Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Southwest Asia". Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:25 +0000 Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:25 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 15 May 2008 13:03:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24386 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24386 It seems possible that the Council will take up the situation in Lebanon in the coming days. The recent fighting in Beirut brought back memories of the Civil War and underlined to all how fragile the situation has become with the ongoing political crisis. An Arab League delegation is arriving in Beirut today to try to mediate between the two sides. The “Friends of Lebanon” have called for the immediate cessation of fighting. Some Council members are currently considering whether the Council can add its voice in a constructive way to reinforcing these initiatives and calming the crisis. However, at press time, the timing and the format of any Council action remained unclear. SOURCE: Security Council Report Security Council Report Thu, 15 May 2008 12:47:20 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24384 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24384 The recent clashes between government supporters and Hizbullah, which claimed more than 80 lives, marked the most serious escalation in Lebanon's internal divisions since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war and demonstrates how the impending threat of a new civil war is constantly present. The decision by the government of Fouad Siniora to ban Hizbullah's phone network, which is critical to its military operations, and dismiss a Shia army officer responsible for security at Beirut's airport, was taken as a "declaration of war" by Hizbullah which laid siege to west Beirut and government institutions. The government's decision to withdraw the measures marked a significant victory for Hizbullah, at least for the short term. SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association Foreign Policy Association Thu, 15 May 2008 12:37:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383 Hizbollah’s takeover of much of West Beirut began as a cost-of-living strike on 7 May 2008. Yet the course of events, their speed and ultimately violent turn exposed the true stakes. For almost four years, Lebanon has been in a crisis alternatively revolving around the government’s composition, its program, the international tribunal investigating Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination, the choice of a new president and the electoral law. All attempts at peaceful resolution having failed, it has reverted, more dangerously than ever, to its origins: an existential struggle over Hizbollah’s arms. The government’s 14 May decision to reverse the measures – removal of the airport security chief and questioning Hizbollah’s parallel telephone system, a key part of its military apparatus, precipitated the crisis – is welcome as is the Arab League-mediated solution. The onus is now on all Lebanese parties to agree a package deal that breaks the political logjam and restricts how Hizbollah can use its military strength without disarming it for now. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Thu, 15 May 2008 12:08:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24379 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24379 Negotiations toward a ceasefire in Gaza, mediated by Egypt and other channels, have been ongoing for some time. Now, however, Egypt's efforts to convince Hamas and the other armed groups in Gaza to agree to a ceasefire while relinquishing some of their demands have borne fruit. The Egyptian minister of intelligence, Omar Suleiman, came to Israel to urge the government to accept Egypt's proposal for a six month ceasefire. Israel must decide whether such a ceasefire would harm Israel's broader interests, and whether its conditions resolve Israel's principal hesitations. The main terms of the ceasefire that must be agreed upon are: The territory to which it applies; Who is governed by it; Its linkage to the easing of pressure on Gaza. * Its linkage to the issue of arms smuggling into Gaza SOURCE: Institute for National Security Studies Institute for National Security Studies Thu, 15 May 2008 09:06:18 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24375 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24375 The Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (Optional Protocol) is meant to safeguard the rights of children under 18 from military recruitment and deployment to war, and to guarantee basic protections to former child soldiers, whether they are seeking refugee protection in the United States or are in U.S. custody for alleged crimes. The U.S. Senate ratified the Optional Protocol in December 2002. By signing and ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the U.S. bound itself to comply with the obligations contained in the Optional Protocol. The Optional Protocol provides that the absolute minimum age for voluntary recruitment is 16 years old. It also instructs countries to set their own minimum age by submitting a binding declaration, and the United States entered a binding declaration raising this minimum age to 17. Therefore, recruitment of youth ages 16 and under is categorically disallowed in the United States. SOURCE: American Civil Liberties Union American Civil Liberties Union Wed, 14 May 2008 15:18:24 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24366 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24366 Michael Young, a political analyst in Beirut, says Hezbollah’s efforts to impose its will in Lebanon have led to “a prolonged crisis that is a reflection of the cold war in the region” between Iran and the United States and their respective allies. He worries that Hezbollah’s latest efforts to show off its military power may spawn genuine hatred between Shiites and Sunnis in Lebanon. “Things could get a lot worse before they get better,” he says. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Wed, 14 May 2008 13:30:27 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24359 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24359 Ce rapport contient des résumés sur les régions suivants: Etats-Unis d’Amérique et Canada, et Europe occidentale et centrale. SOURCE: Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA Wed, 14 May 2008 13:22:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24358 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24358 Si le nombre total de cas de VIH notifiés reste modeste (à l’exception du Soudan), les chiffres sont en hausse dans plusieurs pays, en raison notamment de l’élargissement des activités de dépistage du VIH. SOURCE: Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA Nations Unies // Programme Commun Des Nations Unies Sur le VIH/SIDA Wed, 14 May 2008 12:39:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24353 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24353 In late 2006, the European Union awarded Oxford Research Group, the Middle East Policy Initiative Forum (MEPIF) and Conflicts Forum €500,000 