Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Central Asia". Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:23 +0000 Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:23 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 15 May 2008 12:22:33 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24381 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24381 To understand the reasons for the relative failures of the transition to democracy, the formation of a law-based state and the establishment of respect for human rights in the independent states of Central Asia today, as well as the role of the international community, one has to assess, first of all, the dynamics of the political process in this region of the world. In large part, the origins of the current weakness of democratic processes are the result of developments during the final decades of Soviet power. By the early 1990s, there arose a situation in which the ruling authorities Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), ruling authorities, realising the necessity of reform but at the same time wishing to retain power, initiated a set of reforms that employed democratic phraseology but which aimed first of all at protecting the interests of the ruling group. In this context, during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the reduction of the CPSU’s power, on the other hand and the beginning of independence for the former republics of the Soviet Union on the other hand resulted in a certain liberalisation of both public opinion and social institutions. SOURCE: Centre for European Policy Studies Centre for European Policy Studies Thu, 15 May 2008 11:00:51 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24377 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24377 The problem of killings is a significant one in Afghanistan. In the past four months, hundreds of civilians have been killed. They have died from bombs, missiles, explosive devices, police fire, beheadings and domestic violence. Those responsible include the police, militia groups, the Taliban and other anti-government elements, and the international forces. In the absence of urgent action by all parties, the months and years ahead will see many more civilians killed unlawfully. The message of my report is that a great many of these deaths can be readily avoided. SOURCE: United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights Thu, 15 May 2008 09:08:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24376 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24376 The paper, authored by Raspal Khosa, argues that Australia’s security interests are tied to the success of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. The paper advances three key recommendations on how to increase the effectiveness of Australia’s commitment at little additional cost. First, we must focus on security sector reform by training competent Afghan security forces. Second, we must improve reconstruction and development efforts through better coordination of civil and military resources. Third, we must engage with Pakistan more closely to contain cross-border insurgent activity. The paper argues that the only way to expedite our withdrawal and protect our interests is to work towards a sustainable, democratic and secure Afghanistan. SOURCE: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Australian Strategic Policy Institute Thu, 15 May 2008 09:06:18 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24375 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24375 The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol) is meant to safeguard the rights of children under 18 from military recruitment and deployment to war, and to guarantee basic protections to former child soldiers, whether they are seeking refugee protection in the United States or are in U.S. custody for alleged crimes. The U.S. Senate ratified the Optional Protocol in December 2002. By signing and ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the U.S. bound itself to comply with the obligations contained in the Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol provides that the absolute minimum age for voluntary recruitment is 16 years old. It also instructs countries to set their own minimum age by submitting a binding declaration, and the United States entered a binding declaration raising this minimum age to 17. Therefore, recruitment of youth ages 16 and under is categorically disallowed in the United States. SOURCE: American Civil Liberties Union American Civil Liberties Union Wed, 14 May 2008 16:10:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24370 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24370 Cette étude porte sur les termes et les circonstances dans lesquels le gouvernement canadien a construit et légitimé la politique de sécurité du Canada en Afghanistan de 2001 à 2007. Par la mobilisation des grilles analytiques des approches théoriques postmoderne et constructiviste critique aux Relations internationales, l’auteur identifie et décrit un processus de renouvellement de l’internationalisme canadien dans le sens d’une politique étrangère davantage interventionniste, fondée sur une redéfinition des notions de souveraineté et de territorialité, ainsi que sur un rapport problématique entre militarisme et développementalisme. (date de publication = septembre 2008) SOURCE: Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité Wed, 14 May 2008 14:01:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24364 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24364 Comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are not possible given the current fragmentation of responsibilities, narrow lines of authorities, and archaic funding mechanisms. Afghans are supportive of U.S. and international efforts, and there are occasional signs of progress, but the insurgent threat grows as U.S. military and civilian agencies and the international community struggle to bring stability to this volatile region. Integrated security, stabilization, and reconstruction activities must be implemented quickly and efficiently if failure is to be averted. Much more than a course correction is needed to provide tangible benefits to the population, develop effective leadership capacity in the government, and invest wisely in reconstruction that leads to sustainable economic growth. A proactive, comprehensive reconstruction and stabilization plan for Afghanistan is crucial to counter the regional terrorist insurgency, much as the Marshall Plan was necessary to combat the communist threat from the Soviet Union.1 This paper examines the health sector as a microcosm of the larger problems facing the United States and its allies in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. SOURCE: Center for Technology and National Security Policy // National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy // National Defense University Wed, 14 May 2008 13:22:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24358 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24358 Si le nombre total de cas de VIH notifiés reste modeste (à l’exception du Soudan), les chiffres sont en hausse dans plusieurs pays, en raison notamment de l’élargissement des activités de dépistage du VIH. SOURCE: Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA Wed, 14 May 2008 12:10:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24348 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24348 Le gouvernement ouzbek continue les persécutions contre les personnes qu’il soupçonne d’avoir un lien avec les troubles de mai 2005 à Andijan, affirme Human Rights Watch dans un nouveau rapport publié aujourd’hui. Le rapport de 45 pages, « Saving its Secrets: Government Repression in Andijan » (« Des secrets bien gardés : La répression gouvernementale à Andijan »), documente les pressions intenses exercées par le gouvernement à l’encontre des personnes ayant participé aux manifestations d’Andijan, des familles de réfugiés qui ont fui l’Ouzbékistan à la suite des violences d’Andijan, et des réfugiés qui sont revenus en Ouzbékistan. Les interrogatoires, la surveillance constante, l’ostracisme et les menaces ont continué à engendrer de nouveaux réfugiés d’Andijan. Certains de ces réfugiés fuient pour la deuxième fois depuis le 13 mai 2005, date à laquelle les forces de sécurité gouvernementales ont massacré des centaines de personnes en tentant de réprimer les manifestations antigouvernementales faisant suite à une attaque armée contre la ville. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch - Défendre les droits humains à travers le monde Human Rights Watch - Défendre les droits humains à travers le monde Tue, 13 May 2008 12:16:32 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24324 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24324 It has been three years since Uzbek government forces killed hundreds of unarmed protesters in the eastern city of Andijan on May 13, 2005, following an attack by armed men. Yet even today the government continues vigorously to seek out and persecute anyone it deems to have a connection to or information about the Andijan events. This is particularly true for many of the relatives of hundreds of persons who fled to Kyrgyzstan in the immediate aftermath of the massacre and were later resettled in third countries, as well as those who fled but later returned to Andijan. These groups remain under intense government pressure. They have been subjected to interrogations, constant surveillance, ostracism, and in at least one case an overt threat to life. As a result, three years after the massacre, government persecution continues to generate new refugees from Andijan. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch Tue, 13 May 2008 10:52:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24319 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24319 By deploying tanks and armoured engineers to Afghanistan in October 2006 and supporting the acquisition of the Leopard 2, the leadership of the Canadian Forces (CF) has acknowledged the importance of maintaining heavy armour in a balanced force. While the continued development of sensors and technology will be extremely important to achieving improved situational awareness (SA) on the battlefield, the hard-earned experiences of the Canadian Army and our allies in sustained combat in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven we must be prepared to get our hands dirty and come into physical contact with the enemy if we wish to define their strength, composition and intentions, and subsequently kill them. Canadian tanks and armoured engineers have better protected our dismounted infantry soldiers in Southern Afghanistan, allowing them to close with and destroy a fanatical and determined enemy in extremely complex terrain. SOURCE: The Canadian Army Journal The Canadian Army Journal Tue, 13 May 2008 10:43:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24318 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24318 In the final days of 1979, the Soviet Union, under the direction of the Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, invaded Afghanistan. Soviet Special Forces and KGB agents assaulted Tajbeg Palace and executed President Hafizullah Amin the evening of December 27th as Soviet ground forces started their entry across the northern border. Brezhnev had decided to intervene when it became clear that Soviet advisory and aviation support to the threatened Afghan government was insufficient. Recent governments had attempted to reform the country too rapidly, making Afghanistan vulnerable to an Islamic overthrow similar to that of Iran. This, combined with numerous other reasons, led Moscow to its decision. Soviet forces faced an immense challenge. It was presented with not only the vast and rough terrain of Afghanistan, but also by its xenophobic Islamic population, which at the time was in a state of civil war. Fighting from ambush sites inherited from their ancestors and aided by men and material from around the world, the Afghan mujahideen fought a protracted insurgency against the Soviets. Although Soviet military forces completed every military task they were assigned, the tactical victories combined to result in strategic failure. Analysis through the lens of an appropriate model clearly demonstrates why. SOURCE: The Canadian Army Journal The Canadian Army Journal Tue, 13 May 2008 10:25:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24317 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24317 As John F. Kennedy observed of the Vietnam War in 1962, this type of warfare is again at the centre of the present and future operating environment. The Canadian Forces (CF) in Afghanistan are attempting to bring stability to the country as it suffers such an insurgency, and this environment demands new approaches and new capabilities inspired by old lessons. With respect to ‘how’ Canada would engage such environments, its policy was made clear in April 2005. The government of the day stated that our approach to intervention on the international stage, and in Afghanistan in particular, would be based on a 3D + C (diplomacy + development + defence and commerce) model. This approach is one in which diplomacy, defence, and development work together to synchronize efforts, improve effectiveness, and maximize the impact of Canada’s contribution. It is an approach that demands a coherent policy and integrated activities by all elements of power within the government. SOURCE: The Canadian Army Journal The Canadian Army Journal Tue, 13 May 2008 09:47:26 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24316 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24316 Recently, the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline (TAP) project has been given new momentum, as Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan are pressing for the TAP project to go forward even though everyone concerned recognizes that fighting in Afghanistan casts serious questions over the entire project. Nevertheless, the project is now estimated to cost US$6 billion and is supposed to export some 33 billion cubic meters (BCM) of gas from the Dauletabad field in Turkmenistan annually. The field is not expected to be completed earlier than 2018, so this, like the Iran-Pakistan-India energy coalition, is a project for the future. American and Saudi Arabia governments initiated the TAP project in 1998 with active participation from a third party, Argentinean Company Bridas, and was intended to connect Turkmenistan to Pakistan and de-monopolize Russian presence in the Central Asia. SOURCE: The Georgian Times The Georgian Times Mon, 12 May 2008 15:56:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24314 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24314 The Uzbek government continues to persecute people it believes have any connection with the May 2005 unrest in Andijan, Human Rights Watch said in a new report. The 45-page report, “Saving its Secrets: Government Repression in Andijan,” documents intense government pressure on people who participated in the Andijan protests, families of refugees who fled Uzbekistan in the aftermath of the Andijan violence, and refugees who returned to Uzbekistan. Interrogations, constant surveillance, ostracism, and threats continued to generate new refugees from Andijan. Some of the refugees are fleeing for the second time since May 13, 2005, when government security forces massacred hundreds in an attempt to quell anti-government protests that followed an armed attack on the city. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch Human Rights Watch Fri, 09 May 2008 14:09:51 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24280 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24280 On November 19, 2001, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) convened a roundtable discussion on “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Establishing Security and the Rule of Law.” Participants in the discussion included experts on Afghan law and legal traditions; practitioners and specialists on such issues as post-conflict administration of justice, civilian policing, institution- and capacity-building, technical legal assistance programs, the role of peacekeeping forces in the administration of justice, and the investigation and prosecution of terrorism; and members of the NGO and policy communities. The event was organized in recognition that the process of political transition, reconstruction and recovery in Afghanistan will involve enormous challenges for the people of Afghanistan and for the international community. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace Fri, 09 May 2008 10:53:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24269 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24269 The Winter Supplementary Estimate presented by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requests additional provision of £2,033 million, of which £1,919 million is to meet the estimated additional costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the financial year 2007–08. The MoD waits until the Winter Supplementary Estimates (in November) to present to Parliament the estimated costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the unpredictable nature of operations makes it difficult to forecast their cost with accuracy at the beginning of the financial year. We continue to argue that the estimated costs of military operations should be set out in the Main Estimates (in April); but, as a compromise, we recommend that the MoD provide in its estimates memorandum for the Main Estimates an account of its planning assumptions for the costs of military operations in the financial year ahead. SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee Fri, 09 May 2008 10:50:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24268 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24268 The Spring Supplementary Estimate presented by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requests additional provision of £2,192 million, of which £1,410.5 million is to meet the estimated additional costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in Financial Year 2007–08. The cost of operations in Iraq has risen significantly despite the drawdown of forces there: in particular the estimate of the cost of capital additions there has almost doubled against its forecast just three months ago. The indirect resource costs attributable to operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have also risen five-fold against last year's outturn, far beyond the scale of other costs. The MoD needs to make clearer the reasons for these considerable increases. SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee Thu, 08 May 2008 15:08:10 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24249 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24249 Richard Holbrooke (left), the chairman of the Asia Society and former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., gave a speech on Afghanistan at an event co-hosted by CSIS and the Asia Society. Jack Garrity, executive director of the Asia Society in Washington, welcomed the audience. Anthony Cordesman, the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy, introduced Holbrooke and moderated the question-and-answer session that SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies Thu, 08 May 2008 10:57:52 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24235 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24235 Five years after the U.S.-led coalition initiated its attack on al Qaeda training camps and the Taliban government in Afghanistan, peace is yet to be won. The rapid collapse of the Taliban regime created a security vacuum in vast parts of the country that was soon filled by local warlords and mid-level commanders. The lack of international military presence in the periphery, especially in the South, provided a safe haven for the retreating Taliban to rebuild and expand their power base. In May of 2007, the International Security Assistance Force, led by NATO, took over coordination of international activities in Afghanistan. Transitional power sharing and coordination, along with the tactical, logistical, and managerial necessities of the mission, introduced novel challenges. In addition to these organizational shifts, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces have been continually challenged by the Taliban-led insurgency in southern and eastern Afghanistan, illicit opium production, undeveloped security structures, lack of political control in the provinces, and large-scale corruption within governmental institutions. SOURCE: RAND Corporation RAND Corporation Wed, 07 May 2008 13:02:16 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24215 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24215 Convinced that only a productive and stable economic base will bring peace and prosperity to Afghanistan, in 2005 Chayes and a group of Kandaharis decided to focus their energies on a business concept that adds value to local fruit crops and taps into the growing international market for natural products. They founded the cooperative “Arghand”, which now includes seven women and five men and produces soaps and essential oils for export made from the region’s legendary pomegranates, almonds, apricots and its celebrated roses and wild herbs. Arghand has succeeded in developing locally run production processes and a small network of markets abroad, though the effort is still in early stages and insecurity and the ongoing conflict in Kandahar province