lead toward it, like the spokes on a wheel lead from the rim to the hub. Alternatively, terrorist vision can inform a multiplicity of issues and lead outward toward the rim, out to where the rubber meets the road. In contrast to ongoing efforts to understand the enemy’s extremist theological ideology, there has been less energy devoted to understanding the radicalization process or to understand what leads individuals to become radicalized and act out in violence or terror, or to understand the impact of U.S. foreign policy on this radicalization process. SOURCE: Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:24:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25229 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25229 There is growing evidence that asymmetrical warfare has become a strategy of choice among dissident, extremist political groups and will be the most likely national and international security threat in the 21st century. Operating in small, covert groups, and having no recognized sovereign territory or population to defend, asymmetrical combatants can engage in violent, lethal activities with far less risk of being totally overwhelmed by reprisals that a nation-state might face. In addition, those killed in action can be portrayed as martyrs and used to recruit more converts to the cause. A great many lessons have been learned over the years on how to counter asymmetrical threats, and the breadth, complexity and international scope of the threat are now generally recognized. Moreover, much has been written on countering the threat, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and many corrective measures have been suggested and adopted. But as yet, there has as yet not been a grand strategic vision encompassing all the many, varied facets of the threat. It has not been a lack of understanding or of lessons learned about the many varied elements of asymmetrical warfare that has lead to the lack of progress in effectively countering threats in recent years. Rather it has been has been the lack of a new, comprehensive strategic vision against what is essentially a new and different type of armed conflict. The intention of this article is to help fill that gap. SOURCE: Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:23:39 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25228 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25228 In early March 2008, an organization called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) announced on a Turkish website, that Cüneyt Çiftçi, a Turk born and living in Germany had carried out a suicide attack on American and Afghan troops in the Afghan province of Paktika. The website showed pictures of Çiftçi while training for and preparing the attack. This announcement marked the first peak of an intensive public relations campaign that the IJU began in September 2007. In April 2008, Çiftçi's video was followed by one of a German convert training in an IJU camp in Pakistan, Eric Breininger, who called for Muslims living in Germany to join the "Jihad" against the West. In a bid to gain access to new recruits and funds the organization tries to present itself on the Internet as a transnational organization with supporters in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Europe. Its main recruitment target, however, seem to be young Turks and Germans. This became evident after three of its members were arrested in the Sauerland town of Oberschledorn in the German state of North-Rhine Westphalia in September 2007. They were suspected of planning bomb attacks on American and possibly Uzbek targets in Germany. The planned attack in Germany sought to support the struggle of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan by attempting to swing the German debate on extending the parliamentary mandates for the deployment of the German Army in Afghanistan (OEF and ISAF). The IJU leadership apparently calculated that high-profile attacks just before the Bundestag votes in October and November 2007 could prevent an extension and force the withdrawal of German troops. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have long regarded Germany as the weakest link in the chain of major troop providers and wanted to exploit growing criticism of the campaign in Afghanistan in the German public sphere. SOURCE: Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:16:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25224 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25224 This paper will assess the extent to which transnational terrorists, in particular global Jihadists associated with Osama bin Laden, have been interested in attacks against the global energy infrastructure. We then assess the extent to which terrorists have in fact targeted that infrastructure and with what effect. We then place these attacks in the context of other supply disruption events. Finally, we make suggestions about a viable way ahead. Western fears about the threat posed by transnational terrorists to energy supplies certainly seem warranted. al-Qaeda has repeatedly threatened to disrupt supplies and have followed up on those threats in a few cases. For example, following the attack on the French tanker Limburg in October 2002, al-Qaeda issued a statement that it "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker but...on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word." Moreover, al-Qaeda sees the U.S. intervention in Iraq as strongly linked to the supply of oil. SOURCE: Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:06:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25223 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25223 Most research to date on Islamic charities has given special attention to political aspects, which