Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Terrorism". Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:33 +0000 Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:33 +0000 robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel) Thu, 15 May 2008 13:03:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24386 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24386 It seems possible that the Council will take up the situation in Lebanon in the coming days. The recent fighting in Beirut brought back memories of the Civil War and underlined to all how fragile the situation has become with the ongoing political crisis. An Arab League delegation is arriving in Beirut today to try to mediate between the two sides. The “Friends of Lebanon” have called for the immediate cessation of fighting. Some Council members are currently considering whether the Council can add its voice in a constructive way to reinforcing these initiatives and calming the crisis. However, at press time, the timing and the format of any Council action remained unclear. SOURCE: Security Council Report Security Council Report Thu, 15 May 2008 12:47:20 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24384 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24384 The recent clashes between government supporters and Hizbullah, which claimed more than 80 lives, marked the most serious escalation in Lebanon's internal divisions since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war and demonstrates how the impending threat of a new civil war is constantly present. The decision by the government of Fouad Siniora to ban Hizbullah's phone network, which is critical to its military operations, and dismiss a Shia army officer responsible for security at Beirut's airport, was taken as a "declaration of war" by Hizbullah which laid siege to west Beirut and government institutions. The government's decision to withdraw the measures marked a significant victory for Hizbullah, at least for the short term. SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association Foreign Policy Association Thu, 15 May 2008 12:37:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383 Hizbollah’s takeover of much of West Beirut began as a cost-of-living strike on 7 May 2008. Yet the course of events, their speed and ultimately violent turn exposed the true stakes. For almost four years, Lebanon has been in a crisis alternatively revolving around the government’s composition, its program, the international tribunal investigating Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination, the choice of a new president and the electoral law. All attempts at peaceful resolution having failed, it has reverted, more dangerously than ever, to its origins: an existential struggle over Hizbollah’s arms. The government’s 14 May decision to reverse the measures – removal of the airport security chief and questioning Hizbollah’s parallel telephone system, a key part of its military apparatus, precipitated the crisis – is welcome as is the Arab League-mediated solution. The onus is now on all Lebanese parties to agree a package deal that breaks the political logjam and restricts how Hizbollah can use its military strength without disarming it for now. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Thu, 15 May 2008 12:27:44 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24382 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24382 Military operations against armed opposition groups in Pakistan have displaced hundreds of thousands of people in recent months, according to the limited information available. While many of the internally displaced people (IDPs) have apparently been able to return to their areas of origin after an end to the fighting, others remain displaced with little access to hu-manitarian assistance. In the North West Frontier Province’s Swat Valley, conflict between an armed opposition group and the army led to Asia’s biggest new displacement in 2007, with between 400,000 and 900,000 people forced to flee their homes towards the end of the year. Many people re-turned as soon as possible, but some of them found their homes and property damaged. SOURCE: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Wed, 14 May 2008 17:15:13 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24374 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24374 Dans la même lignée que ses alliés, le Canada plaçait en 2005 les « États en déroute » au centre de son Énoncé de politique internationale ; ils constitueraient, pour reprendre la terminologie de cet Énoncé, autant de « menaces pour la sécurité régionale et mondiale », car la déliquescence de « leurs structures de gouvernement » favoriserait le terrorisme et le crime organisé. À l’instar de son voisin américain, le Canada se dit aujourd’hui plus menacé par la faiblesse des États que par leur puissance. Cette version officielle trouve des échos dans les milieux académiques : à l’heure actuelle prédomine cette conviction que l’instabilité politique d’un quelconque État à la marge du système international représente un danger potentiel à la sécurité des plus grandes puissances au monde. Cette proposition suggère deux hypothèses distinctes : d’une part, que la défaillance étatique expliquerait l’émergence de groupes terroristes (relation causale) et, d’autre part, que les États défaillants joueraient un rôle dans le renforcement de la menace terroriste (relation fonctionnelle). À l’indétermination de la nature du rapport entre ces deux variables, s’ajoutent une terminologie éclatée (État effondré, défaillant, faible, etc.) et des concepts dont la définition est incertaine, ce qui ne permet pas d’esquisser des réponses à certaines questions fondamentales : quelle défaillance favorise le terrorisme ? celle de la légitimité politique ? des institutions de sécurité ? À quel type de terrorisme est il fait référence? au terrorisme transnational ? au terrorisme des groupes engagés dans des conflits nationaux ? SOURCE: Programme paix et sécurité internationales, Université Laval Programme paix et sécurité internationales, Université Laval Wed, 14 May 2008 12:31:59 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24351 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24351 The Joint Committee on Human Rights scrutinises Government Bills for their human rights compatibility. The Committee draws the special attention of both Houses to the Counter-Terrorism Bill. This is the Committee’s second Report on this Bill. The Committee has also published four other Reports relevant to the Bill. This Report updates them in light of the Government’s replies to two of the Committee’s Reports and puts forward amendments to the Bill to give effect to the Committee’s recommendations. The Committee’s approach is based on the human rights standards with which the Government’s counter-terrorism measures must be compatible and on the belief that such measures should as far as possible be part of the ordinary criminal law (paragraphs 1-5). SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Lords // United Kingdom House of Commons // Joint Committee on Human Rights United Kingdom House of Lords // United Kingdom House of Commons // Joint Committee on Human Rights Wed, 14 May 2008 12:06:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24347 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24347 In a significant change of policy, Turkey recently initiated high-level official dialogue with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq. A columnist for the Turkish mass circulation daily Zaman commented that such an official dialogue “was not an ordinary step. It was a turning point in the approach to the Kurdish issue and broke a taboo” (Zaman, May 5). The talks—which focused on a wide range of political, economic and security issues—are the first to occur on such a high official level. The May 2 talks in Baghdad involved a delegation led by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu, the senior advisor to the Turkish prime minister; Murat Ozcelik, the special coordinator for Iraqi affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry; and Derya Kanbay, Turkey’s ambassador in Baghdad. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 14 May 2008 12:05:21 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24345 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24345 Like any major terrorist event, the July 7, 2005 (7/7) bombings of London’s public transportation system that killed 52 commuters and four suicide bombers had the immediate result of generating a number of wide-ranging and speculative conspiracy theories. One of the early unanswered questions concerned the fact that the four bombers left behind at least one viable explosive device in their car at Luton train station, raising the question of whether there was a “fifth bomber” (Guardian, May 19, 2007). Numerous other leads and stories have led to all manner of speculation, but thus far only one very concrete element of conspiracy has shown up in the British legal system, in the form of the ongoing trial against Mohammed Shakil, 31; Sadeer Saleem, 27; and Waheed Ali, 24; all originally of Beeston in West Yorkshire, the hometown of the 7/7 team (Telegraph, April 6, 2007; BBC, April 10). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 14 May 2008 12:04:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24344 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24344 The past week once again saw the international media intensely focus on the capture and death of prominent Islamist leaders. On May 8, hundreds of reports appeared that al-Qaeda’s commander in Iraq Abu Ayub al-Masri (a.k.a. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir) had been captured by U.S. and Iraqi forces in Mosul; this claim proved false (Telegraph, May 9). Then on May 11, Western media flocked to an al-Qaeda internet communiqué announcing that one of its senior field commanders, Abu Suleiman al-Otaibi, had been killed in Afghanistan in a “fierce battle with the worshippers of the cross” after returning from fighting in Iraq (Reuters, May 11). On the same day, the British media focused on the arrest at Manchester airport of an Islamist named Hassan Butt, who is reputed to have helped “200 British Muslims train for jihad” (Guardian, May 11). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 14 May 2008 11:08:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24336 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24336 Né en 1954 à Jérusalem, Moustapha Barghouti est médecin, formé dans les universités de Moscou, Jérusalem et Stanford. Il est secrétaire général d’Al-Mubadara (Initiative nationale palestinienne, INP), une organisation politique laïque. Il a été ministre de l’information dans le gouvernement palestinien d’union nationale constitué en 2007 après les élections législatives. Il fut aussi, en 2006, candidat à l’élection présidentielle. Il obtint un tiers des voix et se classa en seconde position, derrière le président actuel de l’Autorité palestinienne, M. Mahmoud Abbas. Leader de la principale organisation de Résistance de masse qui s’appuie sur la force de la non-violence, le Dr Barghouti a pour modèle de référence Gandhi, le père de l’indépendance de l’Inde, obtenue contre les Britanniques au moyen d’une stratégie de non-violence. Au sein d’une société palestinienne malmenée par six décennies de conflits, lasse de la corruption du Fatah et méfiante à l’égard du fondamentalisme religieux du Hamas, le soutien populaire, en particulier des couches laïques, aux thèses d’Al Mubadara se renforce sans cesse. SOURCE: Le Monde Diplomatique Le Monde Diplomatique Wed, 14 May 2008 10:22:14 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24331 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24331 U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Philippines are making progress but are also confusing counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dangerous implications for conflict in the region. The “Mindanao Model” – using classic counter-insurgency techniques to achieve counter-terror goals – has been directed against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and has helped force its fighters out of their traditional stronghold on Basilan. But it runs the risk of pushing them into the arms of the broader insurgencies in Mindanao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The U.S. and the Philippines need to revive mechanisms to keep these conflicts apart and refocus energies on peace processes with these groups. That imperative has become particularly acute since the Malaysian government announced with­drawal, beginning on 10 May, from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) that has helped keep a lid on conflict since 2004. If renewed attention to a peace agreement is not forth­coming by the time the IMT mandate ends in August, hostilities could quickly resume. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Tue, 13 May 2008 11:47:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24320 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24320 Although there are compelling reasons not to define the struggle against mega-terrorism as a "war," for purposes of moral evaluation of defensive measures, Just War standards provide an essential second line of defense for human rights norms as well as a counsel of strategic prudence. Taking the sum of its policies in the wake of 9/11 it is evident that the Bush administration has failed to satisfy those standards even as it continues the effort of the American Right, launched during the administration of Ronald Reagan, to appropriate human rights for their purposes. SOURCE: Human Rights Quarterly Human Rights Quarterly Mon, 12 May 2008 14:02:43 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24307 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24307 This is the first in a series of reports by the Majority and Minority staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Committee) on the threat of homegrown terrorism inspired by violent Islamist extremism. The Committee initiated an investigation into this threat during the 109th Congress under the leadership of Chairman Susan Collins (R-ME). The first hearing on the homegrown threat considered the potential for radicalization in U.S. prisons, including an examination of the activities of Kevin Lamar James, an American citizen. While in prison, James adopted a variant of violent Islamist ideology, founded an organization known as the Assembly for Authentic Islam (or JIS, the Arabic initials for the group), and began converting fellow prisoners to his cause. Upon release, James recruited members of JIS to commit at least 11 armed robberies, the proceeds from which were to be used to finance attacks against military installations and other targets in southern California. James and another member of the group eventually pled guilty