over two years under its Partnerships for Peace programme. This project is designed to help develop more inclusive and legitimate approaches to transforming the Middle East conflict. The landscape of conflict and security is shifting across the Middle East. This project aims to support a new, inclusive approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict by opening new space for consultations among legitimate yet opposed stakeholders through civil society-brokered dialogue, analysis and engagement. The goal is to explore accommodations grounded in real support in the societies. The action will engage rooted elements of Palestinian and Israeli societies and stakeholders from the wider region, including faith-based movements. SOURCE: Oxford Research Group Oxford Research Group Wed, 14 May 2008 12:06:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24347 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24347 In a significant change of policy, Turkey recently initiated high-level official dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. A columnist for the Turkish mass circulation daily Zaman commented that such an official dialogue “was not an ordinary step. It was a turning point in the approach to the Kurdish issue and broke a taboo” (Zaman, May 5). The talks—which focused on a wide range of political, economic and security issues—are the first to occur on such a high official level. The May 2 talks in Baghdad involved a delegation led by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, the senior advisor to the Turkish prime minister; Murat Ozcelik, the special coordinator for Iraqi affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry; and Derya Kanbay, Turkey’s ambassador in Baghdad. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 14 May 2008 11:39:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24339 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24339 Pour sa première visite à New Delhi, le 29 avril 2008, le président iranien Mahmoud Ahmadinejad n’est resté que quelques heures, mais son passage a marqué les esprits. D’abord par la qualité de ses rencontres : la présidente de la République Pratibha Patil et le premier ministre Manmohan Singh. Ensuite par la relance du projet de gazoduc reliant l’Iran à l’Inde en passant par le Pakistan. Ce dernier semble désormais sur les rails, la construction devant commencer d’ici à 2010. Tous les détails ne sont pas encore réglés - il s’en faut de beaucoup. Mais le principe est retenu. « Le gazoduc est faisable, a déclaré lors d’une conférence de presse le ministre indien des affaires étrangères, M. Shiv Shankar Menon, et c‘est plus qu’un accord commercial. » (Agence France-Presse, 29 avril 2008.) SOURCE: Le Monde Diplomatique Le Monde Diplomatique Wed, 14 May 2008 11:08:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24336 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24336 Né en 1954 à Jérusalem, Moustapha Barghouti est médecin, formé dans les universités de Moscou, Jérusalem et Stanford. Il est secrétaire général d’Al-Mubadara (Initiative nationale palestinienne, INP), une organisation politique laïque. Il a été ministre de l’information dans le gouvernement palestinien d’union nationale constitué en 2007 après les élections législatives. Il fut aussi, en 2006, candidat à l’élection présidentielle. Il obtint un tiers des voix et se classa en seconde position, derrière le président actuel de l’Autorité palestinienne, M. Mahmoud Abbas. Leader de la principale organisation de Résistance de masse qui s’appuie sur la force de la non-violence, le Dr Barghouti a pour modèle de référence Gandhi, le père de l’indépendance de l’Inde, obtenue contre les Britanniques au moyen d’une stratégie de non-violence. Au sein d’une société palestinienne malmenée par six décennies de conflits, lasse de la corruption du Fatah et méfiante à l’égard du fondamentalisme religieux du Hamas, le soutien populaire, en particulier des couches laïques, aux thèses d’Al Mubadara se renforce sans cesse. SOURCE: Le Monde Diplomatique Le Monde Diplomatique Wed, 14 May 2008 09:49:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24327 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24327 De 1915 à 1918, plus d’un million d’'Arménien(ne)s furent les victimes de massacres et de déportations systématiques. La Suisse n'’a pas à ce jour reconnu cet événement historique comme un génocide. De nombreuses interventions parlementaires ont déjà demandé la reconnaissance suisse du génocide. Le dernier en date a été le postulat Zisyadis que le Conseil national a rejeté de justesse en mars 2001. Les développements politiques et juridiques actuels sur la scène nationale et internationale ont mis à nouveau la question du génocide des Arméniens à l’ordre du jour de l’'agenda politique. Lors de la session de printemps 2002, Jean-Claude Vaudroz, Conseiller national, a déposé un postulat visant la reconnaissance du génocide arménien par la Suisse. Le postulat exige que le Conseil national reconnaisse le génocide des Arméniens et qu’'il demande au Conseil fédéral d’'en prendre acte et de la transmettre par voie diplomatique habituelle. Avec la présente documentation, le génocide arménien est présenté et donne lieu à une discussion politique et juridique dans le contexte national et international. SOURCE: Société pour les peuples menacés Société pour les peuples menacés Mon, 12 May 2008 13:12:25 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24301 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24301 On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to “begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres.” Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties’ intention to enter an agreement that would commit the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and confront Al Qaeda and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory. Officials in the Bush Administration have subsequently stated that the agreement will not commit the United States to militarily defend Iraq. The nature and form of such a U.S.-Iraq security agreement has been a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by General Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, who suggested that any such agreement was unlikely to take the form of a treaty, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or otherwise require congressional approval. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Fri, 09 May 2008 10:53:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24269 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24269 The Winter Supplementary Estimate presented by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requests additional provision of £2,033 million, of which £1,919 million is to meet the estimated additional costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the financial year 2007–08. The MoD waits until the Winter Supplementary Estimates (in November) to present to Parliament the estimated costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the unpredictable nature of operations makes it difficult to forecast their cost with accuracy at the beginning of the financial year. We continue to argue that the estimated costs of military operations should be set out in the Main Estimates (in April); but, as a compromise, we recommend that the MoD provide in its estimates memorandum for the Main Estimates an account of its planning assumptions for the costs of military operations in the financial year ahead. SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee Fri, 09 May 2008 10:50:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24268 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24268 The Spring Supplementary Estimate presented by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) requests additional provision of £2,192 million, of which £1,410.5 million is to meet the estimated additional costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in Financial Year 2007–08. The cost of operations in Iraq has risen significantly despite the drawdown of forces there: in particular the estimate of the cost of capital additions there has almost doubled against its forecast just three months ago. The indirect resource costs attributable to operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have also risen five-fold against last year's outturn, far beyond the scale of other costs. The MoD needs to make clearer the reasons for these considerable increases. SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee United Kingdom House of Commons // Defence Committee Fri, 09 May 2008 10:42:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24267 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24267 Despite dangerously high tensions between the United States and Iran, which are rooted in the fundamentally different foreign policy objectives of each country, the risks of open hostilities between the two sides are kept in check by the realization of the catastrophic consequences involved. The conflict between the two sides is one of fundamental foreign policy visions and principles that often — especially since the start of President Bush’s second term — verge on the irreconcilable. The stakes of this dangerous rivalry are high, and the range of possible scenarios for moving beyond it is perilously limited. At the same time, however, both sides appear to be keenly aware of the catastrophic consequences of open hostilities between them, and thus seek to undermine the other’s interests without stepping beyond certain ill-defined red lines. High-level US-Iranian tensions are likely to continue for some time, therefore, without, however, spilling into open warfare. SOURCE: Middle East Institute Middle East Institute Wed, 07 May 2008 15:35:51 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24226 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24226 The Iraq War is an extremely complex conflict, and one where the overall trends and developments are difficult to track with any clarity. The Burke Chair has developed a detailed briefing on key developments in the fighting, drawing on material provided by the Multinational Force- Iraq (MNF-I), the Department of Defense, Department of State, Iraqi government, and other sources. The briefing surveys sectarian and ethnic trends, progress in political accommodation, developments in the fighting, and trends in casualties. Maps show the steady decline in Al Qa’ida capabilities since mid-2007, but also the broader problems in sectarian and ethnic tensions and conflicts. Breakouts are provided on the trends in the fighting in Anbar and Baghdad. Polling data developed by ABC shows how Iraqis view these issues by sect and ethnicity. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies Wed, 07 May 2008 15:33:32 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24225 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24225 The Iraq War is an extremely complex conflict, and one where the overall trends and developments are difficult to track with any clarity. The Burke Chair has developed a detailed briefing on key developments in the fighting, drawing on material provided by the Multinational Force- Iraq (MNF-I), the Department of Defense, Department of State, Iraqi government, and other sources. The briefing surveys sectarian and ethnic trends, progress in political accommodation, developments in the fighting, and trends in casualties. Maps show the steady decline in Al Qa’ida capabilities since mid-2007, but also the broader problems in sectarian and ethnic tensions and conflicts. Breakouts are provided on the trends in the fighting in Anbar and Baghdad. Polling data developed by ABC shows how Iraqis view these issues by sect and ethnicity. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies Wed, 07 May 2008 13:30:18 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24216 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24216 Accusations regularly fly between Washington and Tehran about their involvement in Iraq, but the past few weeks have seen these charges take a more specific turn. The U.S. military in recent weeks has accused Iran of arming Shiite militias inside the war zone. What’s more, an unnamed U.S. official told the New York Times that Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based terrorist group, has been training Iraqi fighters at a base near Tehran. The government of Iran, meanwhile, has pulled out of a fourth round of bilateral talks over Iraqi security to protest what Tehran calls the “massacre” (aj-Jazeera) of innocent civilians in Iraq by U.S.-led forces. The Pentagon says it is only bombing fighters suspected of receiving Iranian backing. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Wed, 07 May 2008 12:12:27 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24209 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24209 Le budget du département américain de la Défense demandé par George W. Bush s’élève à 588,3 milliards de dollars pour l’exercice 2009, en hausse de 7,5% par rapport à 2008. Depuis 2001, les dépenses supplémentaires pour faire face à la « guerre totale contre la terreur » se chiffrent déjà à plus de 800 milliards de dollars. Le président Bush entendait vendre aux Américains une guerre rapide, gratuite et glorieuse. Elle tourne au désastre humanitaire et est en passe de devenir la guerre la plus chère de l’Histoire : plus de 3 000 milliards de dollars, selon le prix Nobel d’économie Joseph Stiglitz. Plusieurs générations d’Américains et d’Irakiens finiront inévitablement par payer le prix vrai de cette guerre, qui ne se mesure pas seulement en dollars sonnants et trébuchants, mais aussi en déficit durable pour la sécurité nationale et internationale ainsi que pour les libertés constitutionnelles. SOURCE: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Wed, 07 May 2008 11:14:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24194 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24194 Turkey appears to be using a two-pronged approach in its continuing efforts to drive the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) from its refuges in northern Iraq. Following raids and incursions by Turkish land forces, Turkey’s air force is now driving home points being made in meetings with Iraqi and Kurdish Iraqi leaders. In late April and early May, Turkish warplanes conducted two waves of airstrikes in northern Iraq against the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union and the United States. The first wave of airstrikes on April 25-26 targeted PKK militants in the Zap, Avashin and Khakurk regions who were trying to infiltrate across the border for attacks on Turkish territory, according to the Turkish General Staff (TGS) (Hurriyet, April 26). 