inevitably come to the fore in conflict zones and in areas of mixed religious affiliations (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, Ghandour 2002, Soares and Otayek 2007). But whereas we should not exclude the political dimension from analysis of any humanitarian aid, of whatever ideological provenance, it would be unjustified to lay so much stress on it in the Muslim case that the question of efficacity was sidelined. There is an increasing recognition of the importance of Faith Based Organizations and their role in the international aid system (Duriez et al. 2007, Clarke and Jennings 2008, Rakodi 2007). Few would question that Christian NGOs such as CAFOD and Christian Aid are often able to make advantageous use of their confessional networks in majority Christian areas such as southern Africa and Latin America. Islamic charities in general – apart from a few UK-based ones – have experienced considerable difficulties since 9/11 owing to suspicions on the part of some Western governments that they have been used as fronts for terrorist activities. Steps are being taken, for instance by the Swiss Government, to try to have obstacles from bona fide Islamic charities removed. No research as far as I am aware has been undertaken to evaluate, let alone quantify, the damage that this campaign against Islamic charities has done to the interests of their beneficiaries – such as the many thousands of orphans that they have sponsored – and potential beneficiaries. It must also remain a matter for speculation how powerful a force in the humanitarian movement the Islamic charities might become if they were encouraged to develop their potential as a vehicle for redistribution of resources and disaster response and preparedness in the Muslim world. SOURCE: Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:03:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25222 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25222 In the absence of an electoral outcome, the best we can do is to come up with what should be the post election agenda for Zimbabwe. Could this be the restoration of democracy or the consolidation of the ‘local version’ of democracy? and Is it a case of who governs or is it a case of being governed well? How do we explain the hesitancy in announcing electoral outcomes? Is it fear of power alternation or fear of the long awaited democratic transition? For the latter can take place without the former, What sort of power alternation in Zimbabwe would result in a democratic transition? Would it be ideological alternation or just leadership alternation? SOURCE: International Security Studies International Security Studies Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:00:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25221 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25221 Human security is at a low ebb in the country. Zimbabweans are grappling with 1.reduced access to basic services, 2. the aftermath of several years of drought, 3.the economic meltdown and 4. the effects of Aids. The government is thus struggling to provide the basics that are needed by all to participate in society: health, education, water, housing and employment. These are essential factors that make up the concept human security. Many of the areas in Zimbabwe are now ‘spatial poverty traps’ (Bird et al 2002a:25) with low geographic capital [the natural, physical, social and human capital of an area that limits the chances to escape from poverty. Recent policy developments, migratory patterns and dwindling resources, have all contributed to the rise in urban poverty. In the same way that the Millennium Development Goals (1990-2015) are interrelated, poverty is also a result of inter-related factors that cut across all the eight goals. SOURCE: International Security Studies International Security Studies Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:56:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25220 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25220 Lebanon is going through a critical period of its history. The security vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Syrian forces in 2005, the campaign of political violence and assassinations of leading public figures, the continued presence of armed militias operating from Lebanon outside the authority of the state and supported by external actors, and the recent war between Lebanon and Israel emphasize the necessity and importance of rebuilding Lebanon's security sector to address challenges that could fatally threaten stbility in Lebanon and its neighborhood. Most recently, the battle opposing the Lebanese Army to jihadi fighters in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared illustrated both the potential of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a stabilizing actor and the structural challenges it suffers from: an overstretched force, poor managerial and strategic skills at the top, inadequate equipment and training, poor coordination among security agencies and perennial concerns about force cohesion. SOURCE: The Henry L Stimson Center The Henry L Stimson Center Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:51:33 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25219 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25219 The Indonesian Supreme Court recently overturned the conviction of pro-government militia leader Eurico Guterres, who had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. Guterres was among 18 people indicted by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. With his recent release, all 18 defendants have now been acquitted. In light of the stalled release of the bi-lateral Commission for Truth and Friendship's final report, and the recent commutations of sentence provided to prisoners convicted of serious crimes in Timor-Leste, the Indonesian Court's acquittal of Eurico Guterres is another set-back for justice. The ICTJ strongly criticizes the Court's decisions and urges the UN secretary-general to address the issue of justice for the 1999 crimes committed in East Timor at the UN Security Council. SOURCE: International Center for Transitional Justice International Center for Transitional Justice Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:50:32 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25218 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25218 The European Union considers conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its foreign policy. It makes use of a number of policy instruments to promote conflict transformation through ‘constructive engagement’, which cover a range of sectors affecting conditions and incentives at the micro level. The EU has recognised the importance of engaging with civil society in situations of violent conflict, but needs to engage more with local civil society to make its policies more effective. This briefing aims to aid the understanding of the role of civil society organisations in situations of violent conflict, and the potential role of EU policies in enhancing CSOs’ conflict transformation efforts. The European Union, historically conceived as a peace project, has considered conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its fledgling foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that the EU aims to promote peace and that its role in the world would reflect the principles that have inspired its creation, development and enlargement. The EU views as critical “indicators” of conflict prevention and resolution issues such as human and minority rights, democracy, state legitimacy, dispute resolving mechanisms, rule of law, social solidarity, sustainable development and a flourishing civil society (Kronenberger and Wouters 2005). This suggests that the Union aims at transforming the structural features of violent conflict, eradicating what Galtung (1969, 1994) defines as the seeds of structural violence: social injustice, unequal development and discrimination. As such, many of its policy instruments can influence conditions and incentives at the micro level. SOURCE: MICROCON MICROCON Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:47:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25217 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25217 After a run-off election marked by violence, Robert Mugabe was sworn in again as president of Zimbabwe in late June. Some African leaders voiced criticism, but the African Union as a whole did not seem prepared to rebut the autocrat. Five days before the run-off election, Morgan Tsvangirai, the chairman and presidential candidate of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), had announced his withdrawal. This was by no means a concession statement, but rather an urgent cry for help. A UN peacekeeping force was needed to protect the Zimbabweans, Tsvangirai said after seeking refuge at the Dutch embassy in Harare. The opinion of some who had still hoped to oust Mugabe in the election, however, was: “Five more days – we could have held out.” SOURCE: Development and Cooperation Development and Cooperation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:46:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25216 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25216 Are peace and justice incompatible pursuits in responding to the Darfur crisis? Do efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute atrocity crimes in Darfur deserve robust international support or exhortations of caution? Is justice fundamental to a resolution of the crisis? or is it a luxury too costly, too threatening to the chances for peace? Would senior officials in the Khartoum regime be more or less likely to engage in meaningful peace talks if they faced forceful and compellingly researched indictments from the ICC? Would international support for the Court and for justice lead Khartoum to retaliate against civilians and humanitarians? Answers to these questions depend upon which of Darfur’s historical realities are accepted, which are denied or ignored. Many insist the most basic truth of Darfur is that senior members of the National Islamic Front (National Congress Party) are responsible for engineering the genocidal destruction and displacement most violently in evidence in 2003-2004, and that the regime remains deeply complicit---and where necessary actively engaged---in sustaining the human catastrophe in Darfur. Those so convinced, including this writer, will find grossly expedient the efforts to trade out the claims of justice for those of a peace that is nowhere in sight. SOURCE: Reeves, Eric Reeves, Eric Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:46:05 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25215 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25215 In the last of our three-part series, our anonymous correspondent in Zimbabwe details what it is like to work as an independent journalist in one of the world's most repressive regimes. "By exposing the government's shortcomings journalists have become enemies of the state," says this writer. "I work in fear every day." Read her dispatch about the crackdown below. Since the latest round of election-related violence, our reporter has gone into hiding in the capital of Harare. From her safe house, she spoke with iWitness correspondent Joe Rubin and described the frightening conditions in the city over the last few days. SOURCE: PBS Frontline PBS Frontline Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:40:30 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25214 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25214 The present report is submitted in compliance with the request of the Security Council contained in the presidential statement dated 26 September 2001 (S/PRST/2001/25), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (BONUCA) in that country. The report covers the period from January to June 2008 and focuses mainly on political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights developments during that period. Since my previous report, dated 5 December 2007 (S/2007/697), the political situation has continued to be dominated by intensified preparations for the inclusive political dialogue aimed at ending the recurrent political and security crises in the country. The Dialogue Preparatory Committee, established by Presidential Decree of 30 November 2007, has completed its work and, on 25 April 2008, submitted its report, containing specifications on the organization of the dialogue, to President François Bozizé. In line with the Committee’s recommendations, President Bozizé, on 8 June, set up a 15-member committee to help organize the dialogue, in particular by mobilizing financial and material resources. SOURCE: United Nations Secretary General Report United Nations Secretary General Report Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:38:11 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25213 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25213 The present report is the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It provides a comprehensive assessment of the steps taken to implement resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report of the Secretary-General was issued on 28 February 2008 (S/2008/135) and highlights both the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and areas of concern that continue to impede the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution between the parties. The present report also proposes measures that could be undertaken by the parties in the coming months with a view to achieving a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the 2006 conflict. The reporting period was characterized for the most part by the continuation of the prolonged political crisis in Lebanon, which culminated early in May in an extremely serious deterioration of the domestic security situation. In protest of two Government decisions taken on 6 May 2008, Hizbullah and other opposition groups took control of and closed roads leading to Beirut International Airport as well as other key roads in parts of the capital. In response, pro-Government groups closed the main border crossing between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Those actions brought the country to a standstill. Armed clashes between opposition and pro-Government groups, which on occasion included the use of heavy weapons, spread rapidly in several parts of the country. During the clashes that occurred from 8 to 13 May 2008, 69 people died, including a number of civilians, and more than 180 were injured. SOURCE: United Nations Secretary General Report United Nations Secretary General Report Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:35:31 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25212 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25212 In the heat of the Kenyan summer just a few miles north of the equator, a U.S. Navy Seabee detachment was working around the clock, digging a hole into the parched red clay earth. The place: a speck of a hamlet called Shidley. The mission: to provide deep, freshwater wells for marginalized nomadic communities. Few humanitarian activities in this remote part of the world are as important as providing clean drinking water for people and their livestock. In Shidley, water is life and American sailors had come ashore to find it. Between February and June 2007, these dedicated Seabees drilled two wells. The first, in a town called Rhea, struck brackish water and was unusable. The second, at Shidley, was still being explored after weeks of futile results. Engineers from the Kenyan army, dispatched to help the Americans find water for their countrymen, had abandoned hope that the Shidley well would be productive. From the shade of their field tent, they watched as the Seabees kept digging in the baking sun. While the Kenyans were concerned about the expense of drilling a “dry” hole, money was no object for the Americans. As the leader of the Seabee detachment said, “We’ll keep drilling ‘til we run out of steel.” SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:30:15 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25211 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25211 The Chechnya armed conflict affected stability and the security of communities across the North Caucasus region of Russia, and continues to do so. In Ingushetia, the republic into which Chechnya’s conflict overflowed, the grave conflict dynamics of its larger neighbor have arisen. For the past four years Russia has been fighting several militant groups in Ingushetia, which have a loose agenda to unseat the Ingush government, evict federal security and military forces based in the region, and promote Islamic rule in the North Caucasus. Beginning in summer 2007, insurgents’ attacks on public officials, law enforcement and security personnel, and civilians rose sharply. Human Rights Watch condemns attacks on civilians and recognizes that the Russian government has a duty to pursue the perpetrators, prevent attacks, and bring those responsible to account. Attacks on civilians, public officials, and police and security forces are serious crimes. Russia, like any government, has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting such crimes and an obligation