Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Armies, Paramilitaries, Non-State Armed Groups ". Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:28 +0000 Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:28 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 15 May 2008 13:03:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24386 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24386 It seems possible that the Council will take up the situation in Lebanon in the coming days. The recent fighting in Beirut brought back memories of the Civil War and underlined to all how fragile the situation has become with the ongoing political crisis. An Arab League delegation is arriving in Beirut today to try to mediate between the two sides. The “Friends of Lebanon” have called for the immediate cessation of fighting. Some Council members are currently considering whether the Council can add its voice in a constructive way to reinforcing these initiatives and calming the crisis. However, at press time, the timing and the format of any Council action remained unclear. SOURCE: Security Council Report Security Council Report Thu, 15 May 2008 12:47:20 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24384 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24384 The recent clashes between government supporters and Hizbullah, which claimed more than 80 lives, marked the most serious escalation in Lebanon's internal divisions since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war and demonstrates how the impending threat of a new civil war is constantly present. The decision by the government of Fouad Siniora to ban Hizbullah's phone network, which is critical to its military operations, and dismiss a Shia army officer responsible for security at Beirut's airport, was taken as a "declaration of war" by Hizbullah which laid siege to west Beirut and government institutions. The government's decision to withdraw the measures marked a significant victory for Hizbullah, at least for the short term. SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association Foreign Policy Association Thu, 15 May 2008 12:37:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383 Hizbollah’s takeover of much of West Beirut began as a cost-of-living strike on 7 May 2008. Yet the course of events, their speed and ultimately violent turn exposed the true stakes. For almost four years, Lebanon has been in a crisis alternatively revolving around the government’s composition, its program, the international tribunal investigating Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination, the choice of a new president and the electoral law. All attempts at peaceful resolution having failed, it has reverted, more dangerously than ever, to its origins: an existential struggle over Hizbollah’s arms. The government’s 14 May decision to reverse the measures – removal of the airport security chief and questioning Hizbollah’s parallel telephone system, a key part of its military apparatus, precipitated the crisis – is welcome as is the Arab League-mediated solution. The onus is now on all Lebanese parties to agree a package deal that breaks the political logjam and restricts how Hizbollah can use its military strength without disarming it for now. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Thu, 15 May 2008 11:26:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24378 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24378 Recent abuses committed by military personnel in war zones and violent conflicts the world over reemphasize the central importance of the law of armed conflict—the law of war—for the protection of combatants, prisoners, and noncombatants alike, and cultural and religious landmarks. At their most basic level, the laws of war promote and protect many of the values intrinsic to human life and dignity. Every country has an obligation to provide training to ensure that their military personnel understand and can adhere to the law of armed conflict. Under the Geneva Conventions, states are explicitly required to “include the study [of the law of armed conflict] in their programmes of military . . . instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to all their armed forces.” Yet not all countries currently include law of war training as part of their regular military training or offer it in any form. Although this shortcoming sometimes results from a lack of motivation or a simple disregard for the Geneva Conventions, in most countries this lack of law of war training stems primarily from an absence of knowledge and opportunity. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace United States Institute of Peace Thu, 15 May 2008 09:08:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24376 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24376 The paper, authored by Raspal Khosa, argues that Australia’s security interests are tied to the success of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. The paper advances three key recommendations on how to increase the effectiveness of Australia’s commitment at little additional cost. First, we must focus on security sector reform by training competent Afghan security forces. Second, we must improve reconstruction and development efforts through better coordination of civil and military resources. Third, we must engage with Pakistan more closely to contain cross-border insurgent activity. The paper argues that the only way to expedite our withdrawal and protect our interests is to work towards a sustainable, democratic and secure Afghanistan. SOURCE: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Australian Strategic Policy Institute Wed, 14 May 2008 12:22:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24350 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24350 Le risque d’une reprise des violences en Ituri est aujourd’hui limité du fait de la présence de la Mission des Nations unies (MONUC), du démantèlement de la plu­part des groupes armés et de la lassitude de la popu­la­tion après des années de souffrance et de destructions. Cependant, les problèmes de fond à l’origine des violences extrêmes qu’a connu le district pendant la guerre – un accès équitable à la terre et une gestion transparente des revenus issus de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles et minières – restent entiers. L’absence de réconciliation intercommunautaire et l’impunité pour la grande majorité des crimes commis pendant la guerre sont également extrêmement inquié­tants en perspective d’élections locales en 2009. Afin d’éviter toute reprise de la violence, dont les femmes seraient les premières à souffrir, les éléments fonda­men­taux d’une paix durable doivent être urgemment mis en place dans le cadre d’une stratégie intégrée impliquant les institutions nationales et provinciales avec le soutien actif de la MONUC et des bailleurs de fonds du Congo. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Wed, 14 May 2008 12:04:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24344 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24344 The past week once again saw the international media intensely focus on the capture and death of prominent Islamist leaders. On May 8, hundreds of reports appeared that al-Qaeda’s commander in Iraq Abu Ayub al-Masri (a.k.a. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) had been captured by U.S. and Iraqi forces in Mosul; this claim proved false (Telegraph, May 9). Then on May 11, Western media flocked to an al-Qaeda internet communiqué announcing that one of its senior field commanders, Abu Suleiman al-Otaibi, had been killed in Afghanistan in a “fierce battle with the worshippers of the cross” after returning from fighting in Iraq (Reuters, May 11). On the same day, the British media focused on the arrest at Manchester airport of an Islamist named Hassan Butt, who is reputed to have helped “200 British Muslims train for jihad” (Guardian, May 11). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 14 May 2008 11:08:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24336 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24336 Né en 1954 à Jérusalem, Moustapha Barghouti est médecin, formé dans les universités de Moscou, Jérusalem et Stanford. Il est secrétaire général d’Al-Mubadara (Initiative nationale palestinienne, INP), une organisation politique laïque. Il a été ministre de l’information dans le gouvernement palestinien d’union nationale constitué en 2007 après les élections législatives. Il fut aussi, en 2006, candidat à l’élection présidentielle. Il obtint un tiers des voix et se classa en seconde position, derrière le président actuel de l’Autorité palestinienne, M. Mahmoud Abbas. Leader de la principale organisation de Résistance de masse qui s’appuie sur la force de la non-violence, le Dr Barghouti a pour modèle de référence Gandhi, le père de l’indépendance de l’Inde, obtenue contre les Britanniques au moyen d’une stratégie de non-violence. Au sein d’une société palestinienne malmenée par six décennies de conflits, lasse de la corruption du Fatah et méfiante à l’égard du fondamentalisme religieux du Hamas, le soutien populaire, en particulier des couches laïques, aux thèses d’Al Mubadara se renforce sans cesse. SOURCE: Le Monde Diplomatique Le Monde Diplomatique Wed, 14 May 2008 11:00:46 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24334 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24334 This report outlines one offensive conducted by the Burma Army against the Karen people in northern Karen State, eastern Burma. It also provides an insight into other means by which the dictators attempt to control and exploit the population in the ethnic areas and provides an analysis of Burma Army strategy and tactics and how the ethnic resistance counters these. It describes the situation of the internally displaced people (IDPs) and makes recommendations for action. Finally, it tells the story of a people living on the edge of survival who have not given up and need help. The slow but unrelenting attacks and building of new camps seem to be driven by a plan to dominate,chase out or crush any people in these areas. This was the largest offensive in Karen State since 1997. It began in earnest in February 2006, with troops from over fifty battalions attacking through the rainy season, and the construction of 7 new main camps and 26 smaller support camps. The Burma Army is now planning the construction of two new roads that, when completed, will cut the northern Karen State into quarters. SOURCE: Free Burma Rangers Free Burma Rangers Wed, 14 May 2008 10:25:02 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24332 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24332 Ce document porte sur le conflit des Grands Lacs en Afrique, qui a donné naissance au génocide rwandais en 1994 avant d'aboutir à l'affrontement de sept pays sur le même sol de la république démocratique du congo. Ces nombreux affrontements de plus de quarante ans qui ont opposé les hutu et les tutsi ont coûté beaucoup à l'Afrique, particulièrement sur le plan économique. Il a fallu attendre les années 2004 pour qu'un espoir de paix se fasse jour ; une paix à laquelle la communauté internationale veut apporter un timide soutien. Le portail propose également une rubrique "Repères", ainsi qu'une carte géographique du continent africain. Table des matières : Introduction I- Un conflit ancien 1.Hutu et Tutsi : 40 ans d'affrontements 2.Le génocide rwandais de 1994 3.Le premier conflit du Zaïre 1996-1997 II- La régionalisation du conflit 1998-2003 1.Sept pays en guerre sur le sol de la Rép. dém. du Congo (RDC) 2.Un conflit meurtrier 3.Le pillage des ressources naturelles III- La RDC entre paix et guerre depuis 2003 1.La transition démocratique 2.Persistance des violences SOURCE: La Documentation française, Paris, France La Documentation française, Paris, France Wed, 14 May 2008 10:22:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24331 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24331 U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are making progress but are also confusing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dangerous implications for conflict in the region. The “Mindanao Model” – using classic counter-insurgency techniques to achieve counter-terror goals – has been directed against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and has helped force its fighters out of their traditional stronghold on Basilan. But it runs the risk of pushing them into the arms of the broader insurgencies in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The U.S. and the Philippines need to revive mechanisms to keep these conflicts apart and refocus energies on peace processes with these groups. That imperative has become particularly acute since the Malaysian government announced with­drawal, beginning on 10 May, from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) that has helped keep a lid on conflict since 2004. If renewed attention to a peace agreement is not forth­coming by the time the IMT mandate ends in August, hostilities could quickly resume. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Tue, 13 May 2008 10:52:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24319 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24319 By deploying tanks and armoured engineers to Afghanistan in October 2006 and supporting the acquisition of the Leopard 2, the leadership of the Canadian Forces (CF) has acknowledged the importance of maintaining heavy armour in a balanced force. While the continued development of sensors and technology will be extremely important to achieving improved situational awareness (SA) on the battlefield, the hard-earned experiences of the Canadian Army and our allies in sustained combat in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven we must be prepared to get our hands dirty and come into physical contact with the enemy if we wish to define their strength, composition and intentions, and subsequently kill them. Canadian tanks and armoured engineers have better protected our dismounted infantry soldiers in Southern Afghanistan, allowing them to close with and destroy a fanatical and determined enemy in extremely complex terrain. SOURCE: The Canadian Army Journal The Canadian Army Journal Tue, 13 May 2008 10:43:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24318 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24318 In the final days of 1979, the Soviet Union, under the direction of the Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, invaded Afghanistan. Soviet Special Forces and KGB agents assaulted Tajbeg Palace and executed President Hafizullah Amin the evening of December 27th as Soviet ground forces started their entry across the northern border. Brezhnev had decided to intervene when it became clear that Soviet advisory and aviation support to the threatened Afghan government was insufficient. Recent governments had attempted to reform the country too rapidly, making Afghanistan vulnerable to an Islamic overthrow similar to that of Iran. This, combined with numerous other reasons, led Moscow to its decision. Soviet forces faced an immense challenge. It was presented with not only the vast and rough terrain of Afghanistan, but also by its xenophobic Islamic population, which at the time was in a state of civil war. Fighting from ambush sites inherited from their ancestors and aided by men and material from around the world, the Afghan mujahideen fought a protracted insurgency against the Soviets. Although Soviet military forces completed every military task they were assigned, the tactical victories combined to result in strategic failure. Analysis through the lens of an appropriate model clearly demonstrates why. SOURCE: The Canadian Army Journal The Canadian Army Journal Tue, 13 May 2008 10:25:03 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24317 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24317 As John F. Kennedy observed of the Vietnam War in 1962, this type of warfare is again at the centre of the present and future operating environment. The Canadian Forces (CF) in Afghanistan are attempting to bring stability to the country as it suffers such an insurgency, and this environment demands new approaches and new capabilities inspired by old lessons. With respect to ‘how’ Canada would engage such environments, its policy was made clear in April 2005. The government of the day stated that our approach to intervention on the international stage, and in Afghanistan in particular, would be based on a 3D + C (diplomacy + development + defence and commerce) model. This approach is one in which diplomacy, defence, and development work together to synchronize efforts, improve effectiveness, and maximize the impact of Canada’s contribution. It is an approach that demands a coherent policy and integrated activities by all elements of power within the government. SOURCE: The Canadian Army Journal The Canadian Army Journal Mon, 12 May 2008 14:59:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24311 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24311 The Central African Republic is striving to turn the page on decades of armed violence linked to mutinies, coups and attempted coups. Hundreds of thousands of civilians remain displaced, many of them unable, or too afraid, to farm their land. This is an overview of the various armed groups, government security forces and international military missions in the country. SOURCE: Integrated Regional Information Networks Integrated Regional Information Networks Mon, 12 May 2008 13:42:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24304 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24304 The attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, coupled with the rise of militant transnational Islamism, have prompted both the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress to reassess foreign policy in Africa and to begin to give considerable attention to Africa’s Muslim populations and it’s failed and failing states. Some experts have noted that Africa’s failing and failed states may serve as a breeding ground for terrorists.1 In response to terrorist threats, the United States, in partnership with countries across Africa, has developed a range of strategies to help regional governments face the challenge of terror. Since September 11, 2001, the size of U.S. diplomatic missions in sub-Saharan African countries with large Muslim populations has increased. Presently, there are 45 active embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, including 16 new compounds built since 2001. Most recently, President Bush returned from a five-country visit to Africa, his second trip to the continent. Some observers view these trips as reflective of the Administration’s focus, which has seen increasing American engagement with the continent in recent years. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Mon, 12 May 2008 12:44:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24292 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24292 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions including not quite half of the FY2008 request. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $526 billion (74%), OEF about $140 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (5%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of January 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.2 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.4 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Mon, 12 May 2008 12:31:35 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24287 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24287 Despite a peace agreement being reached - and the largest UN peace-keeping mission in attendance - eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is still racked by violence. For the eastern (Kivu) region is home to a plethora of militias who continue to use violence in order to propagate ‘criminal’ economic-related activities; to protect their communities – reinforced by strong ethnic allegiance; and to exploit the post-transition political climate in order to resist the demilitarisation process. Link such insecurity with government DRC forces who frequently loot, terrorise and abduct members of the local population and the effect on civilians is calamitous – they have to endure forced displacement, death, economic and physical insecurity and sexual violence. To address such chronic instability and violence, international bodies continually seek attempts at Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of the local militias in Kivu. This paper presents an overview of such attempts and seeks to explore methods and processes which can help effect DDR and address the endemic insecurity of the region. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies // Eldis Community Institute for Security Studies // Eldis Community Fri, 09 May 2008 10:10:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24263 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24263 A battle between rebels and security forces took place in Chechnya’s Urus-Martan district on May 6. Kavkazky Uzel on May 7 quoted a Chechen Interior Ministry source as saying of the incident: “Yesterday at around 1400 in a forest tract at the village of Komsomolskoe in Urus-Martan district servicemen from a Defense Ministry unit who were carrying out intelligence-reconnaissance activities discovered a gang-formation unit numbering up to 15 people that was concealed at a temporary base. After a short shootout, the bandits retreated and left, presumably in the direction of the mountains (the village of Komsomolskoe is located in the foothills). There were no causalities or wounded among the servicemen. An operation to find and neutralize that gang group is continuing at the moment.” According to Kavkazky Uzel, Chechen rebel websites claimed that the battle lasted more than one and a half hours but did not report on whether any rebel fighters were killed or wounded. SOURCE: Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 09 May 2008 10:05:37 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24262 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24262 Dagestan’s Interior Minister Adalgirei Magomedtagirov recently admitted that the government expects rebel fighters to strike over the May holidays. The projected spread of rebel attacks mentioned in his statement was quite intriguing: “Makhachkala-based groups of bandits are planning to commit acts of terror in several Dagestani cities, including Makhachkala, Khasavyurt, Kizilyurt, Kizlyar, Buinaksk, Kaspiisk and Derbent,” he said. Yet as inclusive as that list was, Magomedtagirov had to add that terror acts elsewhere in Dagestan could also not be ruled out (Grani.ru, April 30). SOURCE: Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 08 May 2008 16:13:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24254 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24254 La réintégration est le processus personnel au cours duquel les ex-combattants quittent leurs unités de combat pour rejoindre et être acceptés par les groupes sociaux civils, comme les familles ou les communautés. Le processus peut être complexe et profondément personnel, suivant un calendrier individuel et opérant à différents niveaux sociaux, économiques et psychologiques. Il a été démontré que lʼappui à la réintégration des ex-combattants constitue un élément crucial du processus de désarmement, démobilisation et réintégration (DDR) et contribue à la réussite de la transition vers la paix. SOURCE: Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration Thu, 08 May 2008 16:02:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24253 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24253 Le Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration (MDRP) est une initiative, menée par plusieurs organismes, qui apporte un appui à la démobilisation et la réintégration des ex-combattants dans la Région élargie des Grands Lacs, en Afrique Centrale. Le MDRP est le programme le plus important de cette nature dans le monde et l'on estime qu'il vise actuellement à atteindre 450.000 ex-combattants dans sept pays : l'Angola, le Burundi, l'Ouganda, la République centrafricaine, la République Démocratique du Congo, la République du Congo et le Rwanda. SOURCE: Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration Programme multi-pays de démobilisation et de réintégration Thu, 08 May 2008 12:38:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24242 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24242 Lord’s Resistance Army leader Joseph Kony’s failure to sign a peace deal in April drove a nail into the coffin of the Juba peace process—a process that is grinding to an unsuccessful end.[1] The talks have certainly contributed to northern Uganda’s current state of relative peace and created a mechanism to address tensions between the people in the North and the southern-dominated government in Kampala. But without real leverage and without a direct channel of negotiations to Kony himself, the LRA leader has exploited this last year of negotiations to stave off international pressure, collect food and money from the mediators and donors, and buy time to abduct, train, and equip new combatants. Another meeting with the LRA high command and the mediators set for May 10 looks like it will just be more of the same. SOURCE: ENOUGH Project ENOUGH Project Thu, 08 May 2008 10:31:21 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24232 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24232 The military legacy of socialism put a heavy burden on the transition economies and their societies at large. When socialism came to an end, the armed forces became a part of the transition process -both objects and subjects at the same time. During transition, the military was affected by shifts in political, economic and financial priorities. Not only did its role in the political system alter from being a cornerstone of socialism to being merely one of the many competing bureaucratic and social interest groups, but most military functions that had emanated from this Cold War role were devalued. Thus, while the Central Eastern European countries have been forced to reduce their armed forces dramatically over the last decade, changes in the composition of armed forces must be seen as part of an overarching restructuring process. SOURCE: Bonn International Center for Conversion Bonn International Center for Conversion Wed, 07 May 2008 14:06:22 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24219 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24219 En octobre 2007, la Commission européenne a adressé au Conseil et au Parlement européens, sous la forme d’un « Livre Bleu », une communication portant sur l’organisation d’une politique maritime intégrée au niveau de l’Union. Cette démarche, prenant acte de l’importance des activités maritimes pour l’Europe, faisait suite à un « Livre Vert » (juin 2006) qui se donnait pour but d’établir « un juste équilibre entre les dimensions économique, sociale et environnementale du développement durable ». L’automne dernier, ce sont des propositions pour une gouvernance maritime partiellement mutualisée qui ont été exprimées, assorties d’un plan d’action. Le Conseil européen du 14 décembre 2007, le dernier de la présidence portugaise, a approuvé les conclusions du « Livre Bleu » et demandé que le plan d’action qui l’accompagne soit mis en oeuvre, ce qui sera un des rôles de la présidence française de l’Union, au deuxième semestre 2008. SOURCE: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique Wed, 07 May 2008 11:14:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24194 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24194 Turkey appears to be using a two-pronged approach in its continuing efforts to drive the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) from its refuges in northern Iraq. Following raids and incursions by Turkish land forces, Turkey’s air force is now driving home points being made in meetings with Iraqi and Kurdish Iraqi leaders. In late April and early May, Turkish warplanes conducted two waves of airstrikes in northern Iraq against the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union and the United States. The first wave of airstrikes on April 25-26 targeted PKK militants in the Zap, Avashin and Khakurk regions who were trying to infiltrate across the border for attacks on Turkish territory, according to the Turkish General Staff (TGS) (Hurriyet, April 26). 43 Turkish warplanes took part in the attacks, reportedly destroying PKK control posts, anti-aircraft positions and logistical supply units while taking care not to harm the civilian population (Sabah, April 30; Hurriyet, April 26). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 11:04:09 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24191 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24191 Anti-terrorism officials in the Horn of Africa are on high alert following the killing of Shaykh Aden Hashi Ayro, the military leader of al-Shabaab, the youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, in a May 1 strike by U.S. ship-launched Tomahawk missiles (SomaliNet, May 2; Daily Nation [Nairobi], May 2). Shaykh Ayro, trained in terrorist and insurgency methods in Afghanistan and believed to have been in his 30s, was killed in a house together with another five insurgents in the small central Somalia town of Dusamareb, 250 miles north of Mogadishu (al-Jazeera, May 2). Those killed included Ayro’s brother, another commander, Muhiyadin Muhammad Umar, and several other insurgents. At least a dozen civilians in neighboring houses were also killed by the missiles. Soon after the attack, Shaykh Muqtar Robow Adumansur, the group’s spokesman, vowed the group would retaliate, setting off an alert in the Horn of Africa: “This does not deter us from continuing our holy war against Allah’s enemy; we will be on the right way, that is why we are targeted” (The Standard [Nairobi], May 2). Thousands of people took to the streets of Dusamareb on May 4 to protest the attack (AFP, May 4). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 11:01:09 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24190 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24190 Secret peace talks between the government and the Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Taliban groups, collapsed in late April but the unilateral ceasefire declared by the latter is still in place (The News International [Islamabad], April 29). By agreeing to continue observing the ceasefire, the TTP signaled its willingness to revive the peace negotiations, provided some of its demands were met. Speaking from an undisclosed location in Bajaur tribal region bordering Afghanistan, TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar told reporters that the government must show flexibility if it wanted the talks to resume (Dawn [Islamabad], May 4). Maulvi Omar said the government should withdraw Pakistan Army troops from Waziristan, Darra Adamkhel and Swat as part of confidence-building measures to create the proper atmosphere for the peace talks to proceed. He insisted that this was a commitment made by the government through a jirga (council of tribal elders) mediating between it and the TTP (The News International, May 4). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 10:03:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24182 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24182 Les Battlegroups, appelés les « Groupements tactiques 1500 » (GT 1500) sont nés de l’opération Artémis. En effet, suite à l’accord franco-britannique de Saint-Malo conclu en 1998, est apparue la nécessité pour l’Union européenne de « disposer d’une capacité d’action autonome soutenue par des forces militaires crédibles ». Le Sommet européen d’Helsinki a défini en 1999 l’Objectif global 2003 qui vise à permettre à l’Union de disposer d’une capacité de réaction permettant le déploiement de 50 000 à 60 000 hommes dans un délai de soixante jours. Mais lorsqu’en 2003 Kofi Annan s’adresse à l’Union européenne au sujet du problème congolais, elle fait appel à un contingent beaucoup plus modeste. Le concept adopté permet à l’Union européenne de disposer, à tout moment, d’une force de réaction rapide de l’ordre de 1 500 hommes et qui peut être déployée en dix jours sur un théâtre d’opérations extérieur. SOURCE: Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Wed, 07 May 2008 09:56:04 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24181 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24181 Depuis la fin des opérations majeures de combat en Irak, la bataille de Fallujah a été la plus importante opération militaire menée par les forces de la coalition multinationale (MNF-I). Les tensions entre Fallujah et les forces de la coalition ont culminé par l’assassinat de quatre contracteurs civils américains. Au début d’avril 2004, l’opération Vigilant Resolve était mise en branle afin de punir les coupables de ces actes. Intervenir était crucial pour la coalition, car rester passive aurait produit l’image d’une coalition faible et vulnérable, risquant d’encourager l’insurrection et de perdre Fallujah au statut de « no go area ». Il était donc essentiel d’intervenir. Suite à l’échec de Vigilant Resolve, l’opération Al Fajr, menée en novembre, a rempli ses objectifs tactiques, prenant contrôle de la ville entière. Malgré cela, la bataille de Fallujah est perçue comme une défaite stratégique. Les leçons tirées de cette bataille sont toutefois essentielles tant militairement, où de nouvelles technologies et tactiques ont révélé leur efficacité, que politiquement, où il apparaît clair que le problème lié à l’insurrection en Irak ne peut pas se résoudre uniquement que par les armes. SOURCE: Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Wed, 07 May 2008 09:46:55 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24179 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24179 Depuis les 25 dernières années, un des traits les plus marquants des organisations terroristes d’obédience islamiste a été l’usage des attentats suicides pour atteindre leurs objectifs. C’est ainsi que ces organisations en ont fait une de leurs « armes de frappe » favorites. Enfin, la violence de ces attentats et leurs cotés spectaculaires et meurtriers ont amené un grand nombre de gens à faire l’amalgame entre la religion musulmane et la violence terroriste. Plus encore, les exécutants de ces attentats sont souvent décrits comme des ‘fous d’Allah’, « mus par des motifs relevant de la démence ou d’un hiatus par rapport à la vie occidentale ». Ils sont, en général, parfaitement pris en charge par les organisations intégristes qui les endoctrinent et leur « lavent le cerveau » avant de les envoyer faire ces attentats. C’est ce même processus que l’on retrouve dans les attaques terroristes fomentées par Al-Qaida, par le Hamas et le Jihad Islamique en Palestine, ou encore par Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique, (l’ex GSPC), en Algérie. L’image de ces terroristes détendus et déterminés, filmés en train de lire leur testament, ou invectivant l’Occident en appelant d’autres à suivre leur chemin « de martyrs » et l’image, en arrière plan, d’inscriptions en arabe à la gloire de l’Islam, n’ont fait que renforcer cette vision effroyable que l’on a d’eux et de l’Islam. En fait, la réalité de ces nouveaux « martyrs » ou « chahids », ainsi qu’ils aiment se faire appeler, est bien plus complexe. Qu’est-ce qu’un attentat suicide ? Où les organisations islamistes ont-elles puisé son origine ? Quelle en est la justification religieuse ? Dans quels buts? Ce sont là quelques questions auxquelles nous tenterons de répondre. SOURCE: Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Wed, 07 May 2008 09:34:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24178 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24178 « Que les Américains s’en aillent ou qu’ils demeurent », signait Patrice Claude dans Le Monde du 19 mars 2008, « la stabilisation de la vieille Mésopotamie n’est pas pour demain. » Le contexte international s’est largement détérioré au cours des dernières années, particulièrement entre la Russie et les États-Unis, notamment à cause de la volonté américaine d’installer 10 intercepteurs antimissiles en Pologne et un radar à pulsions phasées en République tchèque, d’étendre la couverture de l’OTAN à l’Ukraine et à la Georgie, sans parler du soutien des pays occidentaux à l’indépendance du Kosovo. De son côté, le président Bush continue de soutenir contre vents et marées la candidature de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, « le seul pays non membre de l’OTAN », souligne-t-il, « qui appuie chacune des missions de l’OTAN », que ce soit au Kosovo ou en Afghanistan. L’Allemagne, la France, l’Italie et d’autres pays européens vont sans doute mettre les bâtons dans les roues de ce projet de Washington ou du moins soulever suffisamment d’obstacles pour prévenir l’application du Plan d’adhésion de l’Ukraine à l’OTAN, d’ici la fin du mandat du président Bush. La question géorgienne est encore plus épineuse pour l’OTAN étant donné les conflits persistants de ce pays avec les régions séparatistes d’Abkhazie et de l’Ossétie du Sud. Pourtant, le sénateur McCain (Arizona) ne se préoccupe guère de ces questions puisqu’à ses yeux il faut exclure la Russie du G-8, élargir ce club sélect à l’Inde et au Brésil, et cesser de travailler avec une Russie revanchiste pour s’adjoindre une « Ligue des démocraties » sous leadership américain, comme alternative à l’ONU. Formule largement privilégiée dans le passé par les États-Unis – une coalition de volontaires –, il est donc difficile de savoir en quoi la nouveauté du sénateur McCain réside ici. SOURCE: Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité, Université du Québec à Montréal Wed, 07 May 2008 09:15:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24175 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24175 Entre le 19 et le 27 août 2007, une première manifestation est orga nisée à Rangoon par deux mouvements d’opposition birmans : la Ligue Nationale pour la Démocratie (LND), le principal parti d’opposition dont la secrétaire générale est Mme Aung San Suu Kyi (Prix Nobel de la Paix en 1991 et assignée à résidence depuis 2003) et le mouvement Génération 88, groupe informe d’anciens étudiants ayant participé au grand soulèvement de l’été 1988 dont la répression brutale a fait quelque trois mille morts. SOURCE: Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval Wed, 07 May 2008 09:07:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24173 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24173 Devant l’importance que revêt la reconstruction du secteur de la sécurité en Afghanistan en tant que stratégie de sortie de la communauté internationale, cet article propose d’effectuer un bilan des efforts accomplis afin de créer des forces de sécurité nationales afghanes opérationnelles, soit l’Armée nationale afghane (ANA) et la Police nationale afghane (PNA). Alors que l’ANA obtient des résultats satisfaisants en progressant vers une plus grande indépendance par rapport aux troupes internationales, la faiblesse de la PNA est davantage marquée, principalement en raison de la confusion dans le rôle qu’elle doit assurer sur le territoire afghan ainsi que de la primauté d’une vision à court terme. Suite à ce bilan, il sera également question de deux principaux défis posés à la consolidation de la légitimité des forces de sécurité nationales afghanes, soit l’instauration d’un lien de confiance avec la population et le renforcement des milices locales suite à la chute du régime taliban. Ces deux défis sont particulièrement importants à relever afin de favoriser l’implantation de l’autorité de l’ANA et de la PNA à l’ensemble du territoire afghan. SOURCE: Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval Programme Paix et sécurité internationales - Université Laval Tue, 06 May 2008 13:27:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24165 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24165 This article investigates the determinants of armed group organization and the downstream effects of organization on civil wars. It demonstrates that the interaction between geographical and technological factors influences the types of hierarchical organizations that armed groups develop. It then argues that variations in the types of hierarchies developed by armed groups have important consequences for principal-agent relations, which in turn affect groups’ overall level of military effectiveness. Using evidence from field research conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the model’s plausibility is examined in comparative case studies of four armed groups that fought in those countries from 1989–2003. SOURCE: Center for International Security and Cooperation // Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation // Stanford University Tue, 06 May 2008 10:19:08 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24150 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24150 Peace processes are renowned for their many twists and turns, moods and opaque terrain. Within them, matters related to weapons and violence have a paradoxical status: at once the subject of intense anxiety and attention, yet frequently duly ignored. Reflections on Guns, Fighters and Armed Violence in Peace Processes represents a rich collection of voices and experiences, and seeks to contribute to a growing debate about holistic response to these matters in peace processes. It is the first of a two-part series bringing together first-hand accounts and careful observations from individuals with diverse connections to peace processes, offering space for their views on how weapons control, violence reduction, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration fare in the push and pull of peace negotiations. SOURCE: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Mon, 05 May 2008 15:12:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24142 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24142 The changing nature of armed conflict has had a dramatic impact on the security risks facing humanitarian personnel. Historically, the safety of humanitarian aid delivery was secured through the consent of the relevant Parties to the conflict. However, non-international ethnically-motivated armed conflicts, failed and failing states, and insurgency-based warfare have fundamentally challenged the viability of this traditional security paradigm. In confronting today's complex security climate, humanitarian organizations are faced with a diverse menu of alternatives to enhance their security. The debate over armed protection that has sharply divided the humanitarian community is explored in this paper, including a critique of specific armed protection options. Tensions between the safe and efficient delivery of aid, and principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence are discussed. SOURCE: Canadian Red Cross // Liu Institute for Global Issues Canadian Red Cross // Liu Institute for Global Issues Mon, 05 May 2008 14:51:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24137 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24137 The so-called “surge” in Iraq, a reinforcement of U.S. forces by thirty thousand troops which began in spring 2007, has been credited by many with slowing civilian casualties, building morale among Iraqi security forces, and helping restore some order to the country, particularly in its capital, Baghdad. Yet critics see it as little more than an unsustainable holding action which has propped up what they regard as an essentially flawed strategy in Iraq. Two CFR experts on the war, Max Boot, senior fellow for national security studies, and Steven Simon, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, debate whether the surge has put Iraq on the path to sucess. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Mon, 05 May 2008 14:48:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24136 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24136 The latest spike in cross-border attacks (NYT) into Afghanistan by militants based in Pakistan has once again exposed the vulnerabilities of those fighting the war for a stable Afghanistan. In a repeat of past instances, Afghan officials blamed (IHT) the recent assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai on insurgents in Pakistan’s tribal areas with links to al-Qaeda. A spokesperson from Pakistan’s army denied (Daily Times) the allegations. But all recent U.S. intelligence and investigative reports have pointed to the growing strength of the terrorist groups in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border.“Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al-Qaeda has been able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants capable of directing the organization’s operations around the world,” said the 2008 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Mon, 05 May 2008 14:37:06 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24134 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24134 Much has happened since mid 2005 when the Institute published its first account of the progress that had been achieved with the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) (Cilliers & Malan 2005). This paper provides an update and commentary on subsequent progress. It does so without repeating in detail the background and basis of the ASF project – much of which is contained in the earlier paper. The purpose of the ASF is to provide the African Union with capabilities to respond to conflicts through the deployment of peacekeeping forces and to undertake interventions pursuant to article 4(h) and (i) of the Constitutive Act in terms of which the AU was established. The ASF is intended for rapid deployment for a multiplicity of peace support operations that may include, inter alia, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace building, post conflict disarmament, demobilisation, re-integration and humanitarian assistance. SOURCE: Institute for Security Studies Institute for Security Studies Mon, 05 May 2008 14:14:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24128 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24128 President John F. Kennedy of the US was assassinated on November 22, 1963, at Dallas, Texas, as he was being taken in a tightly-protected motorcade. In view of the strict access control, which might not have allowed access to his car, Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin, took up position in an unoccupied room on the sixth floor of the Texas Book Repository and fired at Kennedy. The incident highlighted the need for perimeter security, meaning the physical security of buildings in the vicinity of a VIP motorcade or a place of meeting of the VIP to prevent anyone taking shelter in a building and opening fire. On October 6, 1981, the then President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated during the annual 6th October parade in Cairo marking the eighth anniversary of what the Egyptians view as their victory over Israel in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. As Sadat and his security staff were engrossed watching a spectacular fly-past in the sky, Khalid Islambouli of the Islamic Jihad, who was a member of the military formations participating in the parade, ran towards Sadat and shot him dead. Eleven others were also killed by other terriorists, who indiscriminately opened fire SOURCE: International Terrorism Monitor // South Asia Analysis Group International Terrorism Monitor // South Asia Analysis Group Mon, 05 May 2008 13:46:11 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24126 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24126 At the beginning of the year we decided that we needed to do a more focused discussion on Lebanon and the crisis in Lebanon and its many dimensions. This has proved to be more difficult than we imagined and it is becoming a movable feast. We had originally planned to do a major symposium, but then in each case some of the key speakers were unable to turn up, so we have ended up improvising to a series of Lebanon. The first one we had was with a group of Lebanese experts and many of you were there I think for that about a month ago. Today we are very honored to have former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon to address us. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution The Brookings Institution Mon, 05 May 2008 10:21:53 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24110 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24110 During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, the jihadist movement espouses larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order. The modern jihadist insurgency is also more global in terms of its popular support and operational territory. It makes far better use of communications technology and propaganda to reach the minds and hearts of global audiences. The contemporary international security environment has therefore become a frustrating place for Western powers. Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations. SOURCE: RAND Corporation RAND Corporation Fri, 02 May 2008 14:38:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24105 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24105 The first car bomb attacks on unarmed civilians began in early 2004. More than 200 Shias were killed on 2 March during the festival of Ashura as bombs ripped through crowds in the holy city of Kerbala and at the main Shia shrine in Baghdad in the northern suburb of Kadhimiya. Body parts and strips of flesh were scattered all over the blood-stained streets. The vast number of deaths, the biggest on a single day, as well as the symbolic impact of attacking unarmed pilgrims during a religious festival, shocked Iraqis. “Our movement began as Shia but we have many Sunni members. History has taught us that nothing has happened between the Sunnis and the Shias in the past,” Duaffar said proudly. “I’m sure there won’t be sectarian clashes in the future. The Sunnis and the Shias know the enemy want to provoke clashes, but we are containing the danger successfully.” Duaffar was one of many political leaders who worked hard to prevent retaliation in the hours after the bombings at Kerbala and Kadhimiya. He assumed they were probably the work of Sunni militants from abroad or from the Salafis. In March 2004 in Fallujah, which the Americans saw as a “Sunni bastion” and a hotbed of militant Islam, Abed Ruzuqi, a retired employee in the agriculture department, was keen to tell me that the town had a well-integrated Shia minority and there were no sectarian problems. As his brothers offered us rice and chicken at a shaded table in his front garden, he described an American attack a few nights earlier which, the Americans said, was a response to grenades being fired at a US patrol. SOURCE: Global Policy Forum // Guernica Magazine Global Policy Forum // Guernica Magazine Fri, 02 May 2008 12:24:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24091 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24091 On April 23 the Turkish Council of State ordered former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar to stand trial for allegedly “forming a criminal organization” in the dirty war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during the 1990s, a period most Turks refer to as the “Susurluk” era (Turkish Daily News, April 23; Sabah, April 23; Today's Zaman, April 22). It will be the first time a former government minister has faced charges related to one of the darkest chapters in recent Turkish history, the repercussions of which still haunt Turkey today. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the PKK’s first insurgency was at its peak, there were frequent rumors that the Turkish state was conducting a campaign of torture and assassination against suspected PKK sympathizers, including the formation of death squads and the recruitment of ultranationalist hitmen from the Turkish underworld. No unequivocal evidence could ever be produced and the claims were routinely dismissed by the Turkish authorities as PKK propaganda. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 12:21:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24089 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24089 Over the last few years the Afghan National Army (ANA) has often been presented as a success story. This certainly holds some truth, at least in comparison with Afghanistan’s national police, which is widely seen as a complete failure. The ANA is reasonably well behaved and quite popular throughout most of Afghanistan. Its initial difficulties in retaining troops within the ranks seem to have been addressed to some extent and both the desertion and absence-without-leave (AWOL) rates are down from the high levels of 2002-2006. AWOL rates in particular have declined dramatically over the last 18 months, to a relatively low 8 percent, from about 33 percent in 2006. This appears to be the combined result of a presidential decree turning absence-without-leave into a crime, a widespread media campaign, rising unemployment and rising food prices, which force even less than enthusiastic recruits to stick to the ANA. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 12:15:37 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24088 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24088 On April 26, Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr stood down from his threat to wage an all-out war against the Iraqi government and the coalition. A week before, the anti-American cleric had issued a statement threatening to declare an open war if the security crackdown by the Iraqi and U.S. forces against his loyalists was not called off. Al-Sadr said that he was giving a final warning to the Shiite-led Iraqi government to “take the path of peace and stop violence against its own people.” Al-Sadr’s statement went on: “If [the Iraqi government] does not stop the militias that have infiltrated the government, then we will declare a war until liberation” (al-Jazeera, April 19). The statement was read out in the mosques of Sadr City, a largely Shiite district of Baghdad. There were calls for jihad against the U.S. forces and calls for the Iraqi government to release detainees and end the siege on the poor district of eastern Baghdad. Sadr City is populated by more than two million people and is a main stronghold of Muqtada’s Jaysh al-Mahdi militia (JaM). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 01 May 2008 15:34:00 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24068 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24068 The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous, reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’. This ARI examines the Pashtun claim for an independent territory, the historical and political roots of the Pashtun identity, the implications for the NATO- or Pakistani-led military operations in the area, the increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination and the reasons why the Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life. SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano Real Instituto Elcano Thu, 01 May 2008 15:12:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24067 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24067 Recent national security reviews have highlighted an emerging trend affecting U.S. vital interests: the importance of the African continent to America’s security. In response to this growing strategic challenge, the President and the Secretary of Defense have announced their intention to create a new unified combatant command for Africa. This new regional command will differ greatly from other regional combatant commands in its interagency approach and the unique, complex challenges facing the U.S. Army in the region. On 6 February 2007, the White House announced a presidential directive to create a new unified combatant command in Africa. The project was detailed in greater length on 9 February 2007 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) commenced official operations on 1 October 2007 and will remain a sub-unified command under U.S. European Command (EUCOM) until October 2008. SOURCE: Association of the United States Army // National Security Watch Association of the United States Army // National Security Watch Thu, 01 May 2008 12:50:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24056 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24056 Informal networks are present at all levels in Iraq and they also exert their influence internationally. Stopping the activities of various militias would not put an end to the activity of informal networks in the country. Informal political and religious networks are deeply embedded within the fabric of Iraqi society. Despite the influence of sectarianism on Iraqi politics, various informal networks have employed sectarianism as a means of furthering their political and policy interests. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that even drastic solutions such as partitioning the country will bring the insurgency to an end. Cross-sectarian political alliances and intra-sectarian conflicts indicate that politics takes precedence over ideology. SOURCE: Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy