Human Security Gateway: Northeast Asia

Chine / Japon : promesses et limites du « nouveau départ »

Wed, 14 May 2008 15:34:16 -0700

Visite historique. Dimanche 10 mai, alors que la Birmanie sinistrée et isolée se « pressait » vers les urnes — avec l’enthousiasme que l’on imagine…— (referendum sur un projet de nouvelle Constitution), que la police népalaise procédait à l’arrestation de 600 manifestants tibétains à Katmandou, un événement politique majeur s’achevait en Asie, dans l’harmonie et l’entrain. Après une visite « historique » d’une exceptionnelle densité, le Président chinois Hu Jintao quittait l’archipel nippon pour regagner, à l’issue de cinq journées de rencontres, de discours et déclarations communes, Pékin et sa fièvre pré-olympique. Une mauvaise nouvelle l’accueillerait hélas deux jours plus tard (séisme dans le Sichuan ; 10 000 morts). Ainsi, nulle anicroche tibétaine significative lors de ce séjour en terre japonaise, pourtant bercée de shintoïsme et de bouddhisme ; Tokyo et le fébrile gouvernement de Y. Fukuda s’y sont employés (7 000 policiers déployés) ; rien ni personne ne devait gâcher la fête des « retrouvailles » entre les deux puissances d’Asie orientale, 2eme et 3eme économies mondiales, toute à la fois voisines, partenaires et rivales. Il n’aurait pû être question que ce rarissime déplacement du plus haut dignitaire chinois au Japon (seulement le 2eme depuis 1972 !) ne soit terni par des phénomènes périphériques… ou suive une trame aussi catastrophique qu’en 1998, lors de la venue du Pdt Jiang Zemin, lestée du sceau de l’échec et de l’incompréhension (J. Zemin avait évoqué, devant l’Empereur Akihito notamment, l’occupation militaire japonaise en Chine). SOURCE: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques

Le point sur l’épidémie de sida - Résumés par région - Asie

Wed, 14 May 2008 13:04:09 -0700

Ce rapport contient des résumés sur les régions suivants: Chine, Inde, et Asie du Sud et du Sud-Est, et aussi sur les thèmes suivantes: Double péril - sexospécifité et risque de VIH parmi les consommateurs de drogues injectables; Comprendre les nouvelles estimations du VIH en Inde, et Surprise dans le Sud. SOURCE: Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA

China's future water war with India

Wed, 14 May 2008 11:33:02 -0700

Is there any end to Chinese ambitions in Asia? China wishes to dominate Asia with blockades, blockages, military diplomacy and political Machiavellism. China’s building of the port of Gwadar at the mouth of the Persian Gulf in fact is meant to blockade the oil supplies of the world. Its military diplomacy is on display at the Tibet-India border, where for the last ten years it has strengthened its military infrastructure to intimidate India. In its blockage diplomacy, it is planning to divert the flow of the River Brahmaputra, also called the Tsandpo in Tibet, toward China’s northeast, hence in the process starve 100 million people in India. SOURCE: United Press International Asia

La Chine avant les Jeux Olympiques - Déjeuner-débat autour de Valérie Niquet

Thu, 08 May 2008 16:33:09 -0700

Valérie Niquet a présenté l’année 2008 comme une année cruciale pour la Chine, marquée par deux événements d’ampleur, les Jeux Olympiques (dont les dirigeants ont fait une priorité politique) et le 30e anniversaire des réformes de Deng Xiaoping. Leur organisation a été confiée au même homme, le vice-président Xi Jinping, héritier probable de Hu Jintao en 2012. Un autre événement de grande importance, éclipsé par les événements survenus au Tibet, a été la tenue au mois de mars de la 11e Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN) au cours de laquelle le mot d’ordre a été la stabilité. L’oratrice s’est alors proposé de dresser un tableau de la situation politique actuelle de la Chine, en perspective des échéances de 2008. SOURCE: Institut français des relations internationales

Perspectives de l'environnement de l'OCDE à l'horizon 2030 - Synthèse

Wed, 07 May 2008 11:15:50 -0700

• Comment le développement économique et social influencera-t-il l’évolution de l’environnement à l’horizon 2030 ? Quelles politiques seront nécessaires afin de répondre aux principaux défis environnementaux ? Comment les pays membres et les pays non membres de l’OCDE peuvent-ils unir leurs efforts pour relever ces défis ? • Les Perspectives de l’environnement de l’OCDE à l’horizon 2030 présentent des analyses des tendances économiques et environnementales jusqu’en 2030, ainsi que des simulations de politiques visant à faire face aux principaux problèmes. Sans nouvelles politiques, nous risquons de causer des dommages irréversibles à l’environnement et à la base des ressources naturelles nécessaires pour soutenir la croissance économique et le bien-être de tous. L’inaction des pouvoirs publics a un coût élevé. • Mais les Perspectives montrent que relever les principaux défis environnementaux d’aujourd’hui – y compris le changement climatique, l’appauvrissement de la biodiversité, le manque d’eau et les impacts de la pollution sur la santé – n’est pas impossible ni inabordable. Elles mettent en lumière un ensemble de politiques qui pourraient permettre de relever ces défis d’une manière économique. Le champ d’observation des Perspectives a été élargi par rapport à l’édition 2001, afin de tenir compte des évolutions concernant aussi bien les pays de l’OCDE que le Brésil, la Russie, l’Inde, l’Indonésie, la Chine et l’Afrique du Sud (BRIICS), et d’examiner comment ils pourraient mieux coopérer pour résoudre les problèmes d’environnement au niveau mondial et local. SOURCE: Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques

Le parternariat stratégique entre la Chine et la Russie: La poursuite d'une amitié pragmatique

Wed, 07 May 2008 09:25:32 -0700

Depuis leurs tout premiers contacts au XVIIe siècle et jusqu’à leur récent rapprochement, les relations entre la Chine et la Russie ont toujours été des plus épisodiques. Bien que très différentes de l’alliance sino-soviétique du début des années cinquante, les relations entre Beijing et Moscou se sont considérablement améliorées depuis le début des années quatre-vingt-dix de sorte à créer aujourd’hui une forme atypique d’association que peu d’observateurs avaient anticipée. Si le partenariat stratégique entre la Chine et la Russie ne demeure pas sans tension au niveau bilatéral et régional, les forces qui ont favorisé leur rapprochement semblent encore les mêmes qui attisent aujourd’hui la poursuite de certaines facettes de leur coopération. SOURCE: Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval

Sudan’s foreign relations with Asia: China and the politics of ‘looking east’

Mon, 05 May 2008 15:19:30 -0700

China has featured prominently in recent international coverage of Sudan. The high–water mark of attention came with the build up to and passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769 that authorised an African Union–UN mission for Darfur. China’s vote in favour of this resolution was widely greeted. It prompted unusually positive headlines, which contrasted with previous coverage of its role in Sudan (such as ‘Empowering Evil: China aids Sudan’s killers’, Brookes 2007). Subsequent eventshave continued to place China at the forefront of coverage of Sudan. This has happened for good reason given the economic importance of China to Sudan and that China’s Sudan engagement has acquired wider significance in relation to expanding Chinese engagement in Africa and in the world at large. Darfur has internationalised China’s relations with Sudan in a manner that has rendered its involvement in the region a defining episode in its wider foreign relations. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies

The Way Forward in Tibet

Mon, 05 May 2008 12:16:31 -0700

When I meet with the Dalai Lama today, I fully expect him to reaffirm his strong commitment to engaging Chinese officials in dialogue. President Bush has repeatedly expressed his own steadfast support for dialogue between the Dalai Lama and China's leadership. Meaningful dialogue presents the only viable way forward. In March, demonstrations in Lhasa that began peacefully escalated into violence and quickly spread to other Tibetan areas of China. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has expressed deep concern regarding these events, has called on all sides to refrain from violence, and has strongly urged China to exercise restraint in dealing with the protesters and to respect the fundamental right of all people to peacefully express their religious and political views. Underlying these tragic events is China's long-standing repression of religious, cultural and other freedoms for the Tibetan people, repression that has been extensively documented in State Department human rights reports and elsewhere. Since 1949, the cycle of protests followed by crackdowns has repeated itself several times, but the end result has always been the same: Control is restored but only temporarily, while the underlying causes of Tibetan grievances remain unaddressed. SOURCE: United States Department of State

The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace - Statement by Lodi Gyari

Mon, 05 May 2008 12:10:57 -0700

Among the most disturbing developments in Tibet is the segregation of Tibetans from Chinese society. Tibetans are now instructed to stay or return to their registered place of residence, they are prohibited from accessing services, like hotels, unless specifically designated for their use; and they are routinely harassed and detained simply because they are Tibetan. Chinese servers in many restaurants are choosing not to serve Tibetans. The Chinese government, which, as a tenet of its economic growth strategy has encouraged travel for its citizens, restricts travel for Tibetans. SOURCE: United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee // Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace - Statement by Steven Marshall

Mon, 05 May 2008 12:08:00 -0700

My experience on the Tibetan plateau dates to the mid-1980s, and I have visited many of the areas, towns, and monasteries where today’s protests and crackdown are unfolding. I witnessed at close range the events of 1989 that led to martial law in Lhasa. I know that Tibetans are facing very serious consequences. The cascade of Tibetan protests began in Lhasa on March 10, 2008, then, by the end of March, had swept across much of the ethnic Tibetan area of China. Except for periods of armed conflict between Tibetan and Chinese armed forces and periods of politically-driven social chaos, no Chinese government has been confronted by an upsurge of Tibetan discontent as widely dispersed, sustained, and popular since the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Chinese public security forces, principally the People’s Armed Police (PAP), moved swiftly to establish lockdowns in each protest site. SOURCE: United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee // Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace - Statement by Lobsang Sangay

Mon, 05 May 2008 12:06:06 -0700

Boxer, and members of the subcommittee, for the honor of speaking before you today. I applaud the actions of the Senate during this crisis, most notably the Senate letter to President Hu Jintao, sent on April 2, and the Senate resolution passed on April 9th (S. Res. 504--110th Congress (2008). You have demonstrated your leadership, and the convening of this hearing attests to your commitment to support a positive way forward out of the current crisis. There is now a window of opportunity for meaningful dialogue between the two sides to find a lasting solution to the Tibet issue. The issue will not go away, and the earlier it is addressed, the better it will be for all. SOURCE: United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee // Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

The Crisis in Tibet: Finding a Path to Peace - Statement by John D. Negroponte

Mon, 05 May 2008 12:03:53 -0700

A little over a month ago, what began as peaceful protests in Lhasa erupted into violence and the loss of lives and property spanning the Tibet Autonomous Region and other Tibetan areas of China. The United States welcomes a stable, peaceful and prosperous China, and we have a broad agenda with that country, which is a growing economic powerhouse, a nuclear P-5 member, and an increasingly important actor on the international scene. At the same time, we engage China in a way that is supportive of our political values — urging respect for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy. The United States recognizes Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China, but we have very serious concerns about the recent events, human rights conditions, and limits on religious freedom there. The United States calls upon the PRC Government to exercise restraint in resolving the recent unrest and urges dialogue with the Dalai Lama, but it is up to China and the Tibetans to resolve their differences. In this testimony, I would like to touch on the recent events in Tibet, outline our response, and discuss next steps. SOURCE: United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee // Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs

Middle Powers and Korean Normalization: An Australian Perspective Revisited

Wed, 30 Apr 2008 13:27:01 -0700

Towards the end of 1997, amidst the seemingly momentous changes occurring on the Korean peninsula, the Nautilus Institute published an essay by then Director of the Asia Institute at Monash University, Professor John McKay, and Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) official, Tim Dunk.[1] The essay, entitled "The role of medium sized powers in the normalization process on the Korean peninsula: An Australian perspective", convincingly argued that in the aftermath of the Cold War, a new opportunity had emerged for middle powers, such as Australia, to contribute to normalization on the Korean peninsula. However, a little over a decade later, after a period of substantially heightened security concerns on the peninsula as a result of the nuclear issue, middle powers largely remain either marginalized or, in the case of Australia, dutifully positioned in support of major power policies. This seems to support the realist hypothesis that middle powers are followers during periods of heightened security tension. SOURCE: Nautilus Institute

La crise Tibetaine: Une menace pour l'unité nationale?

Wed, 30 Apr 2008 10:36:19 -0700

A l'approche des Jeux Olympiques, les dirigeants chinois sont soucieux de présenter l'image d'une Chine moderne. Mais toute manifestation de dissidence interne est perçue comme un désordre. Surtout au Tibet dont les revendications pourraient, à leurs yeux, faire tâche d'huile dans d'autres régions du pays. SOURCE: Centre d'études et de recherches internationales - Sciences Po

De la question du boycott des J.O. de Pékin…

Wed, 30 Apr 2008 10:01:40 -0700

Les Jeux Olympiques de Pékin donnent actuellement lieu à une série d’événements qui dépassent sans doute les prévisions les plus pessimistes des dirigeants chinois. Ils ont toujours craint que la nécessaire publicité faite autour de cette rencontre ne soit l’occasion d’être mis sous le feu des critiques. Mais les responsables français n’avaient sans doute pas imaginé que le passage rapide de la flamme olympique dans la capitale pourrait provoquer de telles réactions chinoises et de telles divisions à l’intérieur de leur propre pays. SOURCE: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques

Walking on Thin Ice: Control, Intimidation and Harassment of Lawyers in China

Tue, 29 Apr 2008 09:10:33 -0700

The development of a strong, independent legal profession in China is critical to the promotion and protection of human rights. Lawyers serve a critical function in the administration of justice, a point recognized by China’s top leaders themselves, as well as the large international legal reform community working in China. Over the past two decades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has progressively embraced the rule of law as a key part of its agenda to reform the way the country is governed. Importing entire pieces of Western-style legal institutions, the CCP is in the process of establishing a modern court system, has enacted thousands of laws and regulations, and has established hundreds of law schools to train legal professionals. It has publicized through constant propaganda campaigns the idea that common citizens have basic rights, elevated the concept of the “rule of law” to constitutional status, and recognized the validity of human rights norms with a new constitutional clause stipulating that “the state respects and protect human rights.” SOURCE: Human Rights Watch

Crisis Guide: The Korean Peninsula

Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:42:30 -0700

North Korea's testing of a nuclear weapon in October 2006 prompted international uproar and raised concerns about the erratic nature of negotiations with Pyongyang. While the United States and Japan worry about the isolated country's long-range missile developments, South Korea and China fear the economic implications of the collapse of Kim Jong-Il's regime. Behind these tensions lies a frozen conflict: Over half a century since the end of the Korean War, the peninsula remains divided between the communist North and capitalist South. The United States continues to maintain tens of thousands of troops in South Korea in case the conflict reignites, and North Korea's long-range artillery and rocket-launch batteries keep Seoul in Pyongyang's crosshairs. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations

Denuclearizing North Korea

Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:24:36 -0700

Pyongyang agreed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the September 19, 2005, Six-Party Joint Statement, but elimination of its nuclear weapons program remains elusive. The Six-Party Talks have called for North Korea to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear production complex; disable its facilities; declare its entire nuclear program; dismantle its facilities; and eliminate all nuclear weapons, materials, and weapons infrastructure—all in concert with compensating measures from the other five parties—South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Yet the process is at an impasse, primarily regarding North Korea’s declaration of its entire nuclear program. SOURCE: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists // Stanford University

Australia-India Relations: Hesitating on the Brink of Partnership

Mon, 21 Apr 2008 13:54:11 -0700

As Kevin Rudd visits Washington and other world capitals on his first major international trip as Australian Prime Minister, media attention has fixated on his perceived snub to Japan, since his only Asian destination is Beijing. But India too is feeling a shiver of uncertainty about the new Australian government's priorities. Australia and India are logical strategic partners. Yet circumstances, especially the Cold War and nuclear differences, have long obstructed both countries need, though this will take sustained political will in both capitals. An unsteady start to the relationship under the Rudd government also suggests it is quite possible that expectations will be left unfulfilled. If so, the reasons will include uranium and China SOURCE: East-West Center // University of Hawaii

Sino-Pakistani Defense Relations and the War on Terrorism

Mon, 21 Apr 2008 12:13:19 -0700

Concurrent with Pakistan’s often tumultuous military relationship with the United States is a growing and highly amicable economic and military relationship with China that poses vital questions regarding Pakistan’s future approach to the War on Terrorism. While suspicion of American motives runs high in Pakistan, China has made major inroads in the South Asian country, including a free-trade deal, assistance in power development, the implementation of a five-year trade and development plan and a strategic partnership meant to address deficiencies in Pakistan’s military technology and increase cooperation against Islamist terrorist cells (Xinhua, April 3; Associated Press of Pakistan [APP], April 17). Discussions on defense and security issues were an important part of this week’s state visit to China by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf (APP, April 14). Pakistan and China are involved in major co-production projects involving the manufacture of JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft—similar to American F-16s, which Pakistan continues to purchase from the United States—and F22P naval frigates. The latter project involves the construction of four frigates, three in China and the last in the Karachi shipyards. The project involves important technology transfers—unavailable from the United States—that will allow Pakistan to build major warships on its own (Dawn [Karachi], April 5; China Daily, April 5). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation

La présence chinoise au Cambodge. Contribution à une économie politique violente, rentière et inégalitaire

Fri, 18 Apr 2008 14:56:06 -0700

Depuis une dizaine d’années, l’aide et l’investissement chinois au Cambodge ont crû de manière exponentielle, ce qui est révélateur de la montée en puissance de la Chine populaire, notamment dans les pays où elle peut s’appuyer sur une importante communauté chinoise d’outre-mer. Or l’aide chinoise, libre de toute rhétorique démocratique, peut autoriser les gouvernements qui en bénéficient à s’affranchir des conditionnalités imposées par les bailleurs de fonds, le Cambodge étant l’un des pays les plus tributaires de l’aide publique au développement. Une analyse en termes de contingence historique renvoie à la conjonction de deux processus d’accaparement rentier de l’économie, en Chine comme au Cambodge. De fait, l’aide et l’investissement chinois contribuent à consolider une économie politique fondée tout à la fois sur l’arbitraire, le renforcement des inégalités et de la violence, et le chevauchement des positions de pouvoir et d’accumulation. A cet égard, l’aide des autres donateurs est partie prenante de l’analyse, non seulement parce qu’elle se trouve désormais en concurrence avec l’aide chinoise, mais aussi, et avant tout, parce qu’elle a concouru depuis les Accords de Paris, certes indirectement, à asseoir le pouvoir du Premier ministre Hun Sen. SOURCE: Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales

Managing Crisis and Sustaining Peace between China and the United States

Fri, 18 Apr 2008 14:55:47 -0700

A series of crises have strained relations between the People’s Republic of China and the United States since the end of the Cold War. Included most prominently among them are the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. Although none of these crises led to direct military hostilities, they have had an adverse impact on bilateral relations and portend future such crises between the two countries. To determine how best to mitigate such crises in the future, it is important to study these recent crises and identify the positive and negative responses and actions of both governments during them. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, sparked by Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States, led to the first face-off between Chinese and U.S. militaries since President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Even so, transparency on the part of China, restraint on the part of the United States, and regular communication between Beijing and Washington during the crisis helped reduce anxieties and the possibility of misjudgment on either side, thus avoiding an escalation of the crisis SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace

China in Africa: Lending, Policy Space and Governance

Thu, 17 Apr 2008 11:26:45 -0700

The report findings show that Chinese lending is generally welcome in Africa. The loans that China provides often contribute to financing infrastructure and other projects that African countries need. However, it is of concern that China is lending to countries that already have large debts outstanding. It is not the lending per se that is problematic, since it seems that China’s lending occurs in resource rich countries. What makes China a risk to debt sustainability in poor countries is the lack of transparency in loan contraction processes. Loan contracts between China and African countries are not open to public scrutiny. This leaves a lot of power in the hands of a few African leaders. As our case study from Zambia shows, loan contracts are often made at the highest political level, and because of the lack of transparency, the agreements are not available to parliament, civil society or media. SOURCE: Norwegian Campaign for Debt Cancellation // Norwegian Council for Africa

Olympic Corporate Sponsors: Rhetoric and Reality

Thu, 17 Apr 2008 09:05:33 -0700

Beginning in September 2007, Human Rights Watch wrote to all 12 “TOP” Olympic sponsors to encourage them to address human rights abuses taking place as a result of the Beijing Games, with targeted and achievable asks. The suggested steps are in conformity both with the sponsors’ support for the Olympic Charter and with their own policies on corporate social responsibility or human rights. In addition to these 12 worldwide sponsors, Human Rights Watch has also written to Olympic supplier Microsoft and to NBC, which controls the broadcasting franchise. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch

Access to Justice in China

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 14:46:50 -0700

Amid China’s extraordinary economic growth, the government has made some efforts to reform the legal system and improve methods for resolving grievances. But China’s legal system, a blend of traditional Chinese law with socialist and civil laws, ultimately remains under the complete control of the Communist Party. Leading international human rights groups continue to point to widespread abuses in the country’s judicial system. The ingrained flaws of the system have increasingly led Chinese citizens to seek justice through a variety of alternatives, from petitioning and mediation to political pressure using media and international rights organizations. Says Donald C. Clarke, a specialist in Chinese law at George Washington University: “Courts are not necessarily the place where you would go to seek justice in China.” SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations

Un portrait des femmes autochtones d'Asie

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 14:20:26 -0700

Publiée par le Réseau des femmes autochtones d’Asie (Asian Indigenous Women’s Network, AIWN) et l’Alliance des peuples autochtones de l’archipel (AMAN: Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), de concert avec Droits et Démocratie. Cette trousse d’information met en évidence le travail accompli par les femmes autochtones, qui agissent aux échelons local, national et international afin de faire respecter leurs droits. Cette trousse est une adaptation du document << Femmes autochtones des Amériques >>. SOURCE: Droits et Démocratie

A Security and Peace Mechanism for Northeast Asia: The Economic Dimension

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:30:20 -0700

The creation of an enduring multilateral security and peace mechanism for Northeast Asia and the furthering of regional economic cooperation have been identified as components of a final resolution of the North Korean nuclear controversy in the Six Party Talks among the United States, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. Haggard and Noland argue that a central objective should be North Korea’s integration into the world economy, encouraging its economic revival and the resolution of its chronic humanitarian problems, as well as embedding it in relations that could reduce the likelihood of future disruptive behavior. Reform and the international private sector’s involvement in the country’s economic renewal are key. Yet the North Korean tail should not wag the dog: To be fruitful and politically sustainable, the agenda must engage the interests of all six parties, not just those of North Korea. With progress stalled on more legalistic forms of regional integration, the authors suggest that the Economy and Energy Cooperation Working Group, created by the six parties in February 2007, could become the locus for wider economic cooperation and thus complement the security agenda for Northeast Asia. SOURCE: Peterson Institute // The Stanley Foundation

Péninsule coréenne : une nation, deux identités stratégiques

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 13:03:51 -0700

Pour bon nombre d’observateurs, l’histoire moderne de la Corée renvoie à une réalité politique tragique marquée par de fréquentes incursions chinoises, la brutale colonisation japonaise à partir de 1910 puis la partition du pays en 1953, au terme d’une guerre fratricide et meurtrière de trois ans. La mémoire nationale coréenne s’est ainsi construite dans la violence, l’humiliation et un pessimisme stratégique qui va conduire la Corée du Sud à s’en remettre à la garantie de sécurité américaine et la Corée du Nord au développement d’une rhétorique belliqueuse et au nationalisme nucléaire. L’une comme l’autre, prisonnière de la logique de la guerre froide et du système d’alliance qui en découle, où l’axe Pyongyang-Pékin-Moscou s’oppose à l’axe Séoul-Washington-Tokyo, manifestent le même sentiment d’insécurité et le même instinct de survie. Séoul, à moins d’une soixantaine de kilomètres de la zone démilitarisée (Demilitarized Zone), qui marque la séparation de la péninsule, a la conscience aiguë d’être à portée de l’artillerie lourde nord-coréenne. De son côté, le régime de Pyongyang, persuadée que les États-Unis veulent sa perte, entretient sa population dans une mentalité de citadelle assiégée. SOURCE: Institut français des relations internationales

Tibet: Problems, Prospects, and U.S. Policy

Wed, 16 Apr 2008 12:25:44 -0700

On March 10, 2008, a series of demonstrations began in Lhasa and other Tibetan regions of China to mark the 49th anniversary of an unsuccessful Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in 1959. The demonstrations appeared to begin peacefully with small groups that were then contained by security forces. Both the protests and the response of the PRC authorities escalated in the ensuing days, spreading from the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) into parts of Sichuan, Gansu, and Qinghai Provinces with Tibetan populations. By March 14, 2008, mobs of angry people were burning and looting establishments in downtown Lhasa. Authorities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) responded by sealing off Tibet and moving in large-scale security forces. Beijing has defended its actions as appropriate and necessary to restore civil order and prevent further violence. Still, China’s response has resulted in renewed calls for boycotts of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony on August 8, 2008, and for China to hold talks with the Dalai Lama. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

China and the Olympics

Mon, 14 Apr 2008 12:56:16 -0700

China recently announced thwarted terrorism plots as protests against the country's hosting of the Olympics continue across the world. China expert Cheng Li joins Diane Rehm to discuss these issues and others facing the August games in Beijing. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution

Denied Status, Denied Education: Children of North Korean Women in China

Mon, 14 Apr 2008 10:36:02 -0700

In the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in eastern Jilin province, northeast China, many North Korean children and children of Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers live in legal limbo. There is no official data estimating the number of such children living in the area, but local residents put the number at anywhere between a few thousand and several tens of thousands. A serious problem these children face is access to education, as Chinese schools require verification of identity for admittance and continued schooling. In China, every citizen must be registered under a household registration system called hukou. Chinese law stipulates that a child born in China is entitled to citizenship if either parent is a Chinese citizen. However, since registering a child would expose the identity of the mother, Chinese men who have had children with North Korean women are faced with an awful choice. They can register their child at the risk of exposing their mothers, who could be arrested and repatriated to North Korea as “illegal” economic migrants, or they can decide not to register the child—leaving the child without access to education. When both parents are North Koreans, it is impossible for a child to obtain hukou [household registration permit]. SOURCE: Human Rights Watch

A Harmonious Resolution of the Tibetan Question

Fri, 11 Apr 2008 09:57:23 -0700

What could the likely approaches to the Tibet issue be, that takes into account practical realities rather than reaches back into history? The problem in Tibet could be approached through two concepts articulated by China in the last few years: first, the concept of a "harmonious society" and second, the concept of a "harmonious world." The concept of the "harmonious society" is a wide-ranging concept. Its main characteristics are democracy, rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, and vitality. The concept also includes issues such as guaranteeing respect for the people's rights and interests, the environment, enhanced creativity of society as a whole and the development of an innovation-based nation. This concept has been generated due to a recognition within the Chinese leadership that even though massive economic development in the last 25 years has reduced poverty in China, all this has come at a heavy price such as growing income disparities, regional imbalances, social unrest, corrupt local leaders unfettered by the rule of law, and a highly-degraded environment. SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

China's Growing International Security and Diplomatic Role

Thu, 10 Apr 2008 10:48:43 -0700

This Wilton Park Conference assessed China's role in, and impact upon, international security. Political reform combined with rapid and sometimes extraordinary economic growth have lent a new salience to this question, and while many different answers are possible, one thing that can be agreed upon is that China's international security role 20 years hence will be significantly and perhaps radically different to that pertaining now. How does China itself sees its role now and in the future? China's own perspective on its strategic culture tends to emphasise a 'Great Wall' mentality, in which the state is regarded as essentially pacifist, defensive-minded and non-expansionist. In this self-image, 'hard power' has only been used in cases of self-defence. Use of military force beyond this is regarded as unacceptable unless it is in the interests of 're-unification' of Chinese territory (in which case it can be regarded as a just war). This view of Chinese strategic culture as essentially peaceable and benevolent is appealing to China's self-image, but can be counter-productive to China's own interests by producing an inability to see how China's behaviour could be seen as threatening by other states. This potential blind spot can be exacerbated by the two faces of China's policy, in which traditional realpolitik and a more peaceful Confucianism exist side-by-side. SOURCE: Wilton Park Conference WP843

The Question of Tibet

Wed, 09 Apr 2008 14:48:51 -0700

The recent anti-government clashes in Tibet and other regions in China demonstrate the depth of historical disagreement over the territory. Tensions between China and Tibet have persisted since People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949. China says Tibet has been a part of China for many centuries now, a claim refuted by many Tibetans. Chinese authorities use this claim to support their sovereignty over the territory while proponents of the Tibetan independence point to periods in Tibetan history when it enjoyed self-rule. Meanwhile, Chinese government policies in Tibet have fed the conflict. These inlude restrictions on cultural and religious freedoms of Tibetans, attempts to change the demographics of the region through migration of ethnic Chinese, and an unwillingness to open dialogue with Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Experts believe the dispute over Tibet will persist as long as China refuses to speak to the Dalai Lama, who has been in exile in neighboring India since 1959. China, however, has sought to bypass the 73-year-old Dalai Lama and concentrated instead on efforts to control the process that will determine his successor. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations

Negotiating with North Korea: 1992–2007

Fri, 04 Apr 2008 13:49:56 -0700

Over the past seven years, public debate and political commentary on North Korea’s nuclear program have pitted one mode of negotiations (bilateral) against another (multilateral). That debate obscured important lessons from the past and impeded diplomatic progress. The purpose of this paper is not to revisit the debate between the various approaches but rather to analyze the diplomacy as it has actually unfolded. An important strength of bilateral negotiations with the North is operational simplicity. There is much to be said for being able to focus the discussions and control the message in order to shape the outcome. Multilateral talks, by contrast, dilute the focus and complicate the task of delivering a single, unambiguous policy position. Yet, multilateral diplomacy has certain strengths that are well worth exploiting. Indeed, having come so far down the multilateral road on the North Korean issue, there may be no turning back now without doing considerable damage to the prospects for longer term security cooperation in Northeast Asia. SOURCE: Center for International Security and Cooperation // Stanford University

Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China

Wed, 02 Apr 2008 11:17:19 -0700

The April 1990 armed uprising in Baren marked an increase in Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang, China. Two justifications—ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric—are given. The Uyghurs, who reside throughout the immediate region, are the largest Turkic ethnic group living in Xinjiang as well as being overwhelmingly Muslim. This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the movement of religious and political ideologies, weapons, and people. The desired outcome by groups that use violence is, broadly speaking, a separate Uyghur state, called either Uyghuristan or Eastern Turkistan, which lays claim to a large part of China. While some Uyghurs want a separate state, others want to maintain cultural distinction within an autonomous relationship with China, and others are integrating into the Chinese system. There is no single Uyghur agenda. SOURCE: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies

People’s Republic of China: The Olympics countdown – crackdown on Tibetan protesters

Wed, 02 Apr 2008 09:51:30 -0700

Since 10 March 2008, serious human rights violations have been reported in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR, hereafter ‘Tibet’) and Tibetan areas of neighbouring provinces in connection with the police and military crackdown on Tibetan protesters. Initial protests by Tibetans in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, appear to have been peaceful and suppressed in violation of protesters’ right to freedom of expression, association and assembly, including through excessive use of force. Protests later turned violent, with some protesters attacking individuals because they were believed to be Han Chinese. Some of these attacks are reported to have resulted in death, injury and damage to property. Amnesty International condemns such attacks and acknowledges the Chinese authorities’ right and duty to protect all individuals against violence, including those who are at risk of being targeted solely on account of their ethnic identity. SOURCE: Amnesty International

People’s Republic of China: The Olympics countdown – crackdown on activists threatens Olympics legacy

Wed, 02 Apr 2008 09:50:19 -0700

With little more than four months to go before the Beijing Olympics, few substantial reforms have been introduced that will have a significant, positive impact on human rights in China.1 This is particularly apparent in the plight of individual activists and journalists, who have bravely sought to expose ongoing human rights abuses and call on the government to address them. Recent measures taken by the authorities to detain, prosecute and imprison those who raise human rights concerns suggest that, to date, the Olympic Games has failed to act as a catalyst for reform. Unless the Chinese authorities take steps to redress the situation urgently, a positive human rights legacy for the Beijing Olympics looks increasingly beyond reach. SOURCE: Amnesty International

Chine - Le coût humain de la modernisation urbaine : Expulsions forcées à Chongqing

Tue, 01 Apr 2008 15:29:32 -0700

La présente brochure est née de la volonté de témoigner des violations des droits de l’Homme engendrées par les expulsions forcées, liées au développement et à la modernisation des villes chinoises. Alertée par l’ampleur du phénomène, la FIDH a décidé de mener une mission d’enquête in situ, afi n de rendre compte de la situation dans une grande ville représentative du reste de la Chine, la municipalité autonome de Chongqing. Le rapport de mission, à partir duquel cette brochure a été conçue, se fonde sur les témoignages d’une cinquantaine de personnes de différents milieux socio-économiques, victimes d’expulsions forcées suite à la démolition de leurs habitations. Ils ont été collectés au cours de plusieurs séjours à Chongqing, entre 2002 et 2006. Afin d’éviter de mettre en danger les personnes rencontrées, les autorités chinoises n’ont pas été informées de la mission d’enquête menée par la FIDH. Le rapport garantit également l’anonymat des personnes qui ont accepté de témoigner. La liberté d’expression progresse en Chine mais les personnes travaillant ou prenant position sur des sujets jugés sensibles par le gouvernement sont toujours surveillées de près, menacées, et souvent sévèrement réprimées. La FIDH ne condamne en aucun cas la modernisation, parfois nécessaire, des villes chinoises. Elle s’attache seulement à mettre en évidence les abus dont sont victimes les habitants, en violation de leurs libertés fondamentales, et leur donne l’opportunité de faire entendre leur voix. SOURCE: Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme

Public Interest Litigation and Political Activism in China

Fri, 28 Mar 2008 11:59:28 -0700

Public interest litigation (PIL) involves the use of a country’s legal system to instigate change that affects the public. Internationally, PIL has been described as “seeking to precipitate social change through court-ordered decrees”, “litigation designed to reach beyond the individual case and the immediate client”, “court-driven approaches in producing significant social reform,” “espousing causes through litigation,” “to help produce systemic policy change in society on behalf of individuals who are members of groups that are underrepresented or disadvantaged,” and so forth (Goldston, 2006). Chinese legal scholars have also advanced various definitions of PIL. So far no consensus has been reached, but it is generally agreed that PIL stands in contrast to private interest litigation. A PIL lawsuit must have wider implications beyond the individual case and affects more than the immediate litigant. SOURCE: Rights and Democracy

Les litiges d’intérêt public et le militantisme politique en Chine

Fri, 28 Mar 2008 11:25:13 -0700

Ils contestent devant les tribunaux chinois le prix d’un péage sur une autoroute, l’absence de reçu pour un repas servi à la cantine d’un train, ou encore l’apparition de parcomètres qui gênent l’accès à une voie cyclable. Ils le font dans le but d’entraîner des changements politiques dans un pays réfractaire à ce genre de remise en cause. Ces avocats chinois choisissent avec soin des causes qui ont l’avantage de ne pas attaquer de plein fouet le gouvernement tout en offrant la possibilité de provoquer des changements importants dans les politiques gouvernementales. Dans cette étude, la chercheuse Yiyi Lu examine cette approche à la fois audacieuse et prudente pour promouvoir la primauté du droit et favoriser une prise de conscience des droits humains en Chine. SOURCE: Droits et Démocratie

Tibet : ombres chinoises

Fri, 28 Mar 2008 10:26:59 -0700

Ironie de l’histoire, serait-on tenté de dire, n’était-ce la gravité des événements observés ces deux dernières semaines sur les hauts plateaux tibétains, ce « toit du monde » pétri de sommets et de bouddhisme. Ironie car, à quelques jours près, au pied du Tibet, le Bhoutan, royaume bouddhiste lamaïste coincé entre Chine et Inde, s’essayait avec enthousiasme à la démocratie pour la première fois de son histoire, en élisant les 47 membres de la prochaine assemblée nationale. On ne saurait dire — sauf à regarder en direction de l’Inde — que l’exemple vint des faubourgs septentrionaux de Thimphu, capitale promotrice du concept (à méditer…) de bonheur national brut (gross national happiness). Brut ; sans -–e— à la fin. Une inspiration régionale qui, visiblement, échappe à l’ex Empire du Milieu… SOURCE: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques

Autonomy and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Tibet

Wed, 26 Mar 2008 12:45:31 -0700

Over the past couple years the PRC Government and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile have engaged in five rounds of discussions over their continuing conflict. The difficulties between these parties now stretch back over fifty years since China’s original occupation of Tibet on the heals of its own civil war. It has also been nearly fifty years since the Dalai Lama fled into exile in 1959. For much of this time the parties’ positions appeared intractable, as China claimed full sovereignty over Tibet and the Tibetan exile government essentially sought independence from China. Throughout this time China has successfully occupied Tibet and maintained a substantial military presence there. The combination of actual control and real politic has gained China formal international recognition of its sovereign claim. At the same time, a non-violent strategy and global outreach has won the Tibetan exiles considerable international solicitude, even earning the Dalai Lama a Nobel Prize in 1989. Various UN resolutions from the 1960s and a string of human rights reports suggest that China’s current policy of autonomy under its National Regional Autonomy Law has largely failed to realize legitimate Tibetan aspirations. With the highly respected Dalai Lama now 72 and considerable uncertainty about the future, there have been urgent pleas for the parties to move toward resolution of this seemingly intractable conflict. Both sides have now adopted autonomy as their policy objective, though they tend to define its content very differently. This paper considers the question under what circumstances, including history and international solicitude, autonomy may be said to acquire international recognition and how this may contribute to resolution of seemingly intractable conflicts. The author has visited India, China and Tibet and has interviewed officials in Beijing, Dharamsala and Delhi. This included a substantial interview with HH the Dalai Lama. The study assesses the historical record and current practice to argue that an appropriately grounded and internationally recognized autonomy may offer a path to resolving such internal ethnic conflict. SOURCE: Annual Convention of the International Studies Association

The New York Philharmonic in North Korea. A New Page in US-DPRK Relations?

Wed, 26 Mar 2008 11:18:28 -0700

The New York Philharmonic Orchestra performed in North Korea on February 25 to much international attention -- and controversy. When news of an invitation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name of North Korea) surfaced last fall, it ignited a storm of North Korea-bashing as well as hope in some quarters for a breakthrough in DPRK-US relations modeled on the ping pong diplomacy that jump-started US-China relations earlier. The media coverage of the event recapitulated the regime change vs. engagement debates argued in the security realm. After examining the background to the events in Pyongyang, this article assesses Western responses to the proposed visit and its potential significance for the US-North Korea relationship. SOURCE: Nautilus Institute

Radicalisation of Tibetan Youth

Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:58:54 -0700

The world-wide demonstrations of Tibetans of all ages against China and the uprisings in Greater Tibet since March 10, 2008. have come as the culmination of a long debate in Dharamsala and among Tibetan refugees all over the world, including India, over the wisdom of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's continued adherence to his Middle Path policy. By Middle Path, he meant autonomy and not independence and a non-violent struggle to achieve that objective. By autonomy, he meant on the Hong Kong model of one country, two systems and not the present Chinese model of total integration and Han colonisation in the name of autonomy. He was seeking a dialogue with the Chinese leadership in the hope of thereby making his Middle Path a reality. Tibetan youth organisations such as the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), formed in 1970 under the blessings of His holiness, and Students For A Free Tibet went along with him till 2003 despite having serious reservations as to whether the policy would work and about the insincerity of the Chinese. The action of Shri A.B.Vajpayee, the then Indian Prime Minister, in agreeing to Tibet being described as a part of China in a statement issued during his visit to China in 2003 set off alarm bells ringing in the Tibetan community abroad as well as in Greater Tibet. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group

Beijing Olympics and Jihadi Terrorism

Tue, 25 Mar 2008 14:57:16 -0700

Among those presently undergoing imprisonment in the US for their role in the explosions in the New York World Trade Centre in February, 1993, is Ramzi Yousef, a Kuwaiti resident of Pakistani origin. Before his arrest in Pakistan and conviction in the US, he had planned a series of explosions on board a number of planes. He plotted this from a hide-out in Manila. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, a principal architect of the 9/11 terrorist strikes in the US, was also involved in this conspiracy. However, the plot was thwarted by the Filipino police after an accidental fire in the Manila apartment of Ramzi Yousef alerted them to it. Ramzi Yousef ran away to Pakistan, where he was arrested by the Pakistani authorities and handed over to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US. The investigation brought out that Ramzi and KSM were plotting to blow up the planes with the help of liquid explosives smuggled into the aircraft. SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group

Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects

Tue, 25 Mar 2008 10:40:26 -0700

This paper analyzes the dialogue process in the Sino-Tibetan dispute, examining the relationship between Beijing and the Dalai Lama from their initial engagement in the early post-Mao years through the protracted stalemate of the 1990s and on to the current experimentation with direct contacts. In addition to drawing on lessons from the past, the study surveys the major factors that are likely to impact the future dynamics of engagement. It thereby provides an assessment of the current prospects for dialogue and for settling the longstanding dispute. SOURCE: East-West Center // University of Hawaii

Trouble in Tibet

Thu, 20 Mar 2008 13:01:40 -0700

At the top of the world, there’s trouble afoot. A weeklong conflict between Chinese authorities and Tibetan protestors escalated sharply March 17, with China’s military issuing a mandate (FT) for demonstrators to surrender—or face violent repercussions. Following China’s threat, over one hundred Tibetans turned themselves in (BBC) to police, according to Chinese state media. Chinese troops also moved to seal off the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, blocking movement of people in and out of the city. An eyewitness report from the Economist’s China correspondent paints an ominous scene, with residents of Lhasa too frightened to emerge from their homes. Reuters reports conflicts between protestors and Chinese military may have already resulted in as many as eighty deaths. The protests mark the largest uprising in Tibet in nearly two decades, threaten to incite political tension in neighboring India, and could potentially complicate China’s political situation ahead of the 2008 Olympic Games. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations

Beijing's Propaganda Campaign Can't Obscure Complicity in Darfur Genocide

Wed, 19 Mar 2008 14:07:11 -0700

Recent massive civilian displacement and destruction in West Darfur, orchestrated by the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum, has been amply chronicled by UN and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, as well as by journalists on the ground. Hundreds have been killed or died as a result of the violence and subsequent flight. Some 60,000 people have been newly displaced, more than 13,000 of these into a highly insecure region of Eastern Chad. Some 20,000 civilians are effectively trapped in the mountainous Jebel Moun region to the east of the initial assaults, and are prey to Khartoum’s ongoing bombing attacks, as well as ground attacks by regular army forces and Janjaweed militias. SOURCE: Reeves, Eric

L’Europe et la Chine : une coopération aux dimensions juridiques complexes

Tue, 18 Mar 2008 16:26:07 -0700

Cet article se propose d’évaluer juridiquement le contenu et la mise en oeuvre du « partenariat stratégique » entre l’Union européenne (UE) et la République populaire de Chine (RPC). En l’absence de la catégorie « pays émergents » en droit international économique, l’UE doit adapter sa politique extérieure à l’égard de la Chine, puissance économique et commerciale majeure. Or les relations entre la Communauté européenne (CE) et la Chine sont actuellement régies par un accord de deuxième génération datant de 1985. Depuis 2003, une nouvelle dynamique a donc été enclenchée à travers l’élaboration, par les deux parties, d’actes préparatoires et à travers des déclarations conjointes lors des sommets annuels sur le « partenariat stratégique ». Portant sur le long terme, ce partenariat permet une prévisibilité des relations entre les deux partenaires, en combinant des éléments de soft law et de hard law. Si l’introduction du dialogue politique à travers le partenariat stratégique semble altérer la cohérence de l’Union, notamment au regard des difficultés de mise en oeuvre des droits de l’homme, sa valeur ajoutée réside essentiellement dans les volets économique et commercial, via la mise en place de « dialogues économiques » non contraignants et couvrant un large spectre de la relation, et la multiplication d’accords sectoriels (transports maritimes, coopération douanière, etc.). Cet enrichissement constant a ainsi permis aux parties d’envisager la conclusion d’un nouvel accord-cadre lors du sommet de septembre 2005 : le mandat donné à la Commission européenne en décembre 2005 vise ainsi à conclure un accord de partenariat et de coopération. Cet article esquisse donc une prospective de ce cadre juridique à l’aune des reconfigurations régionales asiatiques et du droit de l’Organisation mondiale du Commerce (OMC). Les enjeux commerciaux de la relation pourraient impliquer l’intégration de domaines « OMC plus » dans le futur accord, notamment en matière d’investissements, ce qui engendrerait sa mixité (accord conclu à la fois par « la Communauté et ses États membres »). Cela étant, la négociation risque d’être également délicate sur le plan politique, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’insertion au sein du futur accord d’une clause de conditionnalité démocratique. Aussi, l’articulation entre les valeurs et les intérêts de l’UE sera particulièrement en jeu dans la négociation. SOURCE: Institut français des relations internationales