43 Turkish warplanes took part in the attacks, reportedly destroying PKK control posts, anti-aircraft positions and logistical supply units while taking care not to harm the civilian population (Sabah, April 30; Hurriyet, April 26). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 09:56:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24181 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24181 Depuis la fin des opérations majeures de combat en Irak, la bataille de Fallujah a été la plus importante opération militaire menée par les forces de la coalition multinationale (MNF-I). Les tensions entre Fallujah et les forces de la coalition ont culminé par l’assassinat de quatre contracteurs civils américains. Au début d’avril 2004, l’opération Vigilant Resolve était mise en branle afin de punir les coupables de ces actes. Intervenir était crucial pour la coalition, car rester passive aurait produit l’image d’une coalition faible et vulnérable, risquant d’encourager l’insurrection et de perdre Fallujah au statut de « no go area ». Il était donc essentiel d’intervenir. Suite à l’échec de Vigilant Resolve, l’opération Al Fajr, menée en novembre, a rempli ses objectifs tactiques, prenant contrôle de la ville entière. Malgré cela, la bataille de Fallujah est perçue comme une défaite stratégique. Les leçons tirées de cette bataille sont toutefois essentielles tant militairement, où de nouvelles technologies et tactiques ont révélé leur efficacité, que politiquement, où il apparaît clair que le problème lié à l’insurrection en Irak ne peut pas se résoudre uniquement que par les armes. SOURCE: Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Wed, 07 May 2008 09:34:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24178 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24178 « Que les Américains s’en aillent ou qu’ils demeurent », signait Patrice Claude dans Le Monde du 19 mars 2008, « la stabilisation de la vieille Mésopotamie n’est pas pour demain. » Le contexte international s’est largement détérioré au cours des dernières années, particulièrement entre la Russie et les États-Unis, notamment à cause de la volonté américaine d’installer 10 intercepteurs antimissiles en Pologne et un radar à pulsions phasées en République tchèque, d’étendre la couverture de l’OTAN à l’Ukraine et à la Georgie, sans parler du soutien des pays occidentaux à l’indépendance du Kosovo. De son côté, le président Bush continue de soutenir contre vents et marées la candidature de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, « le seul pays non membre de l’OTAN », souligne-t-il, « qui appuie chacune des missions de l’OTAN », que ce soit au Kosovo ou en Afghanistan. L’Allemagne, la France, l’Italie et d’autres pays européens vont sans doute mettre les bâtons dans les roues de ce projet de Washington ou du moins soulever suffisamment d’obstacles pour prévenir l’application du Plan d’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, d’ici la fin du mandat du président Bush. La question géorgienne est encore plus épineuse pour l’OTAN étant donné les conflits persistants de ce pays avec les régions séparatistes d’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud. Pourtant, le sénateur McCain (Arizona) ne se préoccupe guère de ces questions puisqu’à ses yeux il faut exclure la Russie du G-8, élargir ce club sélect à l’Inde et au Brésil, et cesser de travailler avec une Russie revanchiste pour s’adjoindre une « Ligue des démocraties » sous leadership américain, comme alternative à l’ONU. Formule largement privilégiée dans le passé par les États-Unis – une coalition de volontaires –, il est donc difficile de savoir en quoi la nouveauté du sénateur McCain réside ici. SOURCE: Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal Tue, 06 May 2008 09:57:26 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24149 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24149 We provide this timeline and anthology as a reference for debate on the current war in Iraq. After five years of combat and the expenditure of considerable American treasure, particularly the lives of her sons and daughters, it is an important exercise to recount the words and pledges that were offered during the origins of the current conflict. SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Tue, 06 May 2008 09:44:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24147 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24147 The Kingdom of Bahrain is the first Arab country to have all its detainees released from Guantanamo. They were released as the result of a diplomatic and security agreement between the Bahraini and American authorities, but in reality this would have not taken place without the activity and continued pressure exerted by institutions of civil society, human rights organizations, the US law firm representing Bahraini detainees, a popular movement, and the parliament. The Bahraini detainees were released on a batch basis; three were returned in November 2005, and the other three were returned individually in October 2006 and July and August 2007. SOURCE: Bahrain Center for Human Rights Bahrain Center for Human Rights Mon, 05 May 2008 15:35:46 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24144 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24144 On May 1, The Century Foundation's Prospects for Peace Initiative hosted Aaron David Miller as he discussed his newly-released book, The Much Too Promised Land: America’s Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace. Miller’s first-person account of the peace process tackles the most difficult questions: Why has the United States failed to broker a solution to the conflict? What approaches have been more or less successful? What influence does American domestic politics have on U.S. foreign policy? And how can we get it right next time? The discussion was moderated by Daniel Levy, director of the Prospects for Peace Initiative. Until his departure from government in 2003, Miller served at the Department of State as an adviser to six secretaries of state, where he helped formulate U.S. policy on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli peace process. Drawing both on his personal experiences and 160 interviews, including interviews with three U.S. presidents, nine U.S. secretaries of state, and a host of Arab and Israeli leaders, Miller’s book is a rich insider’s account—full of controversial analysis, wise advice and great stories—and Aaron will be sharing all of this with us at this invitation-only lunch. SOURCE: The Century Foundation The Century Foundation Mon, 05 May 2008 14:51:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24137 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24137 The so-called “surge” in Iraq, a reinforcement of U.S. forces by thirty thousand troops which began in spring 2007, has been credited by many with slowing civilian casualties, building morale among Iraqi security forces, and helping restore some order to the country, particularly in its capital, Baghdad. Yet critics see it as little more than an unsustainable holding action which has propped up what they regard as an essentially flawed strategy in Iraq. Two CFR experts on the war, Max Boot, senior fellow for national security studies, and Steven Simon, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, debate whether the surge has put Iraq on the path to sucess. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Mon, 05 May 2008 14:05:28 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24127 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24127 The total number of documented Afghans aged between 15 and 29 years living in Iran is 341,157 or 33.4 percent of the total population of Afghans in Iran. Broadly speaking, these Afghans may be categorised as “second-generation”, that is, those Afghans born in Iran, or who have spent more than half of their life in Iran. Second-generation Afghans comprise a particular demographic whose experiences and aspirations while not homogenous within that demographic, is different from their parents’ generation, and from their counterparts in Afghanistan. A more liberal social and cultural environment that offers education and economic opportunity has inspired different values and aspirations in the second-generation, some converging with their Iranian counterparts. Discriminatory government policies which differentiate non-nationals also shape these opportunities and experiences, however. SOURCE: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Mon, 05 May 2008 13:46:11 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24126 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24126 At the beginning of the year we decided that we needed to do a more focused discussion on Lebanon and the crisis in Lebanon and its many dimensions. This has proved to be more difficult than we imagined and it is becoming a movable feast. We had originally planned to do a major symposium, but then in each case some of the key speakers were unable to turn up, so we have ended up improvising to a series of Lebanon. The first one we had was with a group of Lebanese experts and many of you were there I think for that about a month ago. Today we are very honored to have former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon to address us. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution Mon, 05 May 2008 13:43:58 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24125 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24125 When the UN Security Council approved the third round of sanctions against Iran by adopting Resolution 1803 in March 2008, U.S. policymakers anticipated that the European Union would follow past practice and enact additional punitive measures. Almost two months later, however, Europeans are still at loggerheads on how best to implement the resolution, with several countries -- mostly the ones with strong commercial interests in Iran -- still adamant that the EU should not go beyond the text of the resolution. The EU could resolve this internal dispute by refocusing its sanctions debate on Iran's human rights record, an issue on which it is often easier to build consensus in Europe. SOURCE: Washington Institute for Near East Policy Washington Institute for Near East Policy Mon, 05 May 2008 11:25:55 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24114 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24114 On April 24, US officials briefed lawmakers on Syria's covert nuclear reactor. They explained their "high confidence" that what was destroyed last September in Syria was in fact a nuclear reactor for the production of plutonium, and that it was built with the long-term and sustained assistance of North Korea. In contrast to this certainty, a central aspect of their estimate regarding Syria's nuclear plans adopted a vaguer tone: when asked whether the material to be produced by the reactor would be used in a nuclear weapons program, the Intelligence officials accorded this only a "low confidence" level. Interestingly and rather surprisingly, the officials acknowledged that a low confidence estimate did not concur with what they actually believed to be the case. In fact, on the basis of their overall analysis of the situation, it was their belief that the reactor was intended to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, they found no other reasonable explanation for the reactor: it was clearly not for producing electricity, and it was ill-suited to be a research reactor. Moreover, Syria had acted suspiciously in other regards, such as rushing to destroy the remains of the reactor after the attack. But due to the lack of "additional clinical evidence of other activities" – most importantly, the absence of a reprocessing facility – they could not accord this assessment the level of confidence that they actually believed to be the case. As one of the Intelligence officials at the briefing tried to explain: "there's a difference between evidence and an assessment." SOURCE: Institute for National Security Studies Institute for National Security Studies Fri, 02 May 2008 14:38:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24105 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24105 The first car bomb attacks on unarmed civilians began in early 2004. More than 200 Shias were killed on 2 March during the festival of Ashura as bombs ripped through crowds in the holy city of Kerbala and at the main Shia shrine in Baghdad in the northern suburb of Kadhimiya. Body parts and strips of flesh were scattered all over the blood-stained streets. The vast number of deaths, the biggest on a single day, as well as the symbolic impact of attacking unarmed pilgrims during a religious festival, shocked Iraqis. “Our movement began as Shia but we have many Sunni members. History has taught us that nothing has happened between the Sunnis and the Shias in the past,” Duaffar said proudly. “I’m sure there won’t be sectarian clashes in the future. The Sunnis and the Shias know the enemy want to provoke clashes, but we are containing the danger successfully.” Duaffar was one of many political leaders who worked hard to prevent retaliation in the hours after the bombings at Kerbala and Kadhimiya. He assumed they were probably the work of Sunni militants from abroad or from the Salafis. In March 2004 in Fallujah, which the Americans saw as a “Sunni bastion” and a hotbed of militant Islam, Abed Ruzuqi, a retired employee in the agriculture department, was keen to tell me that the town had a well-integrated Shia minority and there were no sectarian problems. As his brothers offered us rice and chicken at a shaded table in his front garden, he described an American attack a few nights earlier which, the Americans said, was a response to grenades being fired at a US patrol. SOURCE: Global Policy Forum // Guernica Magazine Global Policy Forum // Guernica Magazine Fri, 02 May 2008 12:48:17 