to conspiring to wage war against the United States. SOURCE: United States Senate // Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate // Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Mon, 12 May 2008 13:49:37 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24306 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24306 Why do terrorist attacks frequently succeed, even though later investigations almost always show that warnings had been available but were either misunderstood or ignored? Conventional wisdom, as seen in the 9/11 Commission Report, holds that disasters such as the 9/11 attacks have been caused by failures of analytical imagination, a lack of long-term strategic intelligence on the threat, and organizational limitations that prevent the U.S. intelligence community from being able to “connect the dots” of the existing intelligence. The conventional wisdom is reassuring, because it suggests that if we can fix these problems, the American intelligence community (IC) will be more likely to connect the dots next time and prevent the next major terrorist attack. But the conventional wisdom is wrong, and this reassurance is misplaced. The history of American efforts to prevent terrorist attacks suggests that more imagination, better strategic intelligence, and intelligence reorganization will not prevent future disasters. SOURCE: Belfer center for Science and International Affairs // John F Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University Belfer center for Science and International Affairs // John F Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University Mon, 12 May 2008 13:42:07 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24304 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24304 The attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, coupled with the rise of militant transnational Islamism, have prompted both the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress to reassess foreign policy in Africa and to begin to give considerable attention to Africa’s Muslim populations and it’s failed and failing states. Some experts have noted that Africa’s failing and failed states may serve as a breeding ground for terrorists.1 In response to terrorist threats, the United States, in partnership with countries across Africa, has developed a range of strategies to help regional governments face the challenge of terror. Since September 11, 2001, the size of U.S. diplomatic missions in sub-Saharan African countries with large Muslim populations has increased. Presently, there are 45 active embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, including 16 new compounds built since 2001. Most recently, President Bush returned from a five-country visit to Africa, his second trip to the continent. Some observers view these trips as reflective of the Administration’s focus, which has seen increasing American engagement with the continent in recent years. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Mon, 12 May 2008 12:44:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24292 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24292 With enactment of the FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161 on December 26, 2007, Congress has approved a total of about $700 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This $700 billion total covers all war-related appropriations from FY2001 in supplementals, regular appropriations, and continuing resolutions including not quite half of the FY2008 request. Of that total, CRS estimates that Iraq will receive about $526 billion (74%), OEF about $140 billion (20%), and enhanced base security about $28 billion (5%), with about $5 billion that CRS cannot allocate (1%). About 94% of the funds are for DOD, 6% for foreign aid programs and embassy operations, and less than 1% for medical care for veterans. As of January 2008, DOD’s monthly obligations for contracts and pay averaged about $12.2 billion, including $9.8 billion for Iraq, and $2.4 billion for Afghanistan. SOURCE: Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service Fri, 09 May 2008 14:04:34 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24279 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24279 Facing an evolving, global terrorist threat, the international community’s ability to deal effectively with it will only be as strong as the international community’s weakest link and the United States derives more benefit when it works with partners around the globe rather than alone in the international fight against terrorism. Immediately after 9/11, the U.S. made a promising start by working with the international community. Since then, however, attention to this crucial element of counterterrorism policy has dwindled significantly. SOURCE: Better World Campaign Better World Campaign Fri, 09 May 2008 10:10:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24263 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24263 A battle between rebels and security forces took place in Chechnya’s Urus-Martan district on May 6. Kavkazky Uzel on May 7 quoted a Chechen Interior Ministry source as saying of the incident: “Yesterday at around 1400 in a forest tract at the village of Komsomolskoe in Urus-Martan district servicemen from a Defense Ministry unit who were carrying out intelligence-reconnaissance activities discovered a gang-formation unit numbering up to 15 people that was concealed at a temporary base. After a short shootout, the bandits retreated and left, presumably in the direction of the mountains (the village of Komsomolskoe is located in the foothills). There were no causalities or wounded among the servicemen. An operation to find and neutralize that gang group is continuing at the moment.” According to Kavkazky Uzel, Chechen rebel websites claimed that the battle lasted more than one and a half hours but did not report on whether any rebel fighters were killed or wounded. SOURCE: Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 09 May 2008 10:05:37 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24262 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24262 Dagestan’s Interior Minister Adalgirei Magomedtagirov recently admitted that the government expects rebel fighters to strike over the May holidays. The projected spread of rebel attacks mentioned in his statement was quite intriguing: “Makhachkala-based groups of bandits are planning to commit acts of terror in several Dagestani cities, including Makhachkala, Khasavyurt, Kizilyurt, Kizlyar, Buinaksk, Kaspiisk and Derbent,” he said. Yet as inclusive as that list was, Magomedtagirov had to add that terror acts elsewhere in Dagestan could also not be ruled out (Grani.ru, April 30). SOURCE: Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Chechnya Weekly // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 08 May 2008 14:32:26 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24243 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24243 À Alger, le 11 décembre 2007, un double attentat, revendiqué par El Qaïda Maghreb islamique, frappe des immeubles de l’ONU, la Cour suprême et le Conseil constitutionnel : le bilan est d’au moins 67 morts. Comme pour les massacres de civils revendiqués par le GIA (Groupement islamique armé) durant la guerre civile, des doutes sont formulés aujourd’hui sur les attentats-suicides. Pour certains, les groupes terroristes sont infiltrés par les services de renseignement qui les manipulent, pour d’autres, les groupes terroristes sont des créations des services de renseignements! SOURCE: Programme paix et sécurité internationales, Université Laval Programme paix et sécurité internationales, Université Laval Thu, 08 May 2008 11:07:38 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24237 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24237 In order to adorn the twilight of his presidency with a success story in his self-proclaimed ‘War on Terror’, President Bush should implement a high-intensity, Fast Track policy for Somalia and Somaliland that pushes the former towards stability and rewards the latter for its significant achievements over the past decade. Fast tracking Somaliland recognition will send a shock wave to Somalia, and send a clear message that peace and prosperity can be rewarded without the need to use overpowering military force. To date, efforts to resolve the crisis that has blighted Somalia have been half hearted and misconceived. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa’s beacon of stability – Somaliland – continues to toil in relative anonymity, receiving little recognition for its remarkable progress towards creating a viable, stand-alone state. Somaliland has succeeded where the TFG has failed because it possesses precisely those attributes that Somalia lacks: democratically elected institutions with domestic legitimacy, institutions that serve as a repository of nationalism and sovereignty etc. Fighting terrorism is therefore a domestic priority (it was enshrined in the constitution long before 9/11) since extremist violence threatens the institutions of statehood and the common aspiration to international recognition. SOURCE: Senlis Council Senlis Council Wed, 07 May 2008 12:17:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24211 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24211 The Armed Forced of the Philippines (AFP) and armed groups have been fighting for decades on the territory of the Philippines. Those armed groups include a variety of movements: the so-called “leftist” groups advocating for national democracy and economic and social rights (the New People’s Army – NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines); secessionist groups calling for the independence of Mindanao – the Southern island of the country (the Moro National Liberation Front – MNLF, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front – MILF); and groups with unclear objective which appeared more recently (Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyah, Rajah Solaiman Movement). Some of these groups are considered as terrorist organizations. Tensions between armed groups and the Philippine government are not a new phenomenon; but the international context in the aftermath of September 9/11 combined with the close relation between the USA and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has encouraged the latter to take additional measures to fight against terrorism. SOURCE: International Fact-finding Mission // the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates // the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims International Fact-finding Mission // the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates // the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims Wed, 07 May 2008 12:12:27 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24209 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24209 Le budget du département américain de la Défense demandé par George W. Bush s’élève à 588,3 milliards de dollars pour l’exercice 2009, en hausse de 7,5% par rapport à 2008. Depuis 2001, les dépenses supplémentaires pour faire face à la « guerre totale contre la terreur » se chiffrent déjà à plus de 800 milliards de dollars. Le président Bush entendait vendre aux Américains une guerre rapide, gratuite et glorieuse. Elle tourne au désastre humanitaire et est en passe de devenir la guerre la plus chère de l’Histoire : plus de 3 000 milliards de dollars, selon le prix Nobel d’économie Joseph Stiglitz. Plusieurs générations d’Américains et d’Irakiens finiront inévitablement par payer le prix vrai de cette guerre, qui ne se mesure pas seulement en dollars sonnants et trébuchants, mais aussi en déficit durable pour la sécurité nationale et internationale ainsi que pour les libertés constitutionnelles. SOURCE: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Wed, 07 May 2008 11:14:23 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24194 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24194 Turkey appears to be using a two-pronged approach in its continuing efforts to drive the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) from its refuges in northern Iraq. Following raids and incursions by Turkish land forces, Turkey’s air force is now driving home points being made in meetings with Iraqi and Kurdish Iraqi leaders. In late April and early May, Turkish warplanes conducted two waves of airstrikes in northern Iraq against the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union and the United States. The first wave of airstrikes on April 25-26 targeted PKK militants in the Zap, Avashin and Khakurk regions who were trying to infiltrate across the border for attacks on Turkish territory, according to the Turkish General Staff (TGS) (Hurriyet, April 26). 43 Turkish warplanes took part in the attacks, reportedly destroying PKK control posts, anti-aircraft positions and logistical supply units while taking care not to harm the civilian population (Sabah, April 30; Hurriyet, April 26). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 11:08:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24193 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24193 In their attempts to gather more recruits to the cause, jihadi websites are constantly posting enticing messages about the merits of the holy war against Crusaders and Zionists. A posting that appeared in a pro-jihadi forum entitled “How to become a member of al-Qaeda” lays out the requirements needed to join the terrorist group while encouraging Islamists to join the jihad. Another posting warned about the misconceptions that paralyze jihad efforts (al-ekhlaas.net, March-April). A forum participant nicknamed Wali al-Haq posted the requirements for joining al-Qaeda. Al-Haq argues that the accusations of terrorism commonly applied to any Muslim—whether affiliated with a jihadi group or not—who prays for the victory of Islam and the mujahideen is proof of the jihadis’ success in terrifying the Jews and Crusaders: “Al-Qaeda today is not only an organization seeking to fight the Jews and Crusaders; rather it’s an ideology and a mission calling on all Muslims to uphold God’s religion and rescue the weak monotheists.” Al-Haq, who has over 3,600 contributions to jihadi forums, mostly in the field of jihadi propaganda, then proceeds to explain what a Muslim should do to join al-Qaeda. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 11:04:09 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24191 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24191 Anti-terrorism officials in the Horn of Africa are on high alert following the killing of Shaykh Aden Hashi Ayro, the military leader of al-Shabaab, the youth wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Somalia, in a May 1 strike by U.S. ship-launched Tomahawk missiles (SomaliNet, May 2; Daily Nation [Nairobi], May 2). Shaykh Ayro, trained in terrorist and insurgency methods in Afghanistan and believed to have been in his 30s, was killed in a house together with another five insurgents in the small central Somalia town of Dusamareb, 250 miles north of Mogadishu (al-Jazeera, May 2). Those killed included Ayro’s brother, another commander, Muhiyadin Muhammad Umar, and several other insurgents. At least a dozen civilians in neighboring houses were also killed by the missiles. Soon after the attack, Shaykh Muqtar Robow Adumansur, the group’s spokesman, vowed the group would retaliate, setting off an alert in the Horn of Africa: “This does not deter us from continuing our holy war against Allah’s enemy; we will be on the right way, that is why we are targeted” (The Standard [Nairobi], May 2). Thousands of people took to the streets of Dusamareb on May 4 to protest the attack (AFP, May 4). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 11:01:09 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24190 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24190 Secret peace talks between the government and the Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Taliban groups, collapsed in late April but the unilateral ceasefire declared by the latter is still in place (The News International [Islamabad], April 29). By agreeing to continue observing the ceasefire, the TTP signaled its willingness to revive the peace negotiations, provided some of its demands were met. Speaking from an undisclosed location in Bajaur tribal region bordering Afghanistan, TTP spokesman Maulvi Omar told reporters that the government must show flexibility if it wanted the talks to resume (Dawn [Islamabad], May 4). Maulvi Omar said the government should withdraw Pakistan Army troops from Waziristan, Darra Adamkhel and Swat as part of confidence-building measures to create the proper atmosphere for the peace talks to proceed. He insisted that this was a commitment made by the government through a jirga (council of tribal elders) mediating between it and the TTP (The News International, May 4). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 07 May 2008 10:42:58 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24187 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24187 There are approximately 50 detainees at Guantánamo from “high-risk” countries where there is a very real danger of persecution or torture should they be forcibly returned, or who are unable to return to their home countries because they are stateless.* In 2008, none have been charged or tried after more than six years of imprisonment, and virtually all remain in solitary confinement at a “supermaximum” security prison intended to be outside the rule of law. What follows are short profiles of seven refugees who remain at Guantánamo today. Detainees who fear return include some detainees from Algeria, China, Jordan, Libya, the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Russia, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisia and Uzbekistan. SOURCE: Center for Constitutional Rights Center for Constitutional Rights Wed, 07 May 2008 10:21:16 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24185 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24185 Quel est le rôle de la terreur dans la guerre en général et dans les conflits asymétriques en particulier? Pourquoi des pays démocratiques comme la France et les Etats-Unis ont-ils été confrontés à la torture en Algérie et en Irak? Faut-il "terroriser les terroristes"? Cet article entend apporter quelques pistes de réflexion pour tenter de répondre à ces questions particulièrement sensibles. SOURCE: Institut français des relations internationales Institut français des relations internationales Wed, 07 May 2008 09:46:55 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24179 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24179 Depuis les 25 dernières années, un des traits les plus marquants des organisations terroristes d’obédience islamiste a été l’usage des attentats suicides pour atteindre leurs objectifs. C’est ainsi que ces organisations en ont fait une de leurs « armes de frappe » favorites. Enfin, la violence de ces attentats et leurs cotés spectaculaires et meurtriers ont amené un grand nombre de gens à faire l’amalgame entre la religion musulmane et la violence terroriste. Plus encore, les exécutants de ces attentats sont souvent décrits comme des ‘fous d’Allah’, « mus par des motifs relevant de la démence ou d’un hiatus par rapport à la vie occidentale ». Ils sont, en général, parfaitement pris en charge par les organisations intégristes qui les endoctrinent et leur « lavent le cerveau » avant de les envoyer faire ces attentats. C’est ce même processus que l’on retrouve dans les attaques terroristes fomentées par Al-Qaida, par le Hamas et le Jihad Islamique en Palestine, ou encore par Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique, (l’ex GSPC), en Algérie. L’image de ces terroristes détendus et déterminés, filmés en train de lire leur testament, ou invectivant l’Occident en appelant d’autres à suivre leur chemin « de martyrs » et l’image, en arrière plan, d’inscriptions en arabe à la gloire de l’Islam, n’ont fait que renforcer cette vision effroyable que l’on a d’eux et de l’Islam. En fait, la réalité de ces nouveaux « martyrs » ou « chahids », ainsi qu’ils aiment se faire appeler, est bien plus complexe. Qu’est-ce qu’un attentat suicide ? Où les organisations islamistes ont-elles puisé son origine ? Quelle en est la justification religieuse ? Dans quels buts? Ce sont là quelques questions auxquelles nous tenterons de répondre. SOURCE: Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale Tue, 06 May 2008 12:46:32 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24164 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24164 On Tuesday 8 th April, the GCSP held a public discussion on " Counter-Terrorism: Countering Political Extremism ". The platform was introduced by Amb. Dr. Fred Tanner, Director of the GCSP and was chaired by Dr. Shahram Chubin, Director of Studies and Course Co-Director, New Issues in Security Course, GCSP. Terrorism and especially jihadism remain a daily concern and urgent security challenge for everyone, irrespective of location, culture or religion. While only periodically in the headlines, the struggle to control, reduce and manage the problem of political extremism in all its forms, is a daily one requiring understanding, determination and restraint. The platform focused on counter-terrorism from this perspective and the GCSP was delighted to welcome two distinguished experts to address it: Mr. Jean-Louis Bruguiere , Former Counter-Terrorism Judge (Paris), Expert in Terrorism Affairs to the Council of Europe and the European Commission and Dr. Brian Michael Jenkins , Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation, Washington. SOURCE: Geneva Centre for Security Policy Geneva Centre for Security Policy Tue, 06 May 2008 11:49:30 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24162 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24162 The tragic and previously unimaginable events of 9/11 have changed the United States and indeed the world in ways that are still emerging and difficult to comprehend. Leaders in many countries are struggling to find appropriate policies to deal with the new reality that this level of terrorism presents. This is not a new problem and has been a challenge in many countries for many years. Governments combating terrorism in democracies have an additional burden. They are required to balance efficient law enforcement with respect for the civil liberties of their citizens. There is a consensus that all lawful means must be used to prevent such terrible crimes. The problem relates to the legitimacy, and sometimes the lawfulness, of those means. In particular, to what extent can civil liberties be curtailed and normal legal processes circumvented? SOURCE: The Human Rights Institute // University of Connecticut The Human Rights Institute // University of Connecticut Tue, 06 May 2008 09:54:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24148 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24148 What are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas? Why should we be concerned about them? And what can we do about them? SOURCE: Center for American Progress Center for American Progress Mon, 05 May 2008 14:48:54 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24136 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24136 The latest spike in cross-border attacks (NYT) into Afghanistan by militants based in Pakistan has once again exposed the vulnerabilities of those fighting the war for a stable Afghanistan. In a repeat of past instances, Afghan officials blamed (IHT) the recent assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai on insurgents in Pakistan’s tribal areas with links to al-Qaeda. A spokesperson from Pakistan’s army denied (Daily Times) the allegations. But all recent U.S. intelligence and investigative reports have pointed to the growing strength of the terrorist groups in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border.“Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al-Qaeda has been able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants capable of directing the organization’s operations around the world,” said the 2008 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations Council on Foreign Relations Mon, 05 May 2008 14:14:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24128 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24128 President John F. Kennedy of the US was assassinated on November 22, 1963, at Dallas, Texas, as he was being taken in a tightly-protected motorcade. In view of the strict access control, which might not have allowed access to his car, Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin, took up position in an unoccupied room on the sixth floor of the Texas Book Repository and fired at Kennedy. The incident highlighted the need for perimeter security, meaning the physical security of buildings in the vicinity of a VIP motorcade or a place of meeting of the VIP to prevent anyone taking shelter in a building and opening fire. On October 6, 1981, the then President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was assassinated during the annual 6th October parade in Cairo marking the eighth anniversary of what the Egyptians view as their victory over Israel in the Yom Kippur war of 1973. As Sadat and his security staff were engrossed watching a spectacular fly-past in the sky, Khalid Islambouli of the Islamic Jihad, who was a member of the military formations participating in the parade, ran towards Sadat and shot him dead. Eleven others were also killed by other terriorists, who indiscriminately opened fire SOURCE: International Terrorism Monitor // South Asia Analysis Group International Terrorism Monitor // South Asia Analysis Group Fri, 02 May 2008 12:24:48 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24091 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24091 On April 23 the Turkish Council of State ordered former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar to stand trial for allegedly “forming a criminal organization” in the dirty war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) during the 1990s, a period most Turks refer to as the “Susurluk” era (Turkish Daily News, April 23; Sabah, April 23; Today's Zaman, April 22). It will be the first time a former government minister has faced charges related to one of the darkest chapters in recent Turkish history, the repercussions of which still haunt Turkey today. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the PKK’s first insurgency was at its peak, there were frequent rumors that the Turkish state was conducting a campaign of torture and assassination against suspected PKK sympathizers, including the formation of death squads and the recruitment of ultranationalist hitmen from the Turkish underworld. No unequivocal evidence could ever be produced and the claims were routinely dismissed by the Turkish authorities as PKK propaganda. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 12:23:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24090 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24090 Terrorist activities in Europe increased dramatically in 2007, according to the annual report published by Europol, the European Union’s criminal intelligence agency [1]. Terrorists carried out—or attempted to carry out—583 attacks last year, a 24 percent increase from the previous year. Accompanying this increase in terrorist activities was an increase in counter-terrorist operations: 1,044 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offenses, a 48 percent increase compared to 2006. Most terrorist attacks were claimed or attributed to separatist groups in the Basque country, Spain (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or ETA), or in Corsica, France (Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica, or FLNC). ETA and FLNC were responsible for 517 attacks, constituting 88 percent of all terrorist actions. Arrests among separatist groups were also responsible for the large increase in arrests in the European Union (EU) in 2007. Spain saw a seven-fold increase in arrested suspects compared to 2006, while France registered a 68 percent increase. In total, arrests among separatist groups represented more than half of the total arrests. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Fri, 02 May 2008 09:53:57 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24072 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24072 This analysis is based on a game theory model which assumes the premise that the behaviour of Jihadist groups (taken generally, and al-Qaeda in particular) and of States is rational and responds to strategic choices. The analysis begins with an introduction to the context which situates Spain and global Jihadist groups on opposing sides of the game board of strategic interests. There follows an analysis of each of the scenarios and their implications in the strategies of Jihadist organisations, as well as their influence on Spanish foreign policy and international security policy decisions. Finally, conclusions are presented and the scenarios are classified in accordance with their significance and their capacity to destabilise Spain’s position in its various theatres of operations abroad, most notably those linked to peace missions and, in particular, Afghanistan. SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano Real Instituto Elcano Thu, 01 May 2008 12:50:36 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24056 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24056 Informal networks are present at all levels in Iraq and they also exert their influence internationally. Stopping the activities of various militias would not put an end to the activity of informal networks in the country. Informal political and religious networks are deeply embedded within the fabric of Iraqi society. Despite the influence of sectarianism on Iraqi politics, various informal networks have employed sectarianism as a means of furthering their political and policy interests. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that even drastic solutions such as partitioning the country will bring the insurgency to an end. Cross-sectarian political alliances and intra-sectarian conflicts indicate that politics takes precedence over ideology. SOURCE: Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy Thu, 01 May 2008 12:29:20 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24050 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24050 On the small, remote island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean halfway between Africa and Indonesia, the United States has one of the most secretive military bases in the world. From its position almost 10,000 miles closer to the Persian Gulf than the east coast of the United States, this huge U.S. air and naval base has been a major, if little known, launch pad for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the past year, the Bush administration has made improvements that point toward its use in a possible attack on Iran. The administration recently admitted what it had long denied and what journalists, human rights investigators, and others had long suspected: The island has also been part of the CIA’s secret “rendition” program for captured terrorist suspects SOURCE: Foreign Policy in Focus Foreign Policy in Focus Thu, 01 May 2008 10:48:29 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24039 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24039 Although dead for almost two years, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s negative impact in Iraq continues to be a serious problem for al-Qaeda. Indeed, of all the threats and dangers encountered by al-Qaeda since 9/11, al-Zarqawi was the only strategic threat to the organization’s continuing viability. Al-Zarqawi’s efforts to create a Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq—which would have been blamed on al-Qaeda—threatened al-Qaeda’s ability to keep Sunni Islamists focused on the United States—the “far enemy”—and to an extent would have rehabilitated the reputation of the Arab tyrannies that al-Qaeda and its allies oppose because those states would have quickly moved to provide cash and military materiel to Sunnis fighting Shiites in Iraq. For al-Qaeda, al-Zarqawi today is an annoying memory—though one celebrated for his knightly heroics—but the impact of his actions still bedevil al-Qaeda’s goal of helping to establish a Sunni organization that can govern after the withdrawal of the U.S.-led coalition. SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Thu, 01 May 2008 10:44:37 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24038 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24038 Facing well-entrenched insurgencies and numerous acts of terrorism, Turkey and Pakistan have initiated cooperative efforts to increase their security in the face of these threats. Following a two-day, high-level official visit to Pakistan by Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, the two nations announced “strategic” cooperation on a number of fronts, including defense, trade, and diplomacy (The News International [Islamabad], April 20). The visit, the first to Pakistan by a Turkish foreign minister, heralds a new era in cooperation between the two Muslim nations (Associated Press of Pakistan [APP], April 20). Foreign Minister Babacan made explicit mention of Turkey’s desire for an enhanced level of defense industry cooperation with Pakistan. Babacan described the volume of trade with Pakistan as having risen to the level of $690 million in the past five years, noting that—with the increased efforts of private-sector firms in both nations and the creation by Turkey and Pakistan of a business-friendly environment—there was the hoped-for potential of reaching one billion dollars in trade in the next two years (APP, April 20). SOURCE: Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Global Terrorism Analysis // The Jamestown Foundation Wed, 30 Apr 2008 16:15:12 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24024 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24024 Les groupes armés non étatiques jouent un rôle dans les conflits depuis le quinzième siècle avant J.-C.. C'est pourtant seulement depuis 1949, avec les Conventions de Genève, que la communauté internationale a reconnu l'importance du respect des normes internationales par ces groupes armés pour assurer la protection des populations vivant dans les zones touchées par les conflit armés et les violations des droits de l'homme. Les initiatives visant à convaincre les groupes armés non étatiques d'adhérer à la Convention sur l'interdiction de l'emploi, du stockage, de la production et du transfert des mines antipersonnel et sur leur destruction (ci-après dénommée Traité d'interdiction des mines) bénéficient, depuis la fin des années 90, d'un soutien politique fort de la part des organisations régionales et internationales. Depuis 1997, la majorité des États a interdit ces armes car elles ont des effets inhumains et frappent sans discrimination. Encourager les groupes armés non étatiques à faire de même était indispensable pour renforcer le processus engagé au niveau des États et garantir l'adhésion de tous les utilisateurs de mines antipersonnel – étatiques ou non – à la norme d'interdiction de ces armes. Cette stratégie d'engagement des mouvements armés – autrement dit les efforts visant à explorer, établir, favoriser ou entretenir des contacts avec de tels groupes – sur l'interdiction de ce type d'armes a dans une large mesure atteint ses objectifs et a déjà abouti à des résultats positifs et mesurables sur la vie des civiles. Depuis le 11 septembre 2001, un nombre grandissant de groupes armés non étatiques sont considérés comme des groupes « terroristes ». Si ce phénomène n'est pas nouveau, il a pris de l'ampleur et compromet les initiatives visant à traiter certaines questions de sécurité et humanitaires en favorisant le dialogue avec les groupes armés non étatiques5. Cet article analyse en quoi cette évolution, et plus particulièrement le recours à des « listes de terroristes », a des conséquences sur l'action humanitaire et la résolution des conflits et pourquoi elle devrait aussi inquiéter la communauté de la maîtrise des armements. SOURCE: Institut des Nations Unies Pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement Institut des Nations Unies Pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement Wed, 30 Apr 2008 16:04:58 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24022 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24022 Le système international est déstabilisé depuis la fin de la guerre froide en raison de la prolifération d'armes de destruction massive (ADM). Un certain nombre de groupes armés non étatiques et d'États sont décidés à acquérir des ADM et leurs vecteurs. L'expression « groupes armés non étatiques » englobe toute une série d'acteurs aux objectifs très différents, notamment des extrémistes religieux, des milices racistes, des combattants de la liberté, des révolutionnaires et des groupes armés d'opposition. La plupart des groupes armés non étatiques ne sont toutefois pas intéressés par les ADM car ils ne pourraient pas contrôler les effets d'armes chimiques, biologiques ou nucléaires qui dépasseraient leurs attentes et leurs intentions. Leurs partisans risqueraient même d'être gravement touchés par de telles armes. L'organisation pourrait perdre dans ce cas de nombreux soutiens, politiques et autres. Il n'en reste pas moins que certains groupes armés non étatiques – terroristes – sont intéressés par l'idée de lancer une attaque avec des ADM. Ces organisations peuvent se moquer des conséquences effroyables d'une telle attaque. Les membres de ces organisations peuvent même penser que ces attaques feront plus de « martyrs » (et non des victimes) qui iront au paradis. Ce sont ces organisations qui nous intéressent dans cet article. Nous tenterons d'évaluer la menace particulière que représentent les groupes armés non étatiques qui cherchent à acquérir des ADM et envisagerons différentes ripostes possibles. SOURCE: Institut des Nations Unies Pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement Institut des Nations Unies Pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement Wed, 30 Apr 2008 15:49:56 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24020 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24020 Le présent rapport, établi en application des dispositions de la résolution 1612 (2005) du Conseil de sécurité, est soumis au Conseil et à son Groupe de travail sur les enfants et les conflits armés en tant que premier rapport de pays sur la situation des enfants et les conflits armés aux Philippines. Il porte sur la période du 1er juillet 2005 au 31 novembre 2007. Le rapport décrit les graves violations commises contre des enfants dans ce pays, notamment le recrutement et l’utilisation d’enfants, le meurtre et la mutilation d’enfants, les violences sexuelles visant les enfants, les attaques contre des écoles et des hôpitaux, le refus de l’accès à l’aide humanitaire et l’enlèvement d’enfants. Le rapport identifie les parties au conflit – acteurs étatiques et non étatiques – qui commettent de graves abus contre des enfants, à savoir les forces gouvernementales de sécurité, le Front de libération islamique Moro (MILF), la Nouvelle armée populaire (NPA) et le Groupe Abu Sayyaf/Jemaah Islamiya (ASJ/JI). SOURCE: Nations Unies // Conseil de sécurité Nations Unies // Conseil de sécurité Wed, 30 Apr 2008 14:11:01 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24013 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24013 Traditionnellement, le Moyen-Orient est une destination privilégiée des exportations mondiales d’armement. Cette région est en effet très demandeuse de nouveaux matériels militaires et bénéficie d’importantes liquidités grâce aux revenus pétroliers. Depuis des décennies, la Belgique, presque uniquement par le biais des exportations wallonnes, est parvenue à se créer une place dans ce marché particulier, notamment en tissant des relations commerciales soutenues avec un des États de la région, l’Arabie saoudite. Pourtant, ces transferts belges, comme ceux des autres États, suscitent de nombreuses interrogations, notamment concernant l’utilisation non souhaitée qui pourrait être faite des armes exportées, comme la répression interne ou le risque qu’elles soient détournées par des groupes terroristes. SOURCE: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité Wed, 30 Apr 2008 11:53:13 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23997 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23997 A “dirty bomb” or radiological dispersal device (RDD) has been defined by the Council on Foreign Relations as “a conventional explosive (such as dynamite) packaged with radioactive materials.” Radiological terrorism involves detonating radioactive material with conventional explosives resulting in the dispersal of a radioactive aerosol in the atmosphere causing serious injury through air-borne radiation and contamination. It is primarily for this reason that RDDs are “dirty”. The greatest threat posed by an RDD lies in its capacity to create widespread fear and panic in the population, contamination of areas and mass disruption. Contamination of a target city attacked by a radiological bomb would necessitate its evacuation and the cleanup efforts will probably takes years. SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Wed, 30 Apr 2008 10:57:21 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23993 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23993 La crise libanaise ne fait plus la une des journaux mais elle est loin d’être terminée. Aujourd’hui, tous les regards se portent sur les élections présidentielles, dernière arène en date du combat sans fin entre les forces pro et anti-gouvernement. Même si un candidat consensuel est choisi, aucun des graves problèmes que connaît le pays ne sera réglé, en particulier celui des armes du Hezbollah. Pour que les élections ne soient pas qu’un préambule à une nouvelle épreuve de force, tous les partis et leurs alliés extérieurs devront renoncer à leurs revendications, dans l’ensemble d’une grande exigence, et négocier un accord global qui tolère, pour le moment, le statut armé du Hezbollah tout en limitant l’usage de ces armes. SOURCE: International Crisis Group International Crisis Group Wed, 30 Apr 2008 10:22:00 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23986 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23986 Dans une relative indifférence internationale, la lointaine République Démocratique Socialiste du Sri Lanka (ex-Ceylan), nation insulaire de l’océan Indien, replonge ces jours-ci vers ses plus sombres démons ; un quart de siècle déjà de conflit ethnico-religieux derrière elle et 70 000 morts n’ont guère apaisé les esprits, les revendications et l’irrédentisme des uns et des autres. En ce mois d’avril 2008, séparatistes tamouls du LTTE et forces armées gouvernementales de Colombo s’affrontent dans de terribles joutes septentrionales sur les lignes de front de Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Killinochchi, Mannar ou Vavuniya, semant la terreur et le chaos parmi les combattants et les populations locales (majoritairement tamoules). De l’avis même du gouvernement comme du LTTE, pourtant rarement convergents quel que soit le sujet, pareils combats et violence sont sans précédents depuis un an et demi. SOURCE: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques Wed, 30 Apr 2008 10:19:15 -0700 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23985 http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23985 The present report, prepared pursuant to the provisions of Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), is presented to the Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict as the first country report on the situation of children and armed conflict in the Philippines. It covers the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 November 2007. The report focuses on grave violations perpetrated against children in the Philippines including the recruitment and use of children, killing and maiming of children, sexual violence against children, attacks on schools and hospitals, denial of humanitarian access and abductions of children. The report identifies parties to the conflict, both State and non-State actors, who commit grave abuses against children, including Government security forces, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the New People’s Army and the Abu Sayyaf Group/Jemaah Islamiya. SOURCE: United Nations Secretