Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Asia-Pacific". Fri, 04 Jul 2008 0:30:22 +0000 Fri, 04 Jul 2008 0:30:22 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:16:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25259 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25259 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 through part of FY2008 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $524 billion (75%), OEF about $141 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (4%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of April 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.1 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.3 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:14:11 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25258 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25258 The Gaza Strip is currently undergoing a humanitarian crisis which includes the widespread denial of economic, social and cultural rights. This humanitarian crisis has been precipitated by sanctions imposed on the Gaza administration by both Israel and Western countries and Israel’s closure of Gaza’s border crossings which amounts to a blockade on the territory. This position paper describes violations of the human right to water and sanitation in Gaza that have been caused or exacerbated by the sanctions and blockade in the period from January 2006 to the present. Due to financial and economic sanctions, the blockade preventing spare parts from entering Gaza and the fuel restrictions, water provision has been intermittent in certain areas for a number of months, with some people facing cuts of up to eighteen hours per day. Rising levels of poverty have also meant that many households are struggling to pay for clean drinking water and can no longer afford the cost of emptying their septic tanks, leading to the overflow of sewage which threatens public health. This already dire situation is rapidly deteriorating. Since January 2008, due to a lack of fuel, the Gaza Power Generating Company has had to cut the power supply, leaving Gaza’s 1.5 million people with daily power cuts of up to eight hours reducing access to drinking water, especially for those who live in high rise buildings which require electricity to pump the water to higher levels. On 20 January 2008, the Gaza power plant was shut down and Gaza City was plunged into darkness. The Coastal Municipal Water Utility, the water service provider in Gaza, recently announced that if fuel did not arrive by 22 January 2008, the water and sewage systems of one and a half million people would cease to operate. This could cause a massive health crisis and the outbreak of water-borne disease. On 21 January 2008, the Palestinian Water Authority acknowledged that 40 percent of the houses in the Gaza Strip had no running water and the following day reports emerged that sewage was flooding the streets. SOURCE: Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:07:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25257 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25257 With the recent political changes that have taken place in Nepal, it is only natural to look to the future with hope for beneficial changes and the quick and successful institutionalization of a Democratic Republic. In the past, Nepal has received national and international criticism regarding its failure to comply with its human rights obligations and has been accused of not having the necessary political will to address the numerous cases of human rights violations, including torture. The deep-rooted culture of impunity is posing a serious threat to the on-going peace process. Perpetrators of human rights violations are promoted by the political system and are not brought to justice. Nepal has responded to these accusations, especially on torture, by quoting its domestic legislation, the Torture Compensation Act of 1996 (TCA), claiming that this Act places Nepal in compliance with its international obligations. However, a brief examination of this law shows that not only does it fail to meet international standards by neglecting to criminalize the act of torture, but it also is not adequately addressing the needs of the victims of torture it was enacted to assist. SOURCE: Advocacy Forum Advocacy Forum Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:04:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25256 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25256 When did violence first begin in the region we now know as Indonesia? Indeed it is difficult to determine this. However, in the collective memory of Indonesians, particularly the Javanese, discussions on violence and political intrigue will often refer to the case of Tunggul Ametung and Ken Arok in Java. There are other cases from other kingdoms of the day, however this is the most famous. In the 13th century, when Tunggul Ametung was in power in Java, an intriguing incident took place at the palace of Tumapel. Ken Arok, one of the palace guards known for his history of committing robbery, murdered Tunggul Ametung and walked away from the murder while Kebo Ijo, another palace guard, was punished after being falsely accused of the murder (Saini, 2000:12-13). Violence was not only recorded in Java but also in other kingdoms at the time, including Aceh. Before the Europeans came to the archipelago, rulers and even locals were already familiar with the term which foreign observers call “amok”, such as the case in Banten in 1648, when a person ran amok in the market and murdered several people. It seems, however, that the incidents of violence which took place before the arrival of the Europeans were caused either by the elites or by the citizenry, and thus cannot be described as systematic or state-based violence. SOURCE: Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity // University of Oxford Centre for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity // University of Oxford Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:58:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25254 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25254 In the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 raids on New York City and Washington D.C., the Western media thundered damnation at the governments of the United States and its allies for having failed to take seriously the growth in post-Cold War national security threats from transnational Islamist groups. The media mercilessly attacked the “group-think” of Western governments for their continued focus on threats from nation-states—Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, etc.—and their on-again, off-again concern with the threat from al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies. The media’s bottom-line was accurate: The fall of the Berlin Wall had not been recognized by Western governments as the end of reliable peace under the umbrella of Mutually Assured Destruction and that the 9/11 attacks made it plain that the relatively peaceful, largely predictable Cold War-era was over for good. The media’s post-9/11 argument was an essential wake-up call to those wielding power in the West, but it appears, in retrospect, to have been ineffective. Washington and many of its allies continue to focus on nation-state threats—witness the war in Iraq and the apparently nearing war with Iran—while addressing the transnational Islamist threat symbolized by al-Qaeda half-heartedly as if they had time to end the threat at their leisure. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:56:49 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25253 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25253 In an interview with Italian newspaper Il Tempo, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani stated that “the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] is not a terrorist organization.” Barzani also added that “if the PKK rejects Turkey’s commitment to hold talks with it, the PKK can be then considered as terrorist” (Il Tempo, June 21). Peyamner, the official media organ of Barzani’s political party (the Kurdistan Democratic Party—KDP), did not report on his statements, although the other main Iraqi Kurdish political party (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—PUK) did post a story containing the interview (PUKMedia, June 22). Naturally, Turkish media immediately picked up on Barzani’s statement (Hurriyet, June 23; Today’s Zaman, June 24; Milliyet, June 24). This was not the first time that KRG President Barzani refused to characterize the PKK as a terrorist group. As recently as October 2007, Turkish newspapers reported on an interview Barzani gave to CNN in which he made almost identical statements, emphasizing that he did not see the PKK as a terrorist organization, but “if in order to solve the [Kurdish] problem Turkey proposed a peaceful path and the PKK rejected this, then I would agree that the PKK is a terrorist organization. At the moment, however, this is not the case” (Radikal, October 22, 2007). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:55:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25251 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25251 Approximately a year has passed since the outbreak of violence between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the armed Islamist group Fatah al-Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in Northern Lebanon; and yet—one year later—the situation in the camps is far from being stable. On the contrary, episodes of violence have spread to the Ain al-Hilweh camp, and the conflict has broadened to include other Salafist factions, such as Jund al-Sham, or Asbat al-Ansar (Daily Star [Beirut], June 17). In the past few months fighting has resumed in the Ain al-Hilweh camp, the largest Palestinian camp in Lebanon, located near the southern city of Sidon. Accordingly, Ain al-Hilweh—traditionally a foothold of Fatah and the former operating base of Yasser Arafat in the 1980s—is now increasingly under the control of Islamist groups (Ya Libnan, June 15). Among such factions, one of the most active has certainly been Jund al-Sham. Jund al-Sham, literally “the Army of Greater Syria,” is a splinter group of Asbat al-Ansar, a Salafist movement founded in the late 1980s by Palestinian cleric Shaykh Hisham Shreidi in the northern camp of Nahr al-Bared. This takfiri group is mostly Lebanese, although it includes some Palestinian fighters (Naharnet, May 31). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:54:05 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25250 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25250 Iraqi radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has issued a statement describing a new strategy for attacking Coalition forces (alkufanews.com, June 13). The statement follows a year of intense military pressure against his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and a series of confusing and sometimes contradictory decisions. The hard-line cleric, who has not been seen in public for months, issued orders to reorganize his militia into a civilian branch and a small but select armed wing commissioned to fight Coalition forces. Only three months earlier al-Sadr had announced his retirement and admitted failure in his efforts at “liberating Iraq” (see Terrorism Monitor, May 1). Muqtada’s statement was proclaimed in the mosques by his aides during the weekly prayer of his followers on Friday, June 13 (almanar.com, June 13). A written copy—signed the previous day—was published on a pro-Sadr web site: “Everyone knows that we will not abandon the resistance against the occupiers until liberation or death, but you individuals in Jaysh al-Mahdi should know, and this is an obligation on you, that the resistance will be restricted to a group which will be authorized by a written statement by me soon. Those will be people with experience, management, awareness and sacrifice. They would have a prior permission—firstly from the religious ruler through their appointed command and secondly from the supreme command—through secret and private structures. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:51:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25248 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25248 The Security Council this morning renewed the mandate for a period of six months until 31 December 2008 of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which has supervised the ceasefire between Israel and Syria since 1974. Unanimously adopting resolution 1821 (2008), the Council called for the implementation of its resolution 338 of 1973, which required immediate negotiations between the parties with the aim of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In conjunction with the adoption of today’s resolution, a statement was also read out by Zalmay Khalilzad of the United States, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council in June, reiterating that tension would remain until such a just and lasting peace could be reached. In his latest report on UNDOF (see background), Secretary-General Ban Ki‑moon recommended the extension of the Force, noting that, while the situation in the Golan Heights has been “generally quiet” and Israel and Syria had even conducted indirect peace talks, the overall region remains tense. Mr. Ban also drew attention to nearly $15 million in unpaid assessments for UNDOF’s funding. SOURCE: United Nations Security Council United Nations Security Council Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:46:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25246 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25246 As the U.S. military engagement entered its sixth year in mid-March, Iraq finally seemed in many ways to be turning a corner toward stabilization. Even jaundiced journalists were conceding that the military surge, which had taken effect by the summer of 2007, was significantly helping security. Whole neighborhoods had returned to a more normal commercial and social life. Terrorist acts were way down, with multiple-fatality bombings dropping by more than two-thirds from their peak in the bloody year of 2006. With the change in American force levels and military strategy, the average daily death toll of Iraqis dropped from more than 100 a day to 20. The improvement was palpable. Iraqi police and military deaths fell from a peak of 300 in April 2007 to 110 in February 2008. Deaths of U.S. soldiers also dropped sharply, from more than 100 per month in late 2006 and early 2007 to under 40 per month in late 2007 and early 2008. But these casualties still were painful losses. American troops continued to suffer wounds, both physical and psychological; 600 –700 Iraqis were dying every month; and the violence in Iraq had declined only to the still-serious level of insecurity that prevailed in 2005. SOURCE: Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:44:51 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25245 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25245 There seems to be a growing, renewed animus against Israel. Arun Gandhi, grandson of the purported humanist Mohandas Gandhi, thinks Israel and Jews in general are prone to, and singularly responsible for, most of the world ’s violence. The Oxford Union took up the question in January of whether Israel even has a right to continue to exist. Our generation no longer speaks of a “Palestinian problem” but rather of an “Israeli problem.” So perhaps it is time for a new global approach to deal with Israel and its occupation. Perhaps we ought to broaden our multinational and multicultural horizons by transcending the old comprehensive settlements, road maps, and other arrangements when dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, a dispute that originated with the creation of Israel. Why not simply hold an international conference on all these issues—albeit in a far more global context, outside the Middle East? The ensuing general accords and principles could be applied to Israel and the West Bank, where the number of people involved, the casualties incurred, and the number of refugees affected are far smaller and far more manageable. SOURCE: Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:36:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25242 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25242 In "The Price of the Surge" (May/June 2008), Steven Simon correctly observes that the Sunni turn against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), known as the Sunni Awakening, has been a key factor in security progress during the period of "the surge." Simon is also on point when he notes that the Awakening, which began before the surge, was not a direct consequence of additional U.S. troops. But although Simon gets much of the past right, he ultimately draws the wrong lessons for U.S. policy moving forward. Rather than unilaterally and unconditionally withdrawing from Iraq and hoping that the international community will fill the void and push the Iraqis toward accommodation -- a very unlikely scenario -- the United States must embrace a policy of "conditional engagement." This approach would couple a phased redeployment of combat forces with a commitment to providing residual support for the Iraqi government if and only if it moves toward genuine reconciliation. Conditional engagement -- rather than Simon's policy of unconditional disengagement -- would incorporate the real lesson from the Sunni Awakening. SOURCE: Center for a New American Security // Foreign Affairs Center for a New American Security // Foreign Affairs Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:35:05 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25241 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25241 After a three-month futile courtship with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ( TTP) headed by Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan, the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) headed by Maulana Fazlullah of the Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and other jihadi organisations, the Pakistani Government headed by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has ordered a clean-up operation in the Khyber Agency and South Waziristan of the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and in the Swat Valley. The operation started on June 28, 2008, in the Khyber Agency. While the resumed clean-up operation in South Waziristan and the Swat Valley is meant to put down recrudescence of jihadi terrorism by the TTP and the TNSM, which is a member of the TTP, the new clean-up operation in the Khyber Agency is designed to put down inter-sectarian, inter-tribal and inter-Mullah clashes, which have already caused a large number of deaths in the Khyber Agency and are threatening to spread to Peshawar, the capital of the NWFP. The Khyber Agency, which is adjoining Peshawar, has been seeing increasing attacks by local tribal jihadi groups on convoys carrying oil and other essential supplies for the NATO forces in Afghanistan from the Karachi port. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group South Asia Analysis Group Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:33:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25240 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25240 If one is required to evaluate India’s record in its counter-terrorism efforts in one word, the answer has to be “mixed”, but that would not do justice to the issue. India is widely accepted to be the most affected country from “terrorism” (according to the current wide definition of the word), in terms of casualties, duration of the challenges, types of terrorism (and their causes) etc.; and its counter-terrorism responses have necessarily been varied. Each of these requires to be evaluated separately and I shall make a quick effort. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group South Asia Analysis Group Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:33:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25239 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25239 Years back when I was a young officer in the Regiment of Artillery, our regiment moved from New Mal in Eastern India to Deolali in Western India. On the day of our departure we trooped into the railway station with our trucks, baggage, stores and all the men at 6 am in the morning. Our special train was scheduled to leave at 11 am. We sweated in the heat in the roofless station but the train earmarked for us was nowhere in sight. The hapless station master could do nothing. Around one pm we were informed the train would be placed by 5 pm. It came at 7 pm and we were kept busy loading it for next three hours because we were told the train would leave by 10 pm. But it did not even when the clock struck twelve. I was the train duty officer and ran around trying to find the railway staff that had vanished. Around 12 am I collared the station master in his house. “The train is ready for a long time to leave, sir,” he said. I was furious; “then why doesn’t it leave,” I thundered brimming with military efficiency. He walked over to the station and told me, “sir, train is there, but power has not come.” My uni-polar military brain could not understand the term ‘power’. “What ‘power’ do you mean?” I asked. He said “sir, you call it the engine, we call it power - the one that pulls the coaches, that has not arrived.” By the time ‘power’ came, a new dawn was on the horizon and we reached our destination two days late. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group South Asia Analysis Group Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:19:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25236 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25236 This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations. SOURCE: RAND Corporation RAND Corporation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:01:19 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25233 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25233 This issue of FMR aims to help bring the crisis of forced displacement of Burmese people back into the international spotlight. With the ‘Saffron Revolution’ of September 2007, Burma was catapulted into the centre of international attention. It was briefly headline news as people monitored the regime’s response and watched for hints of progress towards democracy and the restoration of rights. With little action on either front (and no visible resurgence of violence or protest), interest has since waned. The September protests, led by Buddhist monks, were sparked by a sudden increase in oil prices which had a serious impact on the already impoverished population. After a few days, the government violently ended what it called the “disruption of stability”. Governments around the world condemned the crackdown and the UN Secretary-General sent Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari to negotiate with the Burmese rulers. At the same time, however, China and Russia used their right of veto in the UN Security Council to block discussion of matters which they considered to be internal to Burma, no ‘threat to international security’ – and therefore outside the mandate of the Security Council. SOURCE: Forced Migration Review Forced Migration Review Thu, 03 Jul 2008 14:54:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25232 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25232 On December 17, 2007, eighty-seven countries and international organizations met in Paris and pledged to provide $7.4 billion over three years to the Palestinian Authority (PA), an amount far in excess of any previous level of U.S. or European aid to the Palestinians. The conference participants justified the aid as a means of providing "immediate support to the entire Palestinian population," and as a reward intended to strengthen those Palestinians who favor peaceful coexistence with Israel. In the midst of the effort in Paris to bestow unprecedented sums of foreign aid on the Palestinians, there was little discussion of the unintended consequences — often deadly ones — of previous aid regimens. The recent history of foreign assistance shows a distinct correlation between aid and violence. Perhaps aid itself does not cause violence, but there is strong evidence that it contributes to a culture of corruption, government malfeasance, and terrorism that has had lethal consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians over the past decade. SOURCE: Middle East Institute Middle East Institute Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:23:39 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25228 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25228 In early March 2008, an organization called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) announced on a Turkish website, that Cüneyt Çiftçi, a Turk born and living in Germany had carried out a suicide attack on American and Afghan troops in the Afghan province of Paktika. The website showed pictures of Çiftçi while training for and preparing the attack. This announcement marked the first peak of an intensive public relations campaign that the IJU began in September 2007. In April 2008, Çiftçi's video was followed by one of a German convert training in an IJU camp in Pakistan, Eric Breininger, who called for Muslims living in Germany to join the "Jihad" against the West. In a bid to gain access to new recruits and funds the organization tries to present itself on the Internet as a transnational organization with supporters in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Europe. Its main recruitment target, however, seem to be young Turks and Germans. This became evident after three of its members were arrested in the Sauerland town of Oberschledorn in the German state of North-Rhine Westphalia in September 2007. They were suspected of planning bomb attacks on American and possibly Uzbek targets in Germany. The planned attack in Germany sought to support the struggle of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan by attempting to swing the German debate on extending the parliamentary mandates for the deployment of the German Army in Afghanistan (OEF and ISAF). The IJU leadership apparently calculated that high-profile attacks just before the Bundestag votes in October and November 2007 could prevent an extension and force the withdrawal of German troops. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have long regarded Germany as the weakest link in the chain of major troop providers and wanted to exploit growing criticism of the campaign in Afghanistan in the German public sphere. SOURCE: Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Strategic Insights // Center for Contemporary Conflict Thu, 03 Jul 2008 13:06:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25223 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25223 Most research to date on Islamic charities has given special attention to political aspects, which inevitably come to the fore in conflict zones and in areas of mixed religious affiliations (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, Ghandour 2002, Soares and Otayek 2007). But whereas we should not exclude the political dimension from analysis of any humanitarian aid, of whatever ideological provenance, it would be unjustified to lay so much stress on it in the Muslim case that the question of efficacity was sidelined. There is an increasing recognition of the importance of Faith Based Organizations and their role in the international aid system (Duriez et al. 2007, Clarke and Jennings 2008, Rakodi 2007). Few would question that Christian NGOs such as CAFOD and Christian Aid are often able to make advantageous use of their confessional networks in majority Christian areas such as southern Africa and Latin America. Islamic charities in general – apart from a few UK-based ones – have experienced considerable difficulties since 9/11 owing to suspicions on the part of some Western governments that they have been used as fronts for terrorist activities. Steps are being taken, for instance by the Swiss Government, to try to have obstacles from bona fide Islamic charities removed. No research as far as I am aware has been undertaken to evaluate, let alone quantify, the damage that this campaign against Islamic charities has done to the interests of their beneficiaries – such as the many thousands of orphans that they have sponsored – and potential beneficiaries. It must also remain a matter for speculation how powerful a force in the humanitarian movement the Islamic charities might become if they were encouraged to develop their potential as a vehicle for redistribution of resources and disaster response and preparedness in the Muslim world. SOURCE: Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Journal of Humanitarian Assistance Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:56:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25220 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25220 Lebanon is going through a critical period of its history. The security vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Syrian forces in 2005, the campaign of political violence and assassinations of leading public figures, the continued presence of armed militias operating from Lebanon outside the authority of the state and supported by external actors, and the recent war between Lebanon and Israel emphasize the necessity and importance of rebuilding Lebanon's security sector to address challenges that could fatally threaten stbility in Lebanon and its neighborhood. Most recently, the battle opposing the Lebanese Army to jihadi fighters in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared illustrated both the potential of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a stabilizing actor and the structural challenges it suffers from: an overstretched force, poor managerial and strategic skills at the top, inadequate equipment and training, poor coordination among security agencies and perennial concerns about force cohesion. SOURCE: The Henry L Stimson Center The Henry L Stimson Center Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:51:33 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25219 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25219 The Indonesian Supreme Court recently overturned the conviction of pro-government militia leader Eurico Guterres, who had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. Guterres was among 18 people indicted by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. With his recent release, all 18 defendants have now been acquitted. In light of the stalled release of the bi-lateral Commission for Truth and Friendship's final report, and the recent commutations of sentence provided to prisoners convicted of serious crimes in Timor-Leste, the Indonesian Court's acquittal of Eurico Guterres is another set-back for justice. The ICTJ strongly criticizes the Court's decisions and urges the UN secretary-general to address the issue of justice for the 1999 crimes committed in East Timor at the UN Security Council. SOURCE: International Center for Transitional Justice International Center for Transitional Justice Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:38:11 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25213 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25213 The present report is the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It provides a comprehensive assessment of the steps taken to implement resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report of the Secretary-General was issued on 28 February 2008 (S/2008/135) and highlights both the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and areas of concern that continue to impede the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution between the parties. The present report also proposes measures that could be undertaken by the parties in the coming months with a view to achieving a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the 2006 conflict. The reporting period was characterized for the most part by the continuation of the prolonged political crisis in Lebanon, which culminated early in May in an extremely serious deterioration of the domestic security situation. In protest of two Government decisions taken on 6 May 2008, Hizbullah and other opposition groups took control of and closed roads leading to Beirut International Airport as well as other key roads in parts of the capital. In response, pro-Government groups closed the main border crossing between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Those actions brought the country to a standstill. Armed clashes between opposition and pro-Government groups, which on occasion included the use of heavy weapons, spread rapidly in several parts of the country. During the clashes that occurred from 8 to 13 May 2008, 69 people died, including a number of civilians, and more than 180 were injured. SOURCE: United Nations Secretary General Report United Nations Secretary General Report Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:24:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25210 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25210 The recent death of Corporal Sarah Bryant, the first British servicewoman to die on a "deliberate" operation in Afghanistan, attracted much attention from the UK print media [i] . Though killed alongside Corporal Sean Reeve, Lance Corporal Richard Larkin and Paul Stout, images and tributes to Corporal Bryant, the only woman casualty, have filled the most column inches. One explanation for this is that at least two of the servicemen who died in the same incident are suspected to have belonged to clandestine units and their families have requested privacy whilst they grieve [ii] . Another is that Bryant’s death is particularly newsworthy as a rare occurrence. Since the end of the Second World War, relatively few servicewomen have become combat causalities, and though overstretch means that the military increasingly claim to "select people on the basis of what they can do, not on the basis of their gender", until just over a decade ago servicewomen were generally confined to auxiliary roles [iii] . However, images of a smiling Sarah Bryant and tributes from a grieving mother, father, widower and colleagues - are more than individual reactions to the premature death of a young, bright loved one. They reveal wider cultural discomfort towards the death of a young, bright servicewoman as a direct result of conflict. They also demonstrate the significance of gender to the legitimation of the ‘war on terror’. Tributes to Corporal Sarah Bryant may vary from article to article but her death has elicited some clear, salient, gendered reactions. SOURCE: E-International Relations E-International Relations Wed, 02 Jul 2008 17:02:24 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25207 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25207 Council members are discussing a draft resolution circulated on 27 June by Libya which addresses the Israeli decision to expand its settlements in the Palestinian Territory. It seems that there will be a period of discussions in Informal Consultations. But it is possible that the co-sponsors will move to put the resolution to a vote. The Council has a past history of firm action against settlements but in recent years it has been silent. Indeed no resolution has been adopted by the Council on the Israel/Palestine question since resolution 1544 of 19 May 2004. (Our Special Research Report “The Middle East 1947-2007: Sixty Years of Security Council Engagement on the Israel/Palestine Question” of 17 December 2007 provides a detailed history of the Council’s involvement in this issue.) SOURCE: Security Council Report Security Council Report Wed, 02 Jul 2008 17:00:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25206 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25206 After more than 7 years of activities, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was officially closed down on 29 February 2008 following the Council decision in June 2007 to terminate its mandate. On 9 June 2008, the Secretary-General presented a final account of the activities of UNMOVIC, in particular progress achieved regarding the future of UNMOVIC’s archives and other property, and financial issues related to its closure. The Council is expected to welcome and approve the report in a letter. SOURCE: Security Council Report Security Council Report Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:44:47 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25204 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25204 There is no internationally agreed definition of ‘human security’. As a consequence, this report adopts a flexible definition: ‘human security is achieved when the vital core of all human lives is safeguarded from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment’. This encompasses both ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’, but allows researchers to identify how individuals and communities understand their own security. This is because it is not appropriate to conceive of security solely in terms of crime and justice or basic needs. This research identifies eight categories of human security in Bangladesh. Four of these are largely concerned with ‘freedom from want’; the others with fear’. It should be noted, however, that this grouping is not precise, and there are many links across categories. Freedom from want: economic security; health security; food security; and environmental security. Freedom from fear: personal security; security from misuse of drugs and alcohol; tenure security; and political security. The majority of Bangladeshis perceive ‘freedom from want’ issues as having the largest impact on their daily security. In the household survey, people were first asked which social issues were the biggest problems. The most common answers were poverty (69 percent) and unemployment (65 percent), closely followed by provision of utilities (56 percent) and vulnerability to natural disasters (51 percent). It should be noted that in this report, the term ‘poverty’ is used to refer to both quantitative and qualitative deprivation. By contrast, elements of insecurity which could be classified as ‘freedom from fear’ (for example, crime, extortion, availability of firearms) came further down the list, with crime rating as one of the five main concerns of about one third of Bangladeshis. SOURCE: Saferworld Saferworld Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:40:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25203 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25203 Since 2003, the media has documented the rising civilian death toll in Iraq. A few reports have described the increase in violence against women. However, most government, UN and human rights organisations’ reports fail to disaggregate the numbers of casualties and injured or accounts of violence by sex and, accordingly, it is almost impossible to know the incidence of gender-based attacks. The issue of disaggregated data is decisive; without a complete understanding of who is being targeted and the nature of the violence, it is difficult to analyse the crisis accurately or to optimise the protection response. However, the Iraqi Ministry of Health (MoH) does not publish statistics about whom or even how many Iraqis are being killed. And, as crimes against women and girls are not reported because of stigma, fear of retaliation/re-victimisation (‘honour killing’) or lack of confidence in the police to investigate the complaint, where data is available, it is reasonable to assume that the actual number of women who are attacked, abducted, raped and killed is much higher than the data indicates. SOURCE: NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:15:15 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25198 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25198 Many of the current global policy changes from climate change and development aid to natural disaster response to the protection of civilians in armed conflict can only be addressed with the involvement of long established and emerging powers in this world. This is one of the reasons why both the Security Council and the G8 are under pressure to reform and broaden their membership. But already for the existing permanent members of these two influential fora many concerns are raised about the democratic accountability of the policies that they pursue individually or jointly. Before the background of UN Security Council and G8 reform this paper explores the current capacity of the foreign policy process in India and South Africa to be accountable for the policies these two important countries pursue in their different regions and at global level. In both cases the organisational capacity of Parliament as a body corporate, and the political incentives for individual parliamentarians to get more strongly engaged in parliamentary oversight of foreign policy are weak. SOURCE: One World Trust One World Trust Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:09:51 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25197 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25197 The southern Philippines have long been a breeding ground for terrorist activity. Militant organizations like the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) operate in the Sulu archipelago and easternmost island of Mindanao, where a rugged terrain, weak rule of law, sense of grievance among the country's Muslim minority, and poverty make it difficult for the government to root them out. In recent years, the Philippine government has made significant progress in combating terrorism, due in part to counterterrorism aid provided by the United States. But experts are concerned by what appears to be increasing cooperation among the Abu Sayyaf Group, several major MILF commands, and elements of the Southeast Asian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah. Counterterrorism progress in the region remains difficult, and the Philippines remains vulnerable to penetration by extremist networks like al-Qaeda. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:06:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25196 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25196 At the beginning of the Oslo Process the greatest challenge was the question of Palestinian statehood; negotiation of the refugee issue was postponed until the later stages. Over a decade later, Palestinian statehood is generally accepted as a given, and the refugee issue has taken centre stage. The Israeli perspective, from a leadership standpoint, is seemingly characterized by a sense of being overwhelmed, owing to the complexity of elements making up the refugee issue, the multiplicity of actors involved, and a heightened sense of uncertainty as to the consequences of any negotiated settlement. More strategic work is needed at the political and policy-making level to determine the resolution level required for the agreement itself. Much of the detail involved will have to be developed outside the main negotiation framework. SOURCE: Chatham House Chatham House Wed, 02 Jul 2008 16:04:24 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25195 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25195 The question of Palestinian refugees has long been one of the most difficult issues in dispute in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. With the onset of renewed peace talks following the Annapolis summit of November 2007, it is once again an issue that the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators must address. The two sides are in a worse position to resolve the issue than they were during the last rounds of permanent status negotiations in 2000-01. The political weakness of the Israeli and Palestinian governments is compounded by heightened mistrust between the two societies, as well as by a hardening of Israeli public attitudes against even the symbolic return of any refugees to Israeli territory. There is now a substantial accumulated body of work on the Palestinian refugee issue to guide and inform negotiators and policy-makers. This includes past official negotiations among the key parties, wider discussions among regional states and the international donor community, unofficial and Track II initiatives and a considerable body of technical analysis. SOURCE: Chatham House Chatham House Wed, 02 Jul 2008 15:04:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25190 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25190 Depuis le 10 mars 2008, parallèlement aux mesures de répression prises par la police et l'armée contre les manifestants tibétains, de graves violations des droits humains ont été signalées dans la région autonome du Tibet ainsi que dans les régions tibétaines des provinces voisines. Les premières manifestations de Tibétains dans ces régions semblent avoir été pacifiques, mais elles ont pris plus tard un caractère violent. Amnesty International est préoccupée par le fait que, pour rétablir l'ordre, les autorités chinoises ont pris des mesures contraires à la législation et aux normes internationales relatives aux droits humains. Elles auraient, entre autres, fait un usage non nécessaire et excessif de la force, en ayant recours notamment à la force meurtrière, à la détention arbitraire et à l'intimidation. SOURCE: Amnesty International Amnesty International Wed, 02 Jul 2008 15:01:28 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25189 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25189 Alors qu'il reste à peine plus de quatre mois avant l'ouverture des Jeux olympiques de Pékin, la Chine n'a pas adopté de réforme susceptible d'améliorer de manière significative la situation des droits humains dans le pays. La réalité de ce constat est manifeste au vu des difficultés rencontrées par tous les militants et journalistes qui tentent courageusement de faire connaître les atteintes aux droits fondamentaux toujours commises en Chine et demandent au gouvernement d'y remédier. SOURCE: Amnesty International Amnesty International Wed, 02 Jul 2008 14:36:40 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25185 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25185 Today, Iran and Israel are under the international spotlight for assumed or suspected nuclear weapons programmes, outside or in spite of the global non-proliferation regime. Over a dozen Arab states have announced plans to develop nuclear power programmes and are in various stages of negotiations or research and development. France, the Russian Federation and the United States are once again key players seeking to influence nuclear developments in the Middle East, this time joined by international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and newcomers such as Japan. Leaders and alliances aside, today's political context differs in at least one significant way from that of three decades ago. The international community has a clearly identified and universally agreed vision for the Middle East: 3 a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This vision, or goal, has been confirmed at the highest political levels and by all states in the region. It would turn the Middle East into the first freely negotiated WMD-free zone (WMDFZ), improving on the already existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) elsewhere around the world by incorporating the de facto link among nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, a link that is particularly pertinent to security dynamics in the Middle East. SOURCE: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Wed, 02 Jul 2008 14:31:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25183 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25183 Many followers of Middle East1 affairs will be familiar with the term "Track Two Diplomacy", particularly in dialogues between Israelis and Palestinians. However, there is also another, less well-known, field of Track Two activity under way in the absence of an official regional dialogue on security issues and arms control. This paper will review the phenomenon of Track Two on regional security issues in the Middle East and analyse the difficult question of how to measure the success, or even impact, of such processes. The paper begins with a brief analysis of Track Two diplomacy, which outlines the differences between traditional Track Two (aimed at bilateral dispute resolution) and regional security dialogues. The paper then comments on the only official regional security process in the region, the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group process, and situates regional security Track Two in relation to it. Briefly referencing the main Track Two projects on security issues under way in the region (which are described elsewhere), the paper analyses how these dialogues make their impact. The paper concludes with thoughts on where Middle East regional security Track Two may be going. SOURCE: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Wed, 02 Jul 2008 12:18:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25178 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25178 Incredible India : le slogan de « l’Inde qui gagne », le marketing conquérant du XXIème siècle, l’image idéale (disons idéalisée…) d’un pays qu’il s’agit de promouvoir toute affaire cessante, fut-ce au prix de quelques réductions et de focus exagérément flatteurs. Spots télé et cinéma, plaquettes dans les avions, publicité dans les magazines les plus en vue et posters géants dans les aéroports d’Asie et d’ailleurs : la philosophie décidée, novatrice, d’une nation émergente qui entend gagner au plus tôt le premier cercle des grands acteurs contemporains, être consultée et entendue. Or, de la volonté à la faisabilité, du concept à la réalité, il peut y avoir, dans la patrie de feu Gandhi comme ailleurs, bien loin de la coupe aux lèvres. La riche actualité de ces dernières semaines renvoie semble-t-il une image bien différente, plus fragile et moins glamour, de la « plus grande démocratie du monde », à des années lumières des paillettes et des mirages de Bollywood. SOURCE: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques Wed, 02 Jul 2008 11:57:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25177 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25177 Dans le maelstrom d’une actualité asiatique dense et variée (catastrophes naturelles, attentats, conflit, manifestations), nous l’avions temporairement perdue de vue. L’Indonésie, le plus grand état archipélagique du monde (17 506 iles), 4eme pays le plus peuplé de la planète et 1ère nation musulmane par la démographie, s’était faite discrète, presque anonyme. A la « faveur » de diverses manifestations d’humeur de la rue, Jakarta réapparait sous les feux de l’actualité asiatique. Ainsi, la semaine passée (24–26 juin), des manifestations étudiantes surviennent en divers points de l’ancienne Batavia, alimentées à la fois par la décision gouvernementale d’augmenter le prix de l’énergie (+30 % pour le gasoil) intervenue un mois plus tôt (23 mai), et le décès d’un étudiant à Jakarta (victime de violence policière). Plusieurs milliers d’étudiants se mobilisent en divers lieux de la capitale (Parlement, Atma Jaya University), une équation instable générant des débordements violents (dégradation de biens ; heurts avec les forces de l’ordre ; dizaines de blessés), une réponse « musclée » de la part des autorités, une restriction momentanée de déplacement et une contraction de l’activité économique dans les quartiers concernés. SOURCE: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques Wed, 02 Jul 2008 11:49:08 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25176 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25176 Mongolia, with a population of approximately three million, is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy. Observers noted minor irregularities in the 2005 presidential elections. Parliament (the State Great Hural), with the agreement of the president, selects the prime minister, who is nominated by the majority party. In November parliament confirmed S. Bayar of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) as prime minister, and a new coalition government was formed. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces, but there reportedly were a few instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of government authority. The government generally respected the human rights of its citizens; however, the following human rights problems were noted: police abuse of prisoners and detainees; impunity; poor conditions in detention centers; arbitrary arrest, lengthy detention, and corruption within the judicial system; criminal defamation laws applied to journalists; continued refusal by some provinces to register Christian churches; sweeping secrecy laws and a lack of transparency; domestic violence against women; international trafficking of persons; and some domestic cases of child prostitution. SOURCE: United States Department of State United States Department of State Wed, 02 Jul 2008 11:31:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25172 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25172 Genève/Colombo (CICR) - Ces derniers mois, des civils ont été la cible de nouvelles attaques dans différentes régions de Sri Lanka. Au cours des trois derniers mois, au moins 80 civils ont perdu la vie lors d'attaques sans discrimination contre des transports publics ou des lieux publics bondés. Les tensions causées par les élections provinciales ont également exacerbé la situation dans l'est du pays, où les actes de violence ont fait plusieurs morts, dont neuf personnes tuées dans l'explosion d'une bombe à Ampara, le 9 mai dernier. De son côté, le CICR a continué de recevoir de nombreuses allégations selon lesquelles des civils auraient été directement visés, victimes d’homicides, d’agressions, d’arrestations ou de disparitions. L'institution a rappelé aux parties au conflit que le droit international humanitaire interdit toute attaque contre des civils et qu'elles sont tenues de prendre toutes les mesures possibles pour protéger en tout temps les civils contre les effets du conflit. SOURCE: Comité International de la Croix-Rouge Comité International de la Croix-Rouge Wed, 02 Jul 2008 10:21:16 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25168 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25168 L'édition 2008 du Rapport mondial sur les drogues, lancée aujourd'hui par le Directeur exécutif de l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDC), Antonio Maria Costa, indique que la récente stabilisation du marché mondial des drogues est mise à mal. L'augmentation massive de la culture de la coca et du pavot à opium et le risque de progression de l'abus de drogues dans les pays en développement menacent de compromettre les progrès accomplis dernièrement dans la lutte contre les drogues. L'édition 2008 du Rapport mondial sur les drogues sonne néanmoins l'alarme face à la forte augmentation de l'offre de drogues observée récemment. En Afghanistan, la récolte de pavot à opium a atteint un niveau record en 2007, en conséquence de quoi la production illégale d'opium à l'échelle mondiale a pratiquement doublé par rapport à 2005. Le pavot est cultivé essentiellement (pour 80 %) dans cinq provinces méridionales, où les insurgés taliban tirent profit du commerce de la drogue. Dans le reste du pays, cette culture est en passe d'être éliminée ou est ramenée à des niveaux faibles. "Grâce à une plus grande stabilité du pays et à une assistance économique accrue, la culture du pavot disparaît de nombreuses provinces afghanes. Dans les zones méridionales, contrôlées par les Taliban, il faut s'attaquer simultanément à la drogue et à l'insurrection", a déclaré le responsable de la lutte contre la drogue à l'ONU. La situation est identique en Colombie, où la culture de la coca a augmenté d'un quart (27 %) en 2007, tout en restant environ 40 % en dessous du niveau record atteint en 2000. La production de feuille de coca et de cocaïne est fortement concentrée géographiquement: 10 municipalités (5 % des 195 que compte le pays) représentent près de la moitié de la production totale de cocaïne (288 tonnes) et un tiers des surfaces cultivées (35 000 hectares). "En Colombie, comme en Afghanistan, les régions où la coca est le plus cultivée sont sous le contrôle d'insurgés", a fait remarquer M. Costa. SOURCE: Nations Unies // l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime Nations Unies // l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:07:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25162 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25162 Increased military action by U.S. forces in Afghanistan to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan's tribal areas is putting a strain on Washington's already tense relationship with Islamabad. A June 10 U.S. air strike (IHT) in which Pakistan's army says eleven of its soldiers died was followed, just weeks later, by NATO forces firing into Pakistan (LAT) after being struck by rockets launched from Pakistani territory. The U.S. and Afghan governments consistently blame militants ensconced in safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas for violence in Afghanistan, even though the Pakistani government says it's doing all it can to prevent such attacks. But now, patience on both sides has frayed. Afghan President Hamid Karzai last week threatened to send troops (Guardian) inside Pakistan to hunt down the militants. On June 25, Afghan officials publicly accused Pakistan’s intelligence service of plotting to assassinate (NYT) Karzai in April, further escalating tensions between the countries. Pakistan called the allegations baseless (AFP). SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:06:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25161 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25161 Military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has undergone a tactical renaissance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Moribund at the end of the Cold War, when concerns about nuclear proliferation and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan diminished Pakistan's importance in the eyes of U.S. policymakers, bilateral military cooperation accelerated during the Bush and Musharraf administrations. In 2006, U.S. arms sales to Islamabad topped $3.5 billion (PDF), nearly matching total purchases by Pakistan during the fifty years prior to 2001. Now, with Pakistan's tribal areas serving as the base of operations for Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, the United States has tried to strengthen these bonds. But U.S. covert military operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border, Washington's unflinching support for President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's political instability, and Islamabad's questionable record on terrorism have thrown one of America's most important military alliances into disarray. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:04:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25160 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25160 The war in Iraq is clearly one of the most important foreign policy issues in this year's presidential campaign. Arguably, it was the issue that single-handedly shaped the parties' nomination battles. The success of Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) rested in large part on his early (and then-unpopular) opposition to the Iraq invasion. Senator John McCain (R-IL) supported the invasion, but he staked his candidacy on his steady criticism of occupation policy and his steadfast (and politically risky) support for the 2007 troop surge. In the general election, the two candidates remain defined by their views on Iraq. As the presidential campaign unfolds, however, the situation in Iraq evolves as well, placing pressure on policy positions the candidates have barely changed over the past 18 months. But even as the candidates struggle to adapt to changing real-world conditions, their policy records will continue to define them. SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association Foreign Policy Association Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:32:20 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25152 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25152 Both Israel and the Hamas movement hoped the lull in Gaza would temper the domestic criticism in their respective arenas emanating from the ongoing civilian hardships on both sides of the border. For Hamas, the tension between the political process and dialogue with Israel has not been a problem at all – on the contrary. On the other hand, the shift in Israeli policy, reflected by the very fact of dialogue between Israel and Hamas, threatens to harm relations between Israel and Fatah, and therefore hinder progress in the political process. Israel has now recognized Hamas as a partner for talks even if so far only on the issue of security. In accordance with the understandings put together with Egyptian mediation, the closure of the Gaza Strip will be gradually lifted in return for a cessation of rocket fire by Hamas and all the other militant factions in the Strip. Halting the rocket fire is clearly designed to obviate Israel’s grounds for the closure and military activity in the Strip. Discussions on opening transit points that connect the Strip with the outside world, in particular the Rafah crossing, and conditions for the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, are to continue in Cairo. For its part, Egypt has undertaken to act against the smuggling of weaponry to Gaza, in order to limit Hamas’ ability to exploit the lull to continue building up its military infrastructure. SOURCE: Institute for National Security Studies Institute for National Security Studies Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:23:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25150 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25150 The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. In light of the “Declaration of Principles,”signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, and the possibility that the United States will enter into a SOFA with the Government of Iraq, there is considerable interest in Congress in SOFAs, what they may cover, and how they have been concluded in the past. Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:09:49 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25148 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25148 The Kurdish region lies in one of the centres of ongoing global conflicts and has its own, home-grown disputes. Rich oil fields and water sources are abundant, and the living areas of Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, Persians, Azeris and others overlap. All the countries where the Kurds live (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) are heavily mined, mainly along state borders, with mines generally imported from Western countries. Despite the strong national ambitions of various Kurdish organisations since the 1940s, a Kurdish national state does not yet exist. In each of the four states with a Kurdish minority, Kurds clamour for national, cultural and democratic rights. Depending on both the legal and political situation, these outcries differ in kinds and methods from state to state. Some Kurds form human rights groups and committees; others promote Kurdish culture through cultural associations or join ethnically based political parties. Frequently, political campaigning occurs alongside armed struggle. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been fighting the Turkish Army for more than 20 years. The situation differs in northern Iraq, where a coalition of Kurdish parties—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—have formed a regional government with their Peshmerga1 controlling the territory since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. SOURCE: Geneva Call Geneva Call Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:03:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25146 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25146 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions including not quite half of the FY2008 request. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $526 billion (74%), OEF about $140 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (5%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of February 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.1 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.3 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 26 Jun 2008 12:59:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25143 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25143 At the Afghanistan conference taking place in Paris mid-June some delegates facing forthcoming elections at home may use the occasion to counter widespread voters' criticism of international operations in Afghanistan. President Karzai, who is also involved in the preliminary phase of an election campaign, will call for a change of paradigm in order to rid of himself of his reputation as a "puppet of the donor countries". Citing two new strategy papers for the period up to 2013, he has advocated "government ownership". It seems logical, given the increased confidence of leading Afghan elites on the one hand and the task of adjusting international stabilisation targets on the other, for political responsibility to be gradually handed over to the Afghan government by 2013. The time remaining until the final handover should be used intensively to build up the capacity of Afghan partners, above all the army. SOURCE: German Institute for International and Security Affairs // Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs // Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Thu, 26 Jun 2008 12:55:00 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25142 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25142 Jonathan Evans, director general of Britain’s security service MI5 describes al-Qaeda and its associated groups as “the main national security threat that we face today.” Through a series of attacks and attempted attacks, Islamist extremists have declared war on the values that underpin the liberal democracies of Britain, Europe, and the entire West. In an extraordinary public speech, Mr. Evans detailed a growing and evolving al-Qaeda threat to the United Kingdom, where at least 2,000 individuals have been identified as a threat to national security because of their support for terrorism. He went on to identify the increased threats posed by the “extension of the al-Qaeda brand” in both the Middle East and Europe. When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, NATO’s founding members agreed on the sacred Article 5 clause stipulating that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” As a collective defensive military alliance, NATO rightly invoked Article 5 following al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the United States. The Alliance must now follow through on that invocation and continue to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven in which to operate by winning in Afghanistan. SOURCE: The Heritage Foundation The Heritage Foundation