to do so while respecting Russian and international human rights law. Regrettably, Russia is failing to respect or to adhere to these laws. Law enforcement and security forces involved in counterinsurgency have committed dozens of extrajudicial executions, summary and arbitrary detentions, and acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:24:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25210 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25210 The recent death of Corporal Sarah Bryant, the first British servicewoman to die on a "deliberate" operation in Afghanistan, attracted much attention from the UK print media [i] . Though killed alongside Corporal Sean Reeve, Lance Corporal Richard Larkin and Paul Stout, images and tributes to Corporal Bryant, the only woman casualty, have filled the most column inches. One explanation for this is that at least two of the servicemen who died in the same incident are suspected to have belonged to clandestine units and their families have requested privacy whilst they grieve [ii] . Another is that Bryant’s death is particularly newsworthy as a rare occurrence. Since the end of the Second World War, relatively few servicewomen have become combat causalities, and though overstretch means that the military increasingly claim to "select people on the basis of what they can do, not on the basis of their gender", until just over a decade ago servicewomen were generally confined to auxiliary roles [iii] . However, images of a smiling Sarah Bryant and tributes from a grieving mother, father, widower and colleagues - are more than individual reactions to the premature death of a young, bright loved one. They reveal wider cultural discomfort towards the death of a young, bright servicewoman as a direct result of conflict. They also demonstrate the significance of gender to the legitimation of the ‘war on terror’. Tributes to Corporal Sarah Bryant may vary from article to article but her death has elicited some clear, salient, gendered reactions. SOURCE: E-International Relations E-International Relations Wed, 02 Jul 2008 17:07:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25209 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25209 Nous tenons à encourager les communautés nationales et internationales engagées dans la recherche de voies et de moyens pour répondre aux graves violations et abus du passé au Burundi, constitués de cycles de violences politiques et ethniques qui ont endeuillé le Burundi depuis son indépendance en juillet 1962. Les mécanismes relatifs à la gestion du passé douloureux du peuple Burundais ont été ciblés dans l’accord d’Arusha pour la paix et la réconciliation au Burundi d’août 2000, puis étoffés par le rapport des experts des Nations Unies en 2005, rapport Kalomoh. De ce fait, une Commission Vérité et Réconciliation (CVR) ainsi qu’un Tribunal Spécial (TS) ont été identifiés comme étant des mécanismes non judiciaire et judiciaires destinés à assister les Burundais dans leur quête d’une société juste après des décennies de conflits. Conflits qui ont élargi le fossé entre les communautés ethniques, déplacées, éloignées de leurs familles et dépossédées de leurs biens. Ces conflits ont aussi exacerbé les rancoeurs, détruit la confiance citoyenne, entamé le tissu social, sur fond de violations massives du droit international des droits de l’homme et de violations graves du droit international humanitaire. SOURCE: Centre International pour la Justice Transitionnelle Centre International pour la Justice Transitionnelle Wed, 02 Jul 2008 17:05:15 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25208 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25208 The second round of Zimbabwe’s presidential election is scheduled for the end of June 2008. There has been a sharp increase in state sponsored violence since the first round in March (ICG May 2008), coming after almost a decade marked by violence, intimidation and impunity for which the state itself has been primarily responsible. One of the principal issues for any future political transition will be whether – and how – to formally and publicly deal with past systematic and widespread human rights abuses. This is moreover a core political issue now, not simply a collateral legal or moral one to be left until later. Part of the challenge is to map a way between sheer moral and legal principle and mere political pragmatism (Emmanuel 2007). One transitional justice option is to now flag, and then later establish, a truth and reconciliation commission which might give incentives to people at various levels to denounce violence and cooperate in peacebuilding, but which need not rule out criminal prosecutions where appropriate. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies Institute for Security Studies Wed, 02 Jul 2008 17:02:24 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25207 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25207 Council members are discussing a draft resolution circulated on 27 June by Libya which addresses the Israeli decision to expand its settlements in the Palestinian Territory. It seems that there will be a period of discussions in Informal Consultations. But it is possible that the co-sponsors will move to put the resolution to a vote. The Council has a past history of firm action against settlements but in recent years it has been silent. Indeed no resolution has been adopted by the Council on the Israel/Palestine question since resolution 1544 of 19 May 2004. (Our Special Research Report “The Middle East 1947-2007: Sixty Years of Security Council Engagement on the Israel/Palestine Question” of 17 December 2007 provides a detailed history of the Council’s involvement in this issue.) SOURCE: Security Council Report Security Council Report