leaves its future uncertain. (For information on the Arghand Cooperative in Kandahar, including monthly ‘notes from the field’ by Sarah Chayes see: http://www.arghand.org/). Chayes has lately been calling Arghand “a soap factory in a shooting gallery” because of the deteriorating security situation in Kandahar, described in more detail below. SOURCE: The Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program // University of Calgary The Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program // University of Calgary Wed, 07 May 2008 12:12:27 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24209 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24209 Le budget du département américain de la Défense demandé par George W. Bush s’élève à 588,3 milliards de dollars pour l’exercice 2009, en hausse de 7,5% par rapport à 2008. Depuis 2001, les dépenses supplémentaires pour faire face à la « guerre totale contre la terreur » se chiffrent déjà à plus de 800 milliards de dollars. Le président Bush entendait vendre aux Américains une guerre rapide, gratuite et glorieuse. Elle tourne au désastre humanitaire et est en passe de devenir la guerre la plus chère de l’Histoire : plus de 3 000 milliards de dollars, selon le prix Nobel d’économie Joseph Stiglitz. Plusieurs générations d’Américains et d’Irakiens finiront inévitablement par payer le prix vrai de cette guerre, qui ne se mesure pas seulement en dollars sonnants et trébuchants, mais aussi en déficit durable pour la sécurité nationale et internationale ainsi que pour les libertés constitutionnelles. SOURCE: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Wed, 07 May 2008 09:34:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24178 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24178 « Que les Américains s’en aillent ou qu’ils demeurent », signait Patrice Claude dans Le Monde du 19 mars 2008, « la stabilisation de la vieille Mésopotamie n’est pas pour demain. » Le contexte international s’est largement détérioré au cours des dernières années, particulièrement entre la Russie et les États-Unis, notamment à cause de la volonté américaine d’installer 10 intercepteurs antimissiles en Pologne et un radar à pulsions phasées en République tchèque, d’étendre la couverture de l’OTAN à l’Ukraine et à la Georgie, sans parler du soutien des pays occidentaux à l’indépendance du Kosovo. De son côté, le président Bush continue de soutenir contre vents et marées la candidature de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, « le seul pays non membre de l’OTAN », souligne-t-il, « qui appuie chacune des missions de l’OTAN », que ce soit au Kosovo ou en Afghanistan. L’Allemagne, la France, l’Italie et d’autres pays européens vont sans doute mettre les bâtons dans les roues de ce projet de Washington ou du moins soulever suffisamment d’obstacles pour prévenir l’application du Plan d’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, d’ici la fin du mandat du président Bush. La question géorgienne est encore plus épineuse pour l’OTAN étant donné les conflits persistants de ce pays avec les régions séparatistes d’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud. Pourtant, le sénateur McCain (Arizona) ne se préoccupe guère de ces questions puisqu’à ses yeux il faut exclure la Russie du G-8, élargir ce club sélect à l’Inde et au Brésil, et cesser de travailler avec une Russie revanchiste pour s’adjoindre une « Ligue des démocraties » sous leadership américain, comme alternative à l’ONU. Formule largement privilégiée dans le passé par les États-Unis – une coalition de volontaires –, il est donc difficile de savoir en quoi la nouveauté du sénateur McCain réside ici. SOURCE: Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal Wed, 07 May 2008 09:07:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24173 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24173 Devant l’importance que revêt la reconstruction du secteur de la sécurité en Afghanistan en tant que stratégie de sortie de la communauté internationale, cet article propose d’effectuer un bilan des efforts accomplis afin de créer des forces de sécurité nationales afghanes opérationnelles, soit l’Armée nationale afghane (ANA) et la Police nationale afghane (PNA). Alors que l’ANA obtient des résultats satisfaisants en progressant vers une plus grande indépendance par rapport aux troupes internationales, la faiblesse de la PNA est davantage marquée, principalement en raison de la confusion dans le rôle qu’elle doit assurer sur le territoire afghan ainsi que de la primauté d’une vision à court terme. Suite à ce bilan, il sera également question de deux principaux défis posés à la consolidation de la légitimité des forces de sécurité nationales afghanes, soit l’instauration d’un lien de confiance avec la population et le renforcement des milices locales suite à la chute du régime taliban. Ces deux défis sont particulièrement importants à relever afin de favoriser l’implantation de l’autorité de l’ANA et de la PNA à l’ensemble du territoire afghan. SOURCE: Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval Mon, 05 May 2008 14:48:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24136 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24136 The latest spike in cross-border attacks (NYT) into Afghanistan by militants based in Pakistan has once again exposed the vulnerabilities of those fighting the war for a stable Afghanistan. In a repeat of past instances, Afghan officials blamed (IHT) the recent assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai on insurgents in Pakistan’s tribal areas with links to al-Qaeda. A spokesperson from Pakistan’s army denied (Daily Times) the allegations. But all recent U.S. intelligence and investigative reports have pointed to the growing strength of the terrorist groups in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border.“Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al-Qaeda has been able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants capable of directing the organization’s operations around the world,” said the 2008 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Mon, 05 May 2008 14:14:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24128 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24128 President John F. Kennedy of the US was assassinated on November 22, 1963, at Dallas, Texas, as he was being taken in a tightly-protected motorcade. In view of the strict access control, which might not have allowed access to his car, Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin, took up position in an unoccupied room on the sixth floor of the Texas Book Repository and fired at Kennedy. The incident highlighted the need for perimeter security, meaning the physical security of buildings in the vicinity of a VIP motorcade or a place of meeting of the VIP to prevent anyone taking shelter in a building and opening fire. On October 6, 1981, the then President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated during the annual 6th October parade in Cairo marking the eighth anniversary of what the Egyptians view as their victory over Israel in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. As Sadat and his security staff were engrossed watching a spectacular fly-past in the sky, Khalid Islambouli of the Islamic Jihad, who was a member of the military formations participating in the parade, ran towards Sadat and shot him dead. Eleven others were also killed by other terriorists, who indiscriminately opened fire SOURCE: International Terrorism Monitor // South Asia Analysis Group International Terrorism Monitor // South Asia Analysis Group Mon, 05 May 2008 14:05:28 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24127 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24127 The total number of documented Afghans aged between 15 and 29 years living in Iran is 341,157 or 33.4 percent of the total population of Afghans in Iran. Broadly speaking, these Afghans may be categorised as “second-generation”, that is, those Afghans born in Iran, or who have spent more than half of their life in Iran. Second-generation Afghans comprise a particular demographic whose experiences and aspirations while not homogenous within that demographic, is different from their parents’ generation, and from their counterparts in Afghanistan. A more liberal social and cultural environment that offers education and economic opportunity has inspired different values and aspirations in the second-generation, some converging with their Iranian counterparts. Discriminatory government policies which differentiate non-nationals also shape these opportunities and experiences, however. SOURCE: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Mon, 05 May 2008 13:07:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24121 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24121 By 1932, British troops had been waging war of varying intensity with a group of intractable tribes along and beyond the northwestern frontier of India for nearly a century. That year, in summarizing a typical skirmish, one British veteran noted laconically, “Probably no sign till the burst of fire, and then the swift rush with knives, the stripping of the dead, and the unhurried mutilation of the infidels.” It was a savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by religious zealotry on the tribal side, and it was singularly unforgiving of tactical error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance. It still is. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region has experienced turbulence for centuries. Today a portion of it constitutes a significant threat to U.S. national security interests. The unique underlying factors that create this threat are little understood by most policymakers in Washington. SOURCE: Harvard University // John F Kennedy School of Government Harvard University // John F Kennedy School of Government Mon, 05 May 2008 12:46:16 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24120 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24120 Prior to the NATO summit in Bucharest, we heard from Dr. Abdullah, former foreign minister of Afghanistan, and from Dr. Jalali, the country’s former interior minister. And this afternoon we are very honored to host Ambassador Kai Eide who was recently appointed by the secretary general to be his special representative for, and head of the mission of assistance mission to, Afghanistan. Ambassador Eide previously served with the U.N. as the secretary general’s special envoy to Kosovo in 2005 and special representative to Bosnia in 1997 and ’98. In addition, as a member of the Norwegian foreign service, he has served as Norway’s special advisor on the Balkans, ambassador also with special responsibility to Croatia, has been the perm. rep. to NATO and ambassador to the OSCE. SOURCE: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Mon, 05 May 2008 10:13:40 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24109 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24109 Children remain to be the most vulnerable and delicate balance of a society. They are the foundation stone of a dream of a culture as well as a community that a society represents. Most of the developed and democratic world considers them to be the building bricks on which the society grows, whereas some till date considers them to be elements of pleasure, cheap labour and entertainment. Whenever, such a situation prevails in a community, such society suffers from the worst degenerative disease ever dreamt of. Trafficking amongst children has turned into one of the major menaces of a developing society amongst which Afghanistan, a war torn and socio-economically dilapidated nation, has turned into one of the major breeding grounds of such a menace after illegal narcotics trafficking. SOURCE: CounterCurrents.org CounterCurrents.org Fri, 02 May 2008 14:46:52 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24107 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24107 An April 27 assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karzai offered a clear reminder of the security challenges confronting Afghanistan on its path to stability. But retired army Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, says U.S. efforts in Afghanistan are at a fork in the road (PDF). Prior to 2006, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed overall military command in the country, international efforts were “built around a linkage” between the Afghan government and U.S. military and diplomatic commands. Under the current NATO-led framework much of that “overarching strategy is now absent,” the general says. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Fri, 02 May 2008 14:34:49 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24104 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24104 A vicious cycle of insecurity, under-development, and poor governance has imperiled Afghanistan's progress and provided opportunities for the anti-government insurgency. Countering these trends with a virtuous cycle of security, development, and good governance is the fundamental goal of the Afghan government and the international community. The Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, which runs the acclaimed National Solidarity Program—aimed at creating village-level development and governance—is at the center of this effort. H.E. Mohammed Ehsan Zia has been involved in the implementation of humanitarian and post-conflict programs in Afghanistan since 1988. Minister Zia has extensive professional experience in rural and community development, and specializes in participatory development theory and peace building. He joined the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in 2002, and was appointed Minister in 2006. Minister Zia will discuss the Afghanistan perspective on development, and its relationship to security, governance, and combating the insurgency. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace Fri, 02 May 2008 12:41:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24093 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24093 We fully support the continuing commitment of the UK Government, in partnership with the Government and people of Afghanistan, to help to bring peace and security to Afghanistan and to promote political reform and reconstruction and development. We accept that the commitment, in terms of development assistance, is likely to last at least a generation. As one of the poorest countries in the world, with continuing humanitarian needs, Afghanistan should remain a major focus for DFID. We welcome the Committee’s support for UK commitment in Afghanistan. As the Prime Minister announced to the House of Commons in December, we believe the best way for the UK to support the Afghan Government and people is through a long-term and comprehensive framework. Afghanistan is a key UK priority for reconstruction and development support. The UK signed a ten year Development Partnership Agreement with the Afghan Government at the 2006 London Conference, and DFID has set out its funding to Afghanistan for the next four years. SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // International Development Committee United Kingdom House of Commons // International Development Committee Fri, 02 May 2008 12:21:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24089 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24089 Over the last few years the Afghan National Army (ANA) has often been presented as a success story. This certainly holds some truth, at least in comparison with Afghanistan’s national police, which is widely seen as a complete failure. The ANA is reasonably well behaved and quite popular throughout most of Afghanistan. Its initial difficulties in retaining troops within the ranks seem to have been addressed to some extent and both the desertion and absence-without-leave (AWOL) rates are down from the high levels of 2002-2006. AWOL rates in particular have declined dramatically over the last 18 months, to a relatively low 8 percent, from about 33 percent in 2006. This appears to be the combined result of a presidential decree turning absence-without-leave into a crime, a widespread media campaign, rising unemployment and rising food prices, which force even less than enthusiastic recruits to stick to the ANA. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 11:57:09 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24083 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24083 The present article proposes three main theses: the normality of movements and the prior existence of transnational networks in and around Afghanistan; the resilience and inventiveness of the Afghan population, especially illustrated by the remittance system; the relevance of migratory movements and of transnational networks for the reconstruction of the country and the stability of the region. In contrast to the migratory strategies developed by the refugees, the three solutions to the problem of the refugees promoted by the UNHCR (voluntary repatriation in the country of origin; integration in the host country; resettlement in a third country) are based on the idea that solutions are found when movements stop. But mobility may be seen as a key livelihood strategy. A more comprehensive solution is needed, which takes into account the full range of strategies and responses developed by the Afghan population, including the back-and-forth movements between Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and beyond. SOURCE: Refugee Studies Quarterly Refugee Studies Quarterly Fri, 02 May 2008 11:46:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24082 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24082 This article examines the UNHCR operation in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a case study for the tension between UNHCR's strictly humanitarian mandate and the diverging interests of states. After situating the Afghan refugee crisis in the broader historical context of the Cold War, it analyses a number of documents from the UNHCR archives with a focus on the humanitarian principles that guide UNHCR's work on the one hand, and the influence of states and their political, economic, or military objectives on the UNHCR's operation on the other. It concludes that UNHCR was aware of the negative impact of states’ policies and actions on the humanitarian nature of its operation. However, due to the power difference between UNHCR and its members states as well as states hosting its operations, UNHCR had to accept these negative effects in order to assure minimum assistance and protection for the Afghan refugees in need. SOURCE: Refugee Studies Quarterly Refugee Studies Quarterly Fri, 02 May 2008 09:53:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24072 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24072 This analysis is based on a game theory model which assumes the premise that the behaviour of Jihadist groups (taken generally, and al-Qaeda in particular) and of States is rational and responds to strategic choices. The analysis begins with an introduction to the context which situates Spain and global Jihadist groups on opposing sides of the game board of strategic interests. There follows an analysis of each of the scenarios and their implications in the strategies of Jihadist organisations, as well as their influence on Spanish foreign policy and international security policy decisions. Finally, conclusions are presented and the scenarios are classified in accordance with their significance and their capacity to destabilise Spain’s position in its various theatres of operations abroad, most notably those linked to peace missions and, in particular, Afghanistan. SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano Real Instituto Elcano Thu, 01 May 2008 15:34:00 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24068 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24068 The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous, reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’. This ARI examines the Pashtun claim for an independent territory, the historical and political roots of the Pashtun identity, the implications for the NATO- or Pakistani-led military operations in the area, the increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination and the reasons why the Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life. SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano Real Instituto Elcano Thu, 01 May 2008 11:35:17 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24045 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24045 U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate, and a number of efforts to augment the U.S. stabilization effort are underway or under consideration. Outside studies have tended to contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasizing a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan as failing — either through lack of attention or deliberate strategy — to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan, largely beyond the reach of U.S./NATO-led forces in Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 01 May 2008 10:30:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24036 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24036 In a press conference yesterday, President Bush said, "I think we're making progress in Afghanistan" -- days after President Hamid Karzai was the subject of an attempted assassination plot. The Interior Ministry said the Taliban, nearly vanquished from the country in 2001, admitted to launching the attack. These rounds of violence are the latest in what has been an eroding situation over recent years. The United States is also struggling to gain international support for the efforts in Afghanistan. "Many of them, I think, have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan," Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in February. While the United States has deployed a "new 2,300-strong reserve force" of Marines to Afghanistan, the country still does not receive the necessary attention. Karzai's escape "should serve as a wakeup call to shift the focus to a new front," Center for American Progress (CAP) Senior Fellow Brian Katulis wrote yesterday. CAP has recommended a multi-pronged approach to Afghanistan, including building the governnment, increasing security, jumpstarting reconstruction, reducing opium production, and removing terrorist sanctuaries through redeployment of troops. SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Mon, 28 Apr 2008 14:51:47 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23952 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23952 Set within the complex contemporary context of international interventions, UN peacekeeping operations have now evolved into peace operations. The emergence of the concepts of human security and the responsibility to protect have raised expectations that UN peace operations should deal with both macro and micro level insecurity in conflict and post-conflict situations, especially in the case of failed or collapsed states. Reflecting this development, the question of an appropriate framework in which to conceptualize peace operations has also been debated. This essay considers a conceptualization of UN peace operations from a conflict resolution perspective and analyses the case of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), using a framework of conflict transformation. It argues that the impartiality of UN operations has been reconceived in terms of the values of 'human security' and the 'responsibility to protect', making it vital to explicitly articulate the meaning and implications of 'value-based' impartiality. SOURCE: Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding Mon, 28 Apr 2008 14:47:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23951 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23951 This article examines the UNHCR operation in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a case study for the tension between UNHCR's strictly humanitarian mandate and the diverging interests of states. After situating the Afghan refugee crisis in the broader historical context of the Cold War, it analyses a number of documents from the UNHCR archives with a focus on the humanitarian principles that guide UNHCR's work on the one hand, and the influence of states and their political, economic, or military objectives on the UNHCR's operation on the other. It concludes that UNHCR was aware of the negative impact of states’ policies and actions on the humanitarian nature of its operation. However, due to the power difference between UNHCR and its members states as well as states hosting its operations, UNHCR had to accept these negative effects in order to assure minimum assistance and protection for the Afghan refugees in need. SOURCE: Refugee Survey Quarterly // University of Oxford Refugee Survey Quarterly // University of Oxford Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:31:28 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23934 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23934 There have been many suggestions among media and military analysts since 2003 of possible parallels between the war in Iraq and the United States imbroglio in Vietnam that ended so humiliatingly in 1975. The argument is most prominently made by critics of both wars, though it has also been articulated by defence scholars or officials concerned that the US learns the "right" lessons from its costly Vietnam experience. Three aspects of this approach are notable, however. First, fewer such comparisons have been made with the conflict in Afghanistan, which arguably in some respects offers a closer "fit" with the Vietnam war than does Iraq. Second, the Vietnam precedent is invoked as if the devastating wars in that country started only with the significant American involvement in the mid-1950s and later, and almost completely ignores the earlier, post-1945 clash of arms between Vietnamese nationalists and French colonialists. Third, when parallels (whether Iraqi or Afghan) are drawn, they tend to be presented exclusively from the viewpoint of the Americans. It is as if "only" the United States (and by extension western forces or combatants in general) have the capacity or the interest to draw lessons from the past. SOURCE: openDemocracy openDemocracy Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:30:06 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23933 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23933 As the spring snowmelt signals the onset of Afghanistan’s traditional fighting season, the United States has begun to deploy an additional 3,200 Marines to Afghanistan, raising the total U.S. force level to about 32,000.1 These reinforcements will help to blunt the expected spring offensive by the Taliban-led insurgency, which has grown stronger in recent years. Yet the United States and the young Afghan government need more international support in their efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan, which is a crucial front in the global war against al-Qaeda and its radical allies. Washington and Kabul need greater cooperation from Pakistan in controlling the border and from NATO, which is leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). SOURCE: The Heritage Foundation The Heritage Foundation Fri, 25 Apr 2008 15:29:52 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23908 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23908 Is Afghanistan on the brink of failure? Not necessarily, though the challenges in Afghanistan do remain formidable, says Brookings expert Jeremy Shapiro, who recently returned from Afghanistan and saw optimism among U.S. and NATO ground forces there. That optimism is reminiscent of attitudes in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, but Shapiro draws important distinctions between the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Increasing violence is an expression of the desperation of insurgents," says Shapiro, as Afghans today are seeing the increasing capacity of their government and security services and are increasingly rejecting the insurgency. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution Fri, 25 Apr 2008 14:46:31 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23904 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23904 Below‐average levels of rain and snow during the 2007/08 wet season, high food prices, and low regional cereals supplies are likely to lead to increased levels of food insecurity for small‐scale farmers, rain‐fed agriculturalists, pastoralists, and poor households in urban areas. Well‐targeted food assistance and activities to strengthen households’ purchasing power are needed from now until at least May 2009. Policy interventions to facilitate bilateral agreements and maintain tax exemptions on commercial imports are also recommended. Households in urban areas are highly dependent on markets to source their food needs, and are therefore more vulnerable to food insecurity from increasing prices, due to rising international price trends and below‐normal domestic grain production. These households are also likely to face increased competition for food and labor opportunities, due in part to increased demand from refugee populations returning to urban areas. SOURCE: United States Agency for International Development // Famine Early Warning Systems Network United States Agency for International Development // Famine Early Warning Systems Network Fri, 25 Apr 2008 14:35:28 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23903 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23903 This report offers international agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the media and the public an overview of the humanitarian and development assistance being provided to the people of Afghanistan by InterAction member agencies. The 21 member organizations that submitted information for this report are conducting relief and development operations in Afghanistan. Various sectors are addressed in their programs, including agriculture and food production; business development, cooperatives and credit; disaster and emergency relief; education and training; gender issues and women in development; health care; human rights, peace and conflict resolution; refugee and IDP services; rural development; water and sanitation; infrastructure and governance; and shelter. InterAction member agencies work in provinces throughout Afghanistan, including Badakhshan, Balkh, Baghlan, Bamyan, Herat, Ghor, Kandahar, Ghazni, Paktika and Kabul provinces. SOURCE: InterAction InterAction Thu, 24 Apr 2008 15:45:50 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23880 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23880 During the last decade, an increasing share of foreign aid has been provided to countries coming out of civil war or experiencing severe conflict. Most of these countries—like the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia—suffer from a combination of conflict, a state in crisis, underdevelopment, and poverty. Under most circumstances, poverty is greatly exacerbated by conflict, but it is also one of a number of factors that may contribute to violent conflict. Addressing what Frances Stewart has called “horizontal inequalities” is, therefore, likely to play a role in preventing the shift from grievance to violence, as well as in building and sustaining peace in postwar situations. In several countries that have suffered from protracted conflict, however, an approach focused on poverty has been slow to emerge. To a large extent, peace-building missions have become statebuilding missions, first, because “fragile states” are seen as a risk both for their society and for international security and, second, because it is broadly assumed that one vital condition for sustainable peace is that the state apparatus has the capacity to exercise core functions of statehood in an efficient, nonviolent, and legitimate way. In the process, however, the extent to which the poverty and marginalization of large rural populations have spurred recent wars has been underestimated. As a consequence, donors and policymakers risk rebuilding the causes of war. SOURCE: International Food Policy Research Institute // Chr Michelsen Institute International Food Policy Research Institute // Chr Michelsen Institute Thu, 24 Apr 2008 11:50:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23869 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23869 Since 2004, the Afghan government and its international partners have become increasingly aware that issues and challenges surrounding subnational governance in Afghanistan are crucial to national development, stability, and security. This period has also been a time of extraordinary change in subnational governance structures, with the election of Provincial Councils, the establishment of Provincial Development Committees (PDCs), increases in Public Administrative Reform (PAR) efforts, and the expansion of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) into a large number of communities. To assess the changes produced by these developments and reform efforts, and to address the need for an improved understanding of subnational governance, AREU conducted extensive field and policy research on subnational governance beginning in April 2005. This research built on prior AREU work on subnational administration, NSP and PAR. SOURCE: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Wed, 23 Apr 2008 12:14:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23828 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23828 The report offers a stocktaking of Afghanistan’s regional challenges. It finds that domestic instability in Pakistan, strains in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations and insecurities associated with the US–Iran stand-off on Iran’s nuclear programme continue to pose the most significant regional risks to the stability of Afghanistan. There are, however, a number of additional challenges: the failure of the USA and its allies to enable a substantial dialogue on Afghanistan with Russia and China, in addition to India and Pakistan’s continued rivalry, create a suboptimal regional environment for Afghanistan’s stabilisation process. There are also serious regional challenges related to drugs trafficking and water sharing. Finally, the report discusses the situation in two of Afghanistan’s (lesser known) neighbours in detail. It finds that Uzbekistan is unstable: regime collapse in this country is one possible scenario – and this would entail grave consequences for Afghanistan, especially the northern regions. Turkmenistan, by contrast, whose long time dictator Saparmurat Niyazov died in December 2006, seems stable in the short to medium term. The report ends by providing a set of policy recommendations for Norwegian policymakers. SOURCE: Heidi Kjærnet and Stina Torjesen Heidi Kjærnet and Stina Torjesen Wed, 23 Apr 2008 10:05:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23815 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23815 Adults in the Netherlands are divided over their country’s current mission in Afghanistan, according to a poll by Maurice de Hond. 49 per cent of respondents oppose the Dutch engagement in Uruzgan, while 46 per cent support it. Afghanistan has been the main battleground in the war on terrorism. The conflict began in October 2001, after the Taliban regime refused to hand over Osama bin Laden, prime suspect in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked and crashed four airplanes on Sept. 11, 2001, killing nearly 3,000 people. The Netherlands committed troops to the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. At least 790 soldiers—including 16 Dutch—have died in the conflict, either in support of the United States-led Operation Enduring Freedom or as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). SOURCE: Angus Reid Global Monitor Angus Reid Global Monitor