Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Americas". Fri, 04 Jul 2008 0:30:20 +0000 Fri, 04 Jul 2008 0:30:20 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:16:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25259 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25259 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 through part of FY2008 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $524 billion (75%), OEF about $141 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (4%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of April 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.1 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.3 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 03 Jul 2008 16:00:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25255 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25255 Central America has the reputation of being a violent region with high crime rates, youth gangs, drug traffic, and ubiquitous insecurity. Politicians, the media, and social scientists in and outside the region often claim that the societies are in complete agreement with their judgment of the situation and that all society members are calling for law and order and social segregation. Focusing on Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the paper analyzes the social perception of violence and crime. On the basis of essays written by secondary school students and interviews with citizens from all walks of life in the three countries, the paper points out how elite arguments on violence and crime are translated into everyday life, and what society members suggest be done to deal with these problems. The sources prove that there are noticeable hegemonic discourses on violence and crime in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Simultaneously, a majority of the respondents call for social and integrative solutions rather than the so-called “iron fist.” The repressive trend in Central American policies therefore does not necessarily receive the presumed affirmation asserted by many authorities on and in the region. SOURCE: German Institute of Global and Area Studies German Institute of Global and Area Studies Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:58:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25254 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25254 In the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 raids on New York City and Washington D.C., the Western media thundered damnation at the governments of the United States and its allies for having failed to take seriously the growth in post-Cold War national security threats from transnational Islamist groups. The media mercilessly attacked the “group-think” of Western governments for their continued focus on threats from nation-states—Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, etc.—and their on-again, off-again concern with the threat from al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies. The media’s bottom-line was accurate: The fall of the Berlin Wall had not been recognized by Western governments as the end of reliable peace under the umbrella of Mutually Assured Destruction and that the 9/11 attacks made it plain that the relatively peaceful, largely predictable Cold War-era was over for good. The media’s post-9/11 argument was an essential wake-up call to those wielding power in the West, but it appears, in retrospect, to have been ineffective. Washington and many of its allies continue to focus on nation-state threats—witness the war in Iraq and the apparently nearing war with Iran—while addressing the transnational Islamist threat symbolized by al-Qaeda half-heartedly as if they had time to end the threat at their leisure. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:46:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25246 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25246 As the U.S. military engagement entered its sixth year in mid-March, Iraq finally seemed in many ways to be turning a corner toward stabilization. Even jaundiced journalists were conceding that the military surge, which had taken effect by the summer of 2007, was significantly helping security. Whole neighborhoods had returned to a more normal commercial and social life. Terrorist acts were way down, with multiple-fatality bombings dropping by more than two-thirds from their peak in the bloody year of 2006. With the change in American force levels and military strategy, the average daily death toll of Iraqis dropped from more than 100 a day to 20. The improvement was palpable. Iraqi police and military deaths fell from a peak of 300 in April 2007 to 110 in February 2008. Deaths of U.S. soldiers also dropped sharply, from more than 100 per month in late 2006 and early 2007 to under 40 per month in late 2007 and early 2008. But these casualties still were painful losses. American troops continued to suffer wounds, both physical and psychological; 600 –700 Iraqis were dying every month; and the violence in Iraq had declined only to the still-serious level of insecurity that prevailed in 2005. SOURCE: Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:36:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25242 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25242 In "The Price of the Surge" (May/June 2008), Steven Simon correctly observes that the Sunni turn against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), known as the Sunni Awakening, has been a key factor in security progress during the period of "the surge." Simon is also on point when he notes that the Awakening, which began before the surge, was not a direct consequence of additional U.S. troops. But although Simon gets much of the past right, he ultimately draws the wrong lessons for U.S. policy moving forward. Rather than unilaterally and unconditionally withdrawing from Iraq and hoping that the international community will fill the void and push the Iraqis toward accommodation -- a very unlikely scenario -- the United States must embrace a policy of "conditional engagement." This approach would couple a phased redeployment of combat forces with a commitment to providing residual support for the Iraqi government if and only if it moves toward genuine reconciliation. Conditional engagement -- rather than Simon's policy of unconditional disengagement -- would incorporate the real lesson from the Sunni Awakening. SOURCE: Center for a New American Security // Foreign Affairs Center for a New American Security // Foreign Affairs Thu, 03 Jul 2008 15:19:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25236 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25236 This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations. SOURCE: RAND Corporation RAND Corporation Thu, 03 Jul 2008 12:35:31 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25212 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25212 In the heat of the Kenyan summer just a few miles north of the equator, a U.S. Navy Seabee detachment was working around the clock, digging a hole into the parched red clay earth. The place: a speck of a hamlet called Shidley. The mission: to provide deep, freshwater wells for marginalized nomadic communities. Few humanitarian activities in this remote part of the world are as important as providing clean drinking water for people and their livestock. In Shidley, water is life and American sailors had come ashore to find it. Between February and June 2007, these dedicated Seabees drilled two wells. The first, in a town called Rhea, struck brackish water and was unusable. The second, at Shidley, was still being explored after weeks of futile results. Engineers from the Kenyan army, dispatched to help the Americans find water for their countrymen, had abandoned hope that the Shidley well would be productive. From the shade of their field tent, they watched as the Seabees kept digging in the baking sun. While the Kenyans were concerned about the expense of drilling a “dry” hole, money was no object for the Americans. As the leader of the Seabee detachment said, “We’ll keep drilling ‘til we run out of steel.” SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Wed, 02 Jul 2008 14:55:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25187 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25187 Mustafa Aït Idir et cinq autres hommes ont été arrêtés par la police de Bosnie- Herzégovine. Usama Mostafa Hassan Nasr, connu sous le nom d'Abou Omar, a été enlevé à Milan avec le concours d'un policier italien. Khaled el Masri a été arrêté par des fonctionnaires macédoniens. Ahmed Agiza et Mohammed El Zari ont été interpellés par la police suédoise. Muhammad Zammar a été arrêté au Maroc, semble-t-il sur la foi d'informations fournies par les forces de sécurité allemandes ; Bisher Al Rawi et Jamil El Banna ont été incarcérés en Gambie à la suite de l'envoi de télégrammes par les forces de sécurité britanniques. Le point commun entre tous ces hommes est ce qui leur est arrivé ensuite. Tous ont été remis aux autorités d'un autre État, en secret et en dehors de toute procédure judiciaire, et transférés dans un autre pays. Certains ont été transférés par les États-Unis dans des pays où ils courraient un risque réel de torture et d'autres mauvais traitements ; d'autres ont été emmenés dans des centres de détention en Afghanistan ou à Guantanámo Bay.Tous se sont retrouvés enfermés dans des lieux où les règles du droit ne semblaient pas s'appliquer et où personne ne leur disait ce qui allait leur arriver par la suite. Certains ont fait l'objet de disparition forcée, y compris alors qu'ils se trouvaient aux mains des autorités des États-Unis. Tous disent avoir été torturés ou avoir subi d'autres mauvais traitements. En résumé, tous ces hommes ont été victimes du programme de « restitutions » mené par les États- Unis. SOURCE: Amnesty International Amnesty International Wed, 02 Jul 2008 10:21:16 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25168 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25168 L'édition 2008 du Rapport mondial sur les drogues, lancée aujourd'hui par le Directeur exécutif de l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDC), Antonio Maria Costa, indique que la récente stabilisation du marché mondial des drogues est mise à mal. L'augmentation massive de la culture de la coca et du pavot à opium et le risque de progression de l'abus de drogues dans les pays en développement menacent de compromettre les progrès accomplis dernièrement dans la lutte contre les drogues. L'édition 2008 du Rapport mondial sur les drogues sonne néanmoins l'alarme face à la forte augmentation de l'offre de drogues observée récemment. En Afghanistan, la récolte de pavot à opium a atteint un niveau record en 2007, en conséquence de quoi la production illégale d'opium à l'échelle mondiale a pratiquement doublé par rapport à 2005. Le pavot est cultivé essentiellement (pour 80 %) dans cinq provinces méridionales, où les insurgés taliban tirent profit du commerce de la drogue. Dans le reste du pays, cette culture est en passe d'être éliminée ou est ramenée à des niveaux faibles. "Grâce à une plus grande stabilité du pays et à une assistance économique accrue, la culture du pavot disparaît de nombreuses provinces afghanes. Dans les zones méridionales, contrôlées par les Taliban, il faut s'attaquer simultanément à la drogue et à l'insurrection", a déclaré le responsable de la lutte contre la drogue à l'ONU. La situation est identique en Colombie, où la culture de la coca a augmenté d'un quart (27 %) en 2007, tout en restant environ 40 % en dessous du niveau record atteint en 2000. La production de feuille de coca et de cocaïne est fortement concentrée géographiquement: 10 municipalités (5 % des 195 que compte le pays) représentent près de la moitié de la production totale de cocaïne (288 tonnes) et un tiers des surfaces cultivées (35 000 hectares). "En Colombie, comme en Afghanistan, les régions où la coca est le plus cultivée sont sous le contrôle d'insurgés", a fait remarquer M. Costa. SOURCE: Nations Unies // l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime Nations Unies // l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:10:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25164 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25164 Peace support operations throughout the world have grown from 4 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 1988 to 17 in 2008; more than half of these missions began in the last 10 years. At the 2004 Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States and other G8 nations responded to the growing need for well-trained and equipped peacekeepers by committing to expand the global capability for peace support operations—particularly African peacekeeping skills and capabilities. In 2004, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year, $660 million program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on enhancing peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Key goals of the program are to train military peacekeepers and stability police for peacekeeping missions, including a target of 75,000 military peacekeepers; provide long-term skills and infrastructure to GPOI partner countries and regional organizations; and provide nonlethal equipment and transportation to support countries’ deployment of peacekeepers. Since 2005, the Department of State (State), in consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD), has allocated $374 million to support GPOI objectives. SOURCE: Government Accountability Office Government Accountability Office Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:07:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25162 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25162 Increased military action by U.S. forces in Afghanistan to target suspected terrorists in Pakistan's tribal areas is putting a strain on Washington's already tense relationship with Islamabad. A June 10 U.S. air strike (IHT) in which Pakistan's army says eleven of its soldiers died was followed, just weeks later, by NATO forces firing into Pakistan (LAT) after being struck by rockets launched from Pakistani territory. The U.S. and Afghan governments consistently blame militants ensconced in safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas for violence in Afghanistan, even though the Pakistani government says it's doing all it can to prevent such attacks. But now, patience on both sides has frayed. Afghan President Hamid Karzai last week threatened to send troops (Guardian) inside Pakistan to hunt down the militants. On June 25, Afghan officials publicly accused Pakistan’s intelligence service of plotting to assassinate (NYT) Karzai in April, further escalating tensions between the countries. Pakistan called the allegations baseless (AFP). SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:06:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25161 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25161 Military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has undergone a tactical renaissance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Moribund at the end of the Cold War, when concerns about nuclear proliferation and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan diminished Pakistan's importance in the eyes of U.S. policymakers, bilateral military cooperation accelerated during the Bush and Musharraf administrations. In 2006, U.S. arms sales to Islamabad topped $3.5 billion (PDF), nearly matching total purchases by Pakistan during the fifty years prior to 2001. Now, with Pakistan's tribal areas serving as the base of operations for Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, the United States has tried to strengthen these bonds. But U.S. covert military operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border, Washington's unflinching support for President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's political instability, and Islamabad's questionable record on terrorism have thrown one of America's most important military alliances into disarray. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:04:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25160 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25160 The war in Iraq is clearly one of the most important foreign policy issues in this year's presidential campaign. Arguably, it was the issue that single-handedly shaped the parties' nomination battles. The success of Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) rested in large part on his early (and then-unpopular) opposition to the Iraq invasion. Senator John McCain (R-IL) supported the invasion, but he staked his candidacy on his steady criticism of occupation policy and his steadfast (and politically risky) support for the 2007 troop surge. In the general election, the two candidates remain defined by their views on Iraq. As the presidential campaign unfolds, however, the situation in Iraq evolves as well, placing pressure on policy positions the candidates have barely changed over the past 18 months. But even as the candidates struggle to adapt to changing real-world conditions, their policy records will continue to define them. SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association Foreign Policy Association Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:30:05 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25151 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25151 Writing doctrine for countering insurgency faces two major problems. The first is that governments, their institutions and their people, have changed since the last time they considered the problem. How government bodies are organized, their understanding of their responsibilities in complex interagency, and how they interact and work together are different. The structures and approaches developed for El Salvador, Vietnam, Algeria, Northern Ireland, and Malaya have been dismantled, and, in many cases the lessons learned forgotten. The inter-departmental and international gearing, a key feature of some past campaigns, is rusty and the organizational understanding across and between governments is a work in progress. Nevertheless, we are at a historic turning point in the evolution of counterinsurgency doctrine, something which is reasonably well known and increasingly better understood. John Mackinlay, David Kilcullen and Steven Metz1 are but three who have pointed out things have changed. While insurgency remains a highly political form of warfare, it is its character, not its nature, which has changed. FM 3-24 sees the insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle as a “complex subset of warfare,” while Colin Gray sees it as “organised violence threatened or waged for political purposes.” As a form of warfare, therefore, and picking up on one of Colin Gray’s analogies, insurgency cannot change its nature any more than a cat can become a dog. However, some cats are tigers and are highly dangerous and it is the dangers presented by contemporary insurgencies that seem to contribute to any confusion with regard to the nature and character debate. SOURCE: Carr Center for Human Rights Policy // John F Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University Carr Center for Human Rights Policy // John F Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:23:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25150 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25150 The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country. In light of the “Declaration of Principles,”signed by U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki on November 26, 2007, and the possibility that the United States will enter into a SOFA with the Government of Iraq, there is considerable interest in Congress in SOFAs, what they may cover, and how they have been concluded in the past. Formal requirements concerning form, content, length, or title of a SOFA do not exist. A SOFA may be written for a specific purpose or activity, or it may anticipate a longer-term relationship and provide for maximum flexibility and applicability. It is generally a stand-alone document concluded as an executive agreement. A SOFA may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. Other provisions that may be found in a SOFA include, but are not limited to, the wearing of uniforms, taxes and fees, carrying of weapons, use of radio frequencies, licenses, and customs regulations. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:08:09 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25147 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25147 In the consolidated cases of Boumediene v. Bush and Al Odah v. United States, decided June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated as enemy combatants and detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. The Court also found that § 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which limited judicial review of executive determinations of the petitioners’ enemy combatant status, did not provide an adequate habeas substitute and therefore acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas. The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the circumstances of their detention. This report summarizes the Boumediene decision and analyzes several of its major implications for the U.S. detention of alien enemy combatants and legislation that limits detainees’ access to judicial review. For discussion of litigation challenging detention policy, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Kenneth R. Thomas. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 26 Jun 2008 15:03:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25146 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25146 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161) on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions including not quite half of the FY2008 request. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $526 billion (74%), OEF about $140 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (5%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of February 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.1 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.3 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Thu, 26 Jun 2008 08:57:08 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25133 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25133 The stated desire of the US to imprint a western democratic model upon states with no experience of such systems formed a key element of their casus belli in Iraq, as did America’s right to strike with impunity under the War on Terror justification.Some five years after the Iraq intervention, the US now finds itself in a quagmire which has invoked a collective sense of reluctance amongst the international community to intervene. This collective stasis is being exploited by a raft of non-state actors that are able to exploit such uncertainly to their own advantage. These range from organised crime groups to militant Islamists, both of which are able to recruit disenfranchised and angry young men with no optimism for their futures. An absence of clearly articulated boundaries in the War on Terror has left the US unchecked on the international stage. A focus upon defeating terrorist groups has left other developmental requirements floundering. The need to create real stability, real prosperity and states friendly both politically and economically has been overlooked in global security. objectives. SOURCE: The Senlis Council The Senlis Council Thu, 26 Jun 2008 08:54:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25132 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25132 We do not underestimate the challenges posed by this charge. Iraq is a traumatized and politically fragmented country. Neighboring states may be tempted to intervene in Iraq’s internal conflicts to protect their own interests. The credibility of the United States is badly eroded by a war that most of the world opposed. The United States and the international community bear a responsibility to contribute to the alleviation of suffering and the advancement of stability and peace in Iraq. It was the consensus of our expert Advisory Group that there is little the United States can do to achieve those goals as long as it maintains an open-ended military presence in Iraq. In the context of withdrawal, however, there are many measures the United States and international community can take to maximize the chances for progress. In this report, we propose a set of initiatives that, taken in the proper sequence, can help to create the conditions for ending Iraq’s long national nightmare. SOURCE: Commonwealth Institute Commonwealth Institute Wed, 25 Jun 2008 14:45:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25127 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25127 Bien que le Canada n’ait pas été physiquement touché par les attaques du 11 septembre 2001, sa proximité géographique, stratégique et économique avec les États-Unis lui a conféré de nouvelles insécurités et de nouvelles responsabilités. Alors que la sécurité est devenue un enjeu prioritaire pour le Canada, l’attention du milieu académique a beaucoup porté sur les Forces canadiennes (FC), sur la mission en Afghanistan et sur la transformation du rôle du Canada à l’international. Quelque peu délaissée, la marine canadienne doit pourtant occuper un rôle central dans la défense du territoire canadien qui, de par son emplacement géographique, a des frontières maritimes beaucoup plus étendues que ses frontières terrestres. Dans cette brève recherche, nous nous sommes demandé si la marine canadienne, au premier plan de la sécurité maritime, a su s’adapter aux nouvelles menaces et, si tel est le cas, de quelles façons. Par conséquent, notre recherche porte principalement sur les outils dont dispose la marine canadienne telles que les nouvelles initiatives prises par le Canada en matière de sécurité maritime dont les Centres d’opérations de la sécurité maritime (COSM) et l’Initiative relative à la sécurité des conteneurs (IRSC). En conclusion, il nous a été permis de constater que ces initiatives n’ont pas entraîné de véritables et profonds changements. Si le Canada veut être capable de faire face à d’éventuelles menaces maritimes, il devra se doter d’une meilleure vision à long terme et devra clarifier le rôle et les responsabilités des nombreux intervenants impliqués dans la sécurité maritime canadienne. SOURCE: Programme paix et sécurité internationales, Université Laval Programme paix et sécurité internationales, Université Laval Wed, 25 Jun 2008 10:08:31 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25102 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25102 Ce document explique le but des visites du CICR dans les lieux de détention américains à Bagram (Afghanistan), Guantanamo Bay (Cuba) et Charleston, en Caroline du Sud (États-Unis), et les procédures qu'il applique. De nombreux pays, dont les États-Unis, doivent affronter d'énormes défis pour protéger leurs citoyens contre la menace terroriste. Ils peuvent être amenés à devoir détenir des terroristes présumés. Néanmoins, de profondes divergences d’opinion demeurent entre le CICR et les États-Unis, en particulier quant au cadre juridique applicable à certaines personnes détenues au titre de la lutte contre le terrorisme. Le CICR visite les personnes capturées dans le contexte de cette lutte et internées dans des lieux de détention américains à Bagram (Afghanistan) et à Guantanamo Bay (Cuba). Il visite également un détenu incarcéré à Charleston, en Caroline du Sud (États-Unis). SOURCE: Comité International de la Croix-Rouge Comité International de la Croix-Rouge Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:27:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25096 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25096 President George W. Bush is fond of saying that his administration tackles challenges head-on and refuses to leave tough decisions to his successors. No description could be further from the truth when applied to his policy at Guantánamo. Regardless of what happens over these last months of the Bush administration, the next president will inherit a detainee policy in total disarray. Transfers out of Guantánamo have stalled; the easier cases have already been shipped out, leaving a population stabilizing at around 270 detainees. Trials of Guantánamo detainees in Military Commissions are sputtering as the unproven system struggles to get through simple procedural hearings. Future prosecutions have been thrown into doubt as charges were dropped against a detainee once thought to be the “20th hijacker” on 9/11 because too much of the evidence against him was obtained through torture. In its third successive decision rebuking the Bush administration’s detention policies, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the Guantánamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus. This decision will finally allow the detainees to contest the lawfulness of their confinement in a truly impartial hearing before a federal judge, rejecting the Bush administration’s contention that Guantánamo existed outside the law. And beyond the prison’s walls on the eastern tip of Cuba, serious problems have arisen in Afghanistan as both U.S.- and Afghan-run detention camps are replicating the worst excesses of Guantánamo. SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Tue, 24 Jun 2008 13:54:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25094 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25094 This paper investigates how environmental change and Canadian security are interlinked. First, it attempts to chart the ways in which global environmental change (such as climate change and environmental mismanagement) affect Canada's domestic security and the welfare of Canadian interests overseas. Three particular challenges stand out: the first is the struggle for control of shipping routes across a warming Arctic; the second is the hunt for new sources of energy; and the third is environmental security in regions of diplomatic, economic and military importance to Canada. Second, the paper analyzes the links between environment and security from the opposite direction. We assess the environmental implications of Canada's current national security focus on the prevention of terrorism. This approach to Canadian security, which we call "the new security agenda," has been evolving since the early 1990s in response to the growing threat of international terrorism. In a world of competing priorities and limited budgets, this has inevitably brought the new security agenda into direct competition with other areas of federal policy—including environmental management. The way Canada and its allies pursue their security can have both positive and negative consequences for the environment that must be incorporated into any cost-benefit analysis of Canadian policy; in terms of governance and regulatory impacts, the scope for effective environmental management and the direct environmental impacts of new security measures. Two aspects of the new security agenda have particular relevance for the Canadian environment: the North American quest for energy independence and increased border security. In essence, this paper argues the environment and its management is not just a "soft policy area"—it can have real security implications. Nevertheless, the environment is still typically seen as an optional "add-on" in times of peace and prosperity, to be ignored in times of stress and conflict. In a globalized world shaped by global environmental problems, this might be a dangerously short-sighted approach. SOURCE: International Institute for Sustainable Development International Institute for Sustainable Development Tue, 24 Jun 2008 12:55:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25088 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25088 Syria has more often than not represented a problem for U.S. foreign policy. Its unwillingness to make peace with Israel, close ties to Iran, political and military interference in Lebanon, and support for Hezbollah and Hamas—both of which appear on the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations—have caused significant strain. Syria itself is one of five countries on the State Department’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. In recent years, bilateral tensions have further increased over Syria’s role in allowing militants and weapons into Iraq. Damascus is also widely suspected of involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and of attempts to build a nuclear reactor with help from North Korea. At the same time, the United States and Syria have a history of limited cooperation and there are occasions when U.S. and Syrian interests overlap. The United States facilitated the negotiation of the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In 1990 and 1991, Syria took part in the U.S.-led Gulf War coalition that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Then, after the war, Syria attended the Madrid Conference sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It also sent a representative to the Annapolis conference held by the Bush administration in November 2007. And most recently, it was announced in May 2008 that Israel and Syria were engaging in peace talks through Turkish mediators. In this Council Special Report, Mona Yacoubian and Scott Lasensky make a strong case that the Bush administration’s policy of diplomatic isolation of Syria is not serving U.S. interests. They provide guidance for U.S. policy toward Syria on questions concerning Lebanon, Israel-Syria peace talks, and Iraq. But wherever one comes out on these and other difficult questions, the report offers informed history and thoughtful analysis of the country and its behavior. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Tue, 24 Jun 2008 11:31:32 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25078 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25078 The strategic goal of the United States in Iraq remains a unified, democratic and federal Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself and is an ally in the war on terror. The United States is pursuing this goal along political, security, economic and diplomatic lines of operation. This report measures progress toward achieving this goal during the reporting period (March through May 2008) and highlights challenges to Iraqi and Coalition efforts to achieve their mutual objectives. The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, with all major violence indicators reduced between 40 to 80% from pre-surge levels. Total security incidents have fallen to their lowest level in over four years. Coalition and Iraqi forces’ operations against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) have degraded its ability to attack and terrorize the population. Although AQI remains a major threat and is still capable of high-profile attacks, the lack of violence linked to AQI in recent weeks demonstrates the effect these operations have had on its network. Equally important, the government’s success in Basrah and Baghdad’s Sadr City against militias, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iranian-supported Special Groups, has reinforced a greater public rejection of militias. This rejection, while still developing, is potentially as significant for Iraq as the Sunni rejection of AQI’s indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. Overall, the communal struggle for power and resources is becoming less violent. SOURCE: United States Department of Defense United States Department of Defense Tue, 24 Jun 2008 11:15:30 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25077 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25077 The 2007 Andean coca survey, released today by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), shows a marked increase in coca cultivation. The total area of land under coca cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru in 2007 was 181,600 hectares, a 16% increase over 2006, and the highest level since 2001 (although well below figures from the 1990s). The increase was driven by a 27% rise in Colombia (for a total of 99,000 hectares), and smaller increases of 5% and 4% respectively in Bolivia and Peru. Despite the increase in coca cultivation, production was stable. In 2007, global potential production of cocaine reached 994 metric tons (mt), practically unchanged from the 984 mt recorded for 2006, the survey Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region showed. Even with the significant increase in coca cultivation, cocaine production in Colombia (the world's biggest producer) remained almost unchanged in 2007 (at 600 mt). Lower yields are caused by exploitation of peripheral coca plots - smaller, more dispersed, in remote locations. "In the past few years, the Colombian government destroyed large-scale coca farming by means of massive aerial eradication, which unsettled armed groups and drug traffickers alike. In the future, with the FARC in disarray, it may become easier to control coca cultivation" , said Mr. Costa. SOURCE: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Tue, 24 Jun 2008 11:07:20 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25075 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25075 Defense Comptroller issued new guidance in 2003 to enhance CSF oversight. The guidance calls for, among other things, CSF reimbursement claims to contain quantifiable information that indicates the incremental nature of support (i.e., above and beyond normal operations), validation that the support or service was provided, and copies of invoices or documentation supporting how the costs were calculated. While Defense generally conducted macro-level analytical reviews called for in its guidance, such as determining whether the cost is less than that which would be incurred by the United States for the same service, for a large number of reimbursement claims Defense did not obtain detailed documentation to verify that claimed costs were valid, actually incurred, or correctly calculated. GAO found that Defense did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance. For example, as of May 2008, Defense paid over $2 billion in Pakistani reimbursement claims for military activities covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining sufficient information that would enable a third party to recalculate these costs. Furthermore, Defense may have reimbursed costs that (1) were not incremental, (2) were not based on actual activity, or (3) were potentially duplicative. GAO also found that additional oversight controls were needed. For example, there is no guidance for Defense to verify currency conversion rates used by Pakistan, which if performed would enhance Defense’s ability to monitor for potential overbillings. SOURCE: Government Accountability Office Government Accountability Office Tue, 24 Jun 2008 10:41:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25072 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25072 Recently, some scholars and government officials have called for the creation of “national security courts”—specialized hybrid tribunals that would review the preventive detention of suspected terrorists (both within and outside of the territorial United States), conduct the detainees’ criminal trials, or, in some cases, both. Advocates for these courts claim that they offer an attractive middle ground between adherence to traditional criminal processes and radical departures from those processes. For the reasons that follow, we, the undersigned members of the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee and its Coalition to Defend Checks and Balances, believe that the proposals to create these courts should be resisted. The proposals are surprisingly—indeed alarmingly—underdeveloped. More seriously, they neglect basic and fundamental principles of American constitutional law, and they assume incorrectly that the traditional processes have proven ineffective. SOURCE: The Constitution Project The Constitution Project Mon, 23 Jun 2008 15:11:00 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25068 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25068 Widespread lack of access to clean water ranks as one of Haiti’s most significant obstacles when it comes to meeting basic human rights standards. Historical legacies of inequality, disempowered or corrupt governance, and persistent levels of extreme poverty have all contributed to the Haitian government’s systemic inability to deliver clean water to its people. Lack of access to this crucial resource continues to impact all aspects of life for the vast majority of Haitians, contributing to poor health, food shortages, and diminished educational opportunities. The result: a vicious cycle of contaminated water consumption, ineffective public hygiene, persistent health crises, and—beneath it all—chronic and deeply embedded poverty. Research undertaken in Haiti—both at the national level and in the coastal city of Port-de-Paix—has indicated that Haiti’s water system is severely dysfunctional. Public water systems are rarely available throughout the year and close to 70 percent of the entire population lacks direct access to potable water at all times. Combined with unsanitary conditions, the lack of water is a major factor in exacerbating Haiti’s health crises. Moreover, the problem is actually worsening, as shown by the fact that the percentage of the population without access to safe drinking water has increased by at least seven percent from 1990 to 2005. SOURCE: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice // Partners In Health // the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center // Zanmi Lasante Center for Human Rights and Global Justice // Partners In Health // the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center // Zanmi Lasante Mon, 23 Jun 2008 15:03:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25066 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25066 Overall violence, as measured by enemy-initiated attacks, fell about 70 percent in Iraq, from about 180 attacks per day in June 2007 to about 50 attacks per day in February 2008. Security gains have largely resulted from (1) the increase in U.S. combat forces, (2) the creation of nongovernmental security forces such as Sons of Iraq, and (3) the Mahdi Army’s declaration of a cease fire. Average daily attacks were at higher levels in March and April before declining in May 2008. The security environment remains volatile and dangerous. The number of trained Iraqi forces has increased from 323,000 in January 2007 to 478,000 in May 2008; many units are leading counterinsurgency operations. However, the Department of Defense reported in March 2008 that the number of Iraqi units capable of performing operations without U.S. assistance has remained at about 10 percent. Several factors have complicated the development of capable security forces, including the lack of a single unified force, sectarian and militia influences, and continued dependence on U.S. and coalition forces. SOURCE: Government Accountability Office Government Accountability Office Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:27:47 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25064 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25064 Watch U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reflect on the lessons of the past eight years and answer questions about the future of U.S. foreign policy at the CFR International Affairs Fellows Fortieth Anniversary Conference. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:23:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25062 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25062 On June 12, USIP hosted a discussion titled "New Avenues for National Reconciliation in Iraq." A diverse group of Iraqi leaders discussed the status of national reconciliation efforts at the Track I level and considered new avenues that the Track II level might provide. The panelists were Randa Slim, vice president, International Institute for Sustained Dialogue (IISD); Dr. Omar Abdel Sattar, member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (Islamic Unity Party); Fryad Rwandzi, member of the Iraqi Council of Representatives (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); and Sheikh Balasim Yahia, leader of the Tamim tribe, Diyala province. Moderator Daniel P. Serwer commented, "Iraqis are clearly taking ownership of their own reconciliation process. This is an important development that we can only applaud." SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:20:42 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25061 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25061 In the wake of the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez, co-founder of the FARC, and his succession by Antonio Cano, longtime FARC political wing leader, Colombia stands at a crossroads. FARC spokespersons have renewed their vows to carry on their deceased leader’s fight and Cano may seek short-term military victories to bolster his internal support. However, a window of opportunity for peace with the world’s oldest guerrilla fighting force may simultaneously be opening. The fate of the FARC hostages will indicate whether Colombia is likely to head down a path toward peace or to witness a resurgence of violence. Following Marulanda’s death, Colombian government officials announced that rebels had inquired whether they might be given freedom if they defected with one or more of the hostages in tow, and offered a reward of up to $100 million and freedom in France to any rebels that do so. No one has yet come forward in response. Advocates for a humanitarian accord—which would determine the conditions under which the FARC would release hostages in exchange for the government releasing some 500 FARC prisoners—have underscored the urgency of securing an agreement to end kidnapping as a tool of war. Beyond the humanitarian aspects of such an accord, many see it as a confidence-building measure. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace Mon, 23 Jun 2008 14:09:50 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25059 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25059 Lawyers and courts have become a central part of the Bush administration's "war on terror." The Justice Department's so-called torture memos and other legal documents have triggered extensive debates. The federal courts have entertained numerous habeas corpus challenges from detainees at the Guantánamo Bay detention center, as well as lawsuits on issues ranging from the electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens to the rendition of terrorist suspects to foreign countries. The Supreme Court has already issued three significant decisions concerning the war on terror, and by the time this review is published, it is expected to have issued a fourth. Yet many fundamental legal questions remain unanswered. Who qualifies as an "enemy combatant" in this conflict? How must this classification be made? How long can such combatants be detained by the U.S. military without trial? These issues remain unresolved partly because the war on terror has been regulated not by Congress but by interactions between the executive branch and the courts, and the courts have tended to decide issues in an ad hoc and case-specific manner. Such an approach can be sensible, especially in the face of fluid circumstances. But as the war on terror becomes a more permanent state of affairs, it is becoming increasingly inadequate. SOURCE: Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs Mon, 23 Jun 2008 11:15:45 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25048 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25048 Not long ago I conducted an informal survey during a trip to East Africa, asking everyone I met how they view America. My interlocutors were from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. They were, in the main, educated and working in the private sector, the policy world, or government. Many of them hold dual passports. Their answers were strikingly similar. Most of them said in one way or another that the “idea” of America has changed for the worse, and most asserted that they are less interested in traveling to, working in, or working with the United States now than in the past. But most disconcerting was the hope, expressed with striking consistency, that China would soon attain its full power so that American hegemony could be brought in check. This was not for any love of China’s ideology or even the aggressive aid and investment strategies Beijing is deploying in the developing world. It was, as a young woman attorney explained, because “America used to be the champion for all of us, and now it is the champion only for itself.” SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:25:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25041 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25041 Afghanistan is working to establish the rule of law for its citizens, and the Department of Justice is committed to help achieve that goal. Together with our State and Defense Department colleagues and with our international and Afghan allies, we are making progress notwithstanding the obstacles to these endeavors in Afghanistan. While the task of establishing rule of law in Afghanistan is daunting, it is critically important not only to Afghanistan's security but ours as well. Our work in Afghanistan is already has secured important law enforcement successes - successes that could not have been achieved had DOJ personnel not been on the ground in Afghanistan to train and mentor our Afghan counterparts. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:22:08 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25040 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25040 With nearly $5.9 billioin obligated (and $4 billion spent) on development programs in Afghanistan since 2002, USAID provides the largest bilateral civilian assistance program to Afghanistan. Our work continues to be a vital support to Afghanistan in its efforts to ensure economic growth led by the private sector; establish a democratic and capable state governed by the rule of law; and provide basic services for its people. Since 2002, USAID has engaged in many traditional development activities including building of infrastructures, such as courthouses and judicial training centres, promoting strong civil society through multiple outreach activities and providing wide-ranging support to elections: however, in order to help Afghanistan to develop in such a way that it is less donor dependent, USAID is working to build judicial institutions that strengthen the private sector. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:18:50 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25039 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25039 The long-term prospects of the broader reconstruction effort in Afghanistan are dependant, to a large extent, on progress in these areas. My comments will focus on Afghan National Police (ANP) development, as the Defense Department’s equities lie principally in this mission. I’m pleased to be joined by my colleagues from the Departments of State and Justice, who will speak in greater detail about their respective organizations’ specific programs. ANP development is part of the broader effort to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which include the Afghan National Army (ANA). The purpose of the ANSF development program is to grow a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable ANSF, with competent ministries, staffs, and sustaining institutions, which are capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training, and supporting the ANSF. Specifically, the ANP are being trained and equipped to uphold the rule of law and control movement across Afghanistan’s borders. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:16:41 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25038 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25038 The international community's efforts on justice reform got off to a slow start. As the police became operation, it became crystal clear that no matter how well trained and equipped the police, there would be no sustainable gains in security without a fair and transparent justice system. An effective justice system not only improves public confidence in the police, it also deters crime and extends the reach and authority of the central government. Following the liberation of Afghanistan in 2001, a lead-nation coordination mechanism was established where donor countries took the lead in different sectors. The lead-nation approach had advantages, but it resulted in competing visions and varying levels of commitment (including resources) and did not produce an overarching strategy that would create the full spectrum of security and justice. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Fri, 20 Jun 2008 15:11:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25037 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25037 Rule of law is particularly critical in Afghanistan where there is a direct connection between the lack of a workable system of governance and the national security of the United States. The absence of a modern, functional government sustains the Taliban and al Qaeda and encourages the rapid growth of the opium trade. Confidence that the government can provide a fair and effective justice system is an important element in convincing war-battered Afghans to build their future in a democratic system rather than reverting to one dominated by terrorists, warlords, and narcotic traffickers. SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Fri, 20 Jun 2008 14:50:15 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25033 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25033 Despite a successful election four months ago, Pakistan's political and security situation remains highly unstable and demands close attention from US policymakers. A power struggle at the center among the three main political players - Asif Ali Zardari (leader of the ruling Pakistan People's Party and widower of Benazir Bhutto), Nawaz Sharif (party leader of the junior coalition partner, the Pakistan Muslim League / Nawaz), and President Pervez Musharraf - is distracting the new government from coping with grave economic and terrorism challenges facing the country. Inflation has hit double digits and an acute energy crunch has led to daily power outages lasting six-eight hours per day. A revived lawyers' movement to restore judges deposed by President Musharraf last year is adding to the political uncertainty. Perhaps the most worrisome trend in Pakistan, though, is the advance of the Taliban militants in the northwest part of the country and the government's lack of a strategic approach to roll back the rising extremist threat. SOURCE: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security Fri, 20 Jun 2008 14:44:45 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25032 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25032 The paper analyzes the social construction of youth violence in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador on the one hand, and the related security policies of the three states, on the other. In each country, there is an idiosyncratic way of constructing youth violence and juvenile delinquency. Also, each country has its own manner of reaction to those problems. In El Salvador youths are socially constructed as a threat to security, and the state implements predominantly repressive policies to protect citizens against that threat. In Nicaragua and Costa Rica, where the social discourse on youth violence is less prominent, the state's policies are neither very accentuated nor very coherent, whether in terms of repressive or nonrepressive measures. There are strong relations and mutual influences between the public's fear (or disregard) of youth violence and the state's policies to reduce it. SOURCE: German Institute of Global and Area Studies German Institute of Global and Area Studies Fri, 20 Jun 2008 14:18:39 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25025 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25025 The mayhem of 9/11 has been the attention-getting event of modern times, the exclamation point that marks the end of security and the beginning of an age of anxiety. Alas, attention does not imply analysis. The very notoriety of the 9/11 attacks made us all feel we were experts on terrorism, leading us to bypass the need for background research. We knew what the terrorists were up to just by consulting our guts. Unfortunately, in a stressful conflict situation, guts are a poor guide to understanding the enemy. Participants who respond emotionally are inclined to imagine the worst about opponents and attribute to them all sorts of evil, threatening designs. Then, on the basis of these fears, they take extreme measures that compound the conflict. U.S. policy toward Islamic terrorism is today entrapped in this cycle of misperception and escalation. The George W. Bush administration and the neoconservative architects of its foreign policy have from the beginning insisted on demonizing the terrorist enemy. Swept up by the shock and hysteria of 9/11, this camp leaped to the conclusion that the terrorists are out to conquer the world. SOURCE: The Independent Review // The Independent Institute The Independent Review // The Independent Institute Fri, 20 Jun 2008 14:15:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25024 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25024 President Evo Morales’s efforts to consolidate sweeping reforms on the basis of a controversial new constitution have steered Bolivia into a cul-de-sac. On 8 December 2007, his supporters in the Constituent Assembly (CA) provisionally passed the text by running roughshod over procedures and virtually excluding opposition delegates. Weak attempts to bridge the deepening divide have failed, increasing potential for a violent confrontation both sides still seem to wish to avoid. Openly defying Morales in May 2008, however, Santa Cruz massively approved the department’s autonomy statutes by referendum. Two other eastern lowland departments followed suit, with the fourth expected to do so on 22 June. Morales is pushing for final adoption of the constitution by referendum and a popular vote of confidence. The Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union (EU) and several European countries, and the Group of Friends (Argentina, Brazil and Colombia) should provide good offices to help the government and opposition reach urgent agreement on a revised constitution that can keep the country together. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Fri, 20 Jun 2008 14:08:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25022 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25022 A six term congressman from Arkansas’s second district and Chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Dr. Vic Snyder is a leading voice on Capitol Hill on the need to improve the U.S. government’s ability to shape and respond to national security challenges through better integrated defense, diplomacy, and development assistance programs. His subcommittee recently focused on ongoing stabilization and reconstruction efforts and future capability requirements. He hosted a dozen hearings in the past year on these issues, including the effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Defense Department’s enhanced focus on stability operations, as well as the State Department’s push to fill the void in deployable civilian personnel by establishing a civilian response capability. In April, his subcommittee released a report, using PRTs as a case study on interagency planning and operations, that found PRTs are performing admirably in very challenging and often dangerous conditions with less than ideal training, guidance, oversight, and support. The lack of clear direction, interagency cooperation, and uncoordinated resourcing not only impacts the effectiveness of today’s PRTs, but also offers valuable lessons for the planners of interagency operations in the future. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies Fri, 20 Jun 2008 13:50:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25021 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25021 Despite a successful election four months ago, Pakistan's political and security situation remains highly unstable and demands close attention from US policymakers. A power struggle at the center among the three main political players - Asif Ali Zardari (leader of the ruling Pakistan People's Party and widower of Benazir Bhutto), Nawaz Sharif (party leader of the junior coalition partner, the Pakistan Muslim League / Nawaz), and President Pervez Musharraf - is distracting the new government from coping with grave economic and terrorism challenges facing the country. Inflation has hit double digits and an acute energy crunch has led to daily power outages lasting six-eight hours per day. A revived lawyers' movement to restore judges deposed by President Musharraf last year is adding to the political uncertainty. Perhaps the most worrisome trend in Pakistan, though, is the advance of the Taliban militants in the northwest part of the country and the government's lack of a strategic approach to roll back the rising extremist threat. SOURCE: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security Fri, 20 Jun 2008 13:47:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25020 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25020 Pakistan used to be an important state because of its assets, but it is now important because of its problems. I am sure you are aware of Pakistan's past reputation as a moderate Muslim state, but it has become virulently anti-American, it was the worst proliferator of advanced nuclear and missile technology and it continues to harbor - partially involuntarily - extremists and terrorists whose dedicated mission is to attack the United States. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities present at least four challenges to American policy: There is a small but real possibility of the next India-Pakistan crisis escalating to nuclear levels; Pakistan may decide, as a matter of state policy, to extend a nuclear umbrella (or engage in nuclear sharing) with one or more Middle East states, especially if Iran acquires a nuclear device; There is a hard-to-quantify risk of nuclear theft; Pakistan has a home-grown personnel reliability program, but even this could be circumvented in a determined conspiracy; There is some small chance that should Pakistan unravel, that its nuclear assets will be seized by remnant elements of the army for political, strategic or personal purposes. SOURCE: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security Fri, 20 Jun 2008 13:38:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25019 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25019 There is much we do not know about the stewardship of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Stewardship arrangements changed for the better after national leaders could no longer plausibly deny the evidence regarding AQ Khan's misdeeds. Subsequently, public statements by authoritative Pakistani officials have mostly been confied to organizational matters, but very little else, leaving much room for conjecture. Current events in Pakistan provide ample grounds for further uncertainty. The country's political leadership is unsettled, especially with respect to relations among Pakistan's President, Prime Minister, and Chief of Army Staff. All three positions have key roles in Pakistan's National Command Authority, which oversees all matters pertaining to nuclear weapons. Control over the nation's nuclear assets will remain in the hands of the military, even if the locus of power shifts away from the President. SOURCE: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security Fri, 20 Jun 2008 13:33:08 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25018 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25018 On the front lines in the battle against terrorism, and the world's second most populous Muslim state, Pakistan is also situated at a geopolitical crossroads. Its neighbors are Afghanistan, India, Iran, and China. More than ever, our national security is linked to the success, security and stability of a democratic Pakistan. We must build a long-term, comprehensive partnership, not only with the Pakistani government but with the Pakistani people. Pakistan's February 18 elections provided a new opportunity for us to build upon. We recognize that enabling the Pakistani Government to control its territory and to govern its people justly and humanely will lead to a more stable and secure future for Pakistan and strengthen Pakistan as a partner to the United States and the rest of the international community. SOURCE: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security Fri, 20 Jun 2008 13:27:28 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25017 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=25017 Pakistan, the world's second most populous Muslim state, is a nuclear weapons power occupying a strategic location abutting Afghanistan, Iran, China, and the Arabian Sea, among others. The country sits at the locus of several major US policy concerns, including international terrorism, nuclear weapons security, democratization, relations with the Muslim world, and Afghan and regional stability. US policy makers thus widely recognize that US interests are served through the development of multi-tiered and direct engagement with Pakistan across a broad spectrum of issue areas. Yet anti-American sentiments are widespread in Pakistan. Most observers agree that reducing these negative perceptions - a long-term and potentially difficult goal - will be necessary to meaningfully advance US interests in its relations with Pakistan. Many argue that this goal is overshadowed by shorter-term policies that may fuel the very distrust the United States seek to overcome. SOURCE: United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs // Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security