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24097 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24097 The Subcommittees will come to order. Last March, our two subcommittees held a hearing on the subject of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons where a panel of Bush Administration officials responsible for different aspects of the crisis assured us that the Administration was moving aggressively to assist the refugees and IDPs and would meet the President’s announced target of 12,000 Iraqi refugees resettled in the United States during the current fiscal year. I challenged their ability and the Administration’s sincerity and they again re-assured me. Well, as of March 31, only 2,627 Iraqis have been resettled. With five months left in the fiscal year, that leaves only 9,373, but at the current rate the Administration won’t even meet half of the President’s goal. Not even half. That’s pathetic in terms of performance and embarrassing to us as a nation. And it’s only the tip of the iceberg. For the millions of Iraqis who are stranded in Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, conditions are worsening dramatically. By Ambassador Foley’s own admission at a press briefing last month, the 150,000 Iraqis in Syria who are fed each day by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will swell to 300,000 by summertime as more and more families run out of resources. The situation in Jordan while of lesser magnitude is equally dire. Current appeals for assistance through the United Nations and other international organizations total $900 million for this calendar year and while the United States has provided $208 million towards this goal, a shortfall of $400 million is still expected. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia Fri, 02 May 2008 12:47:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24096 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24096 International Medical Corps was founded in 1984 by volunteer doctors and nurses to train mid-level health care workers in Afghanistan. We are now a global humanitarian non-profit organization dedicated to saving lives and relieving suffering of those affected by war, natural disaster and disease and to delivering vital health care services that incorporate capacity building of our counterparts. IMC helps people return to self-reliance by enabling the development of essential skills for health, livelihoods, rehabilitation and service delivery. IMC implements major emergency relief and longer term transitional and development programs that deliver comprehensive health and nutrition services, rehabilitate infrastructure, train local personnel and enhance community participation and development in more than 20 countries including Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Today we are focusing on our work in Iraq. I had the privilege of establishing our mission there in 2003 and have visited more than a dozen times since then. I share responsibility for program oversight and operations with our in-country expatriate director who has been with IMC in Iraq for the past five years, working with national and local Iraqi government officials; various US entities, including the US embassy and US Agency for International Development (USAID); the United Nations; international and Iraqi nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and local religious and tribal leaders. International Medical Corps has employed thousands of local staff over the years, the vast majority coming from the communities where we work. Currently, we have more than 400 staff members in Iraq, including 11 expatriates and over 40 visiting technical experts, who live and work in the “red zone.” Because of the insecurity and tensions in the country, we depend on building close ties to the communities in the 18 governorates where we work. We vet and hire staff locally and consult and collaborate with Iraqi institutions, officials, local leaders and groups to garner support for the relief, development and training efforts that we implement. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia Fri, 02 May 2008 12:45:58 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24095 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24095 Mercy Corps has been working in Iraq since 2003, with support from the U.S. Agency for International Development and other funding sources. Mercy Corps’ programs in Iraq meet urgent humanitarian needs, strengthen communities and promote the rights of vulnerable populations like women, youth, and persons with disabilities. To date, we have invested over $150 million in programs that have reached over 4.5 million beneficiaries. We also have active programs in Jordan and Syria that serve Iraqi refugees and other vulnerable populations. In Jordan, the situation of Iraqi refugees is well known, in part due to the very well developed operations of international NGOs there with full staffs and active programs. Overall, official UN estimates place the total number of refugees at 500,000. However, based on data collected in a recent FAFO study, and by those NGOs that are providing services to the refugee population, our best guess is that the total number is actually somewhere between 150,000 and 350,000. Iraqi refugees in Jordan are not a homogenous group. There are a significant number – mostly Christians – who came to Jordan before 2003 to escape religious persecution even before the US invasion. Another significant percentage came during the 2004 – 2005 time period: these refugees are mostly middle class Iraqis with college educations, assets in bank accounts, and property outside of Iraq. They have likely been net contributors to Jordan’s economy since they have invested there. Many of them are Sunnis who saw the political changes taking place in Iraq as unfavorable and, as such, took refuge early. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia Fri, 02 May 2008 12:44:31 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24094 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24094 I am Anastasia Brown, director of refugee programs for Migration and Refugee Services (MRS) of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (MRS/USCCB). MRS/USCCB is the largest refugee resettlement agency in the United States. Working with over 100 dioceses across the nation, we provide resettlement assistance to approximately 15,000 to 20,000 refugees each year, helping them with job placement, housing, and other forms of assistance to ensure their early self-sufficiency. My testimony today will focus upon Iraqi refugees, the majority of whom are located in Jordan and Syria. In my testimony, I would like to outline four areas that need to be addressed in the immediate future in order to avoid further deterioration of the refugee situation and to alleviate further human suffering: The Administration and Congress must increase efforts to deliver basic humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees. Not only will this require the provision of more funds, but it also will require more diplomatic initiatives to ensure that the global community also contributes much needed assistance; The Administration must step up efforts to make available resettlement opportunities for vulnerable Iraqi refugees, both in the United States and in other countries; Special attention must be paid to extremely vulnerable populations, including unaccompanied refugee minors, women heads-of-households, and other groups; Specific needs, such as health services (including mental health), education, and basic food and shelter, must be addressed. Protection within host countries is also deteriorating, as refugee families without formal legal status remain at risk. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights and Oversight // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia Fri, 02 May 2008 12:24:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24091 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24091 On April 23 the Turkish Council of State ordered former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar to stand trial for allegedly “forming a criminal organization” in the dirty war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during the 1990s, a period most Turks refer to as the “Susurluk” era (Turkish Daily News, April 23; Sabah, April 23; Today's Zaman, April 22). It will be the first time a former government minister has faced charges related to one of the darkest chapters in recent Turkish history, the repercussions of which still haunt Turkey today. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the PKK’s first insurgency was at its peak, there were frequent rumors that the Turkish state was conducting a campaign of torture and assassination against suspected PKK sympathizers, including the formation of death squads and the recruitment of ultranationalist hitmen from the Turkish underworld. No unequivocal evidence could ever be produced and the claims were routinely dismissed by the Turkish authorities as PKK propaganda. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 12:15:37 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24088 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24088 On April 26, Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr stood down from his threat to wage an all-out war against the Iraqi government and the coalition. A week before, the anti-American cleric had issued a statement threatening to declare an open war if the security crackdown by the Iraqi and U.S. forces against his loyalists was not called off. Al-Sadr said that he was giving a final warning to the Shiite-led Iraqi government to “take the path of peace and stop violence against its own people.” Al-Sadr’s statement went on: “If [the Iraqi government] does not stop the militias that have infiltrated the government, then we will declare a war until liberation” (al-Jazeera, April 19). The statement was read out in the mosques of Sadr City, a largely Shiite district of Baghdad. There were calls for jihad against the U.S. forces and calls for the Iraqi government to release detainees and end the siege on the poor district of eastern Baghdad. Sadr City is populated by more than two million people and is a main stronghold of Muqtada’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia (JaM). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 10:24:45 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24076 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24076 With escalating sectarian violence, the need for a political solution to stabilize Iraq has become imperative. In the first part of his Globalist Paper, David Apgar argues that the most common proposals — a three-way ethnic partition of the country and direct talks with Iran and Syria — are inadequate. He views a two-way partition as the most pragmatic solution. SOURCE: The Globalist The Globalist Fri, 02 May 2008 09:53:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24072 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24072 This analysis is based on a game theory model which assumes the premise that the behaviour of Jihadist groups (taken generally, and al-Qaeda in particular) and of States is rational and responds to strategic choices. The analysis begins with an introduction to the context which situates Spain and global Jihadist groups on opposing sides of the game board of strategic interests. There follows an analysis of each of the scenarios and their implications in the strategies of Jihadist organisations, as well as their influence on Spanish foreign policy and international security policy decisions. Finally, conclusions are presented and the scenarios are classified in accordance with their significance and their capacity to destabilise Spain’s position in its various theatres of operations abroad, most notably those linked to peace missions and, in particular, Afghanistan. SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano Real Instituto Elcano Thu, 01 May 2008 14:49:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24060 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24060 What will happen to Iraq as the recent surge in US troop strength subsides? Violence fell in late 2007; will this trend continue, or was this merely a temporary lull created by an unsustainable US troop presence? The last week saw a major spike in fighting as the Maliki government launched an offensive against militia fighters in Basra; is this a harbinger of future violence? And what do the answers imply for the US posture in Iraq? Should we extend the ongoing troop reductions? Or should these be slowed or even reversed? In fact the violence reduction was more than just a temporary lull. It reflected a systematic shift in the underlying strategic landscape of Iraq, and could offer the basis for sustainable stability if we respond appropriately. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Thu, 01 May 2008 12:50:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24056 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24056 Informal networks are present at all levels in Iraq and they also exert their influence internationally. Stopping the activities of various militias would not put an end to the activity of informal networks in the country. Informal political and religious networks are deeply embedded within the fabric of Iraqi society. Despite the influence of sectarianism on Iraqi politics, various informal networks have employed sectarianism as a means of furthering their political and policy interests. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that even drastic solutions such as partitioning the country will bring the insurgency to an end. Cross-sectarian political alliances and intra-sectarian conflicts indicate that politics takes precedence over ideology. SOURCE: Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy Thu, 01 May 2008 12:45:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24054 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24054 A military solution in Iraq would take a different form from that we associate with conventional strategies, but it would be no less vital to the country’s future in providing the calm for political reconstruction to follow. The miraculous political achievement of postwar Japan or Europe was clearly the dividend of a military solution: the destruction of wartime fascism and the prevention of its re-emergence by vigilant military policing. Likewise, there will be peace in a constitutional Iraq only when its citizens believe that they can safely participate in government, express themselves somewhat freely, prosper economically, and feel safe from internal and external threats and reprisals. SOURCE: Hoover Institution Hoover Institution Thu, 01 May 2008 12:36:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24052 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24052 Last month in Iran, supporters of a long-shot parliamentary candidate stuck campaign materials to a handful of chickens and set them loose in the village in what a local official called “a new way to campaign.” Though the chickens were an innovative way to remind voters that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad failed to deliver on his campaign promise to put a chicken in every pot, this candidate and others were forced to find obscure ways to reach voters because they were prohibited from putting their faces on campaign materials. Because of this and other arbitrary election rules, the large margins of victory by conservative hardliners in the March 14 election came as no surprise. SOURCE: Foreign Policy in Focus Foreign Policy in Focus Thu, 01 May 2008 12:27:52 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24049 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24049 One battle rarely wins or loses a war, at least in the moment. Gettysburg crippled Lee’s army in 1863, but the Confederates fought on until 1865. Stalingrad broke the back of the German 6th Army, but it would be two-and-a-half years before the Russians took Berlin. War – particularly the modern variety – is a complex mixture of tactics, technology, and politics. Then there are the intangibles, like morale. But while a single battle may not end a conflict, it can illuminate an underlying reality. This reality generally gets lost in the thunder of propaganda, illusion, and wishful thinking that always accompanies the horsemen of the apocalypse. Now that some of the dust has settled over the recent battle of Basra that pitted Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army against the armies of the United States and Iraq, it is time to examine what that clash meant, and what are some analogies that might help bring it into focus. There were certainly echoes of Vietnam in last month’s fighting, and some of those parallels, particularly to the 1968 Tet offensive, are worth a closer look. SOURCE: Foreign Policy in Focus Foreign Policy in Focus Thu, 01 May 2008 12:21:47 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24048 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24048 Prior to the January 16, 1991, launch of Operation Desert Storm to reverse Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam. That Administration decided not to try to do so militarily because (1) the United Nations had approved only liberating Kuwait; (2) Arab states in the coalition opposed an advance to Baghdad; and (3) the Administration feared becoming bogged down in a high-casualty occupation. Within days of the war’s end (February 28, 1991), Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq, emboldened by the regime’s defeat and the hope of U.S. support, rebelled. The Shiite revolt nearly reached Baghdad, but the mostly Sunni Muslim Republican Guard forces were pulled back into Iraq before engaging U.S. forces and were intact to suppress the rebellion. Many Iraqi Shiites blamed the United States for not intervening on their behalf. Iraq’s Kurds, benefitting from a U.S.-led “no fly zone” set up in April 1991, drove Iraqi troops out of much of northern Iraq and remained autonomous thereafter. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 01 May 2008 12:19:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24047 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24047 Iran is materially assisting all major Shiite Muslim political factions in Iraq, most of which have longstanding ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran, and their armed militias. The Administration notes growing involvement by Tehran in actively directing, training, and arming Shiite militiamen linked, to varying degrees, to hardline cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Some analysis goes so far as to see a virtual “proxy war” between the United States and Iran inside Iraq. This report will be updated. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 01 May 2008 11:44:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24046 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24046 Varying media estimates of military forces in Iraq have raised concerns about the actual number of troops deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Interest in troop level deployments continue in 2008. Last year, a major announcement on a surge in troop deployments to Iraq by the President Bush included a planned gradual increase of more than 20,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Baghdad and Anbar province over several months. Since the “new strategy for Iraq” speech by the President on January 10, 2007, troop deployments gradually increased during the months of February through October in 2007 but decreased beginning in November 2007. This report provides solely Department of Defense (DOD) statistical information on U.S. forces serving in Iraq. It also provides brief official information on the military units scheduled for the next rotation of duty into Iraq. As of March 1, 2008, according to DOD, the United States had 159,700 troops stationed in Iraq — 134,900 active component and 24,800 National Guard or Reserves. For security reasons, DOD does not routinely report the composition, size, or specific destination of military forces deployed to the Persian Gulf. This report will be updated upon receipt of new DOD data. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 01 May 2008 10:48:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24039 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24039 Although dead for almost two years, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s negative impact in Iraq continues to be a serious problem for al-Qaeda. Indeed, of all the threats and dangers encountered by al-Qaeda since 9/11, al-Zarqawi was the only strategic threat to the organization’s continuing viability. Al-Zarqawi’s efforts to create a Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq—which would have been blamed on al-Qaeda—threatened al-Qaeda’s ability to keep Sunni Islamists focused on the United States—the “far enemy”—and to an extent would have rehabilitated the reputation of the Arab tyrannies that al-Qaeda and its allies oppose because those states would have quickly moved to provide cash and military materiel to Sunnis fighting Shiites in Iraq. For al-Qaeda, al-Zarqawi today is an annoying memory—though one celebrated for his knightly heroics—but the impact of his actions still bedevil al-Qaeda’s goal of helping to establish a Sunni organization that can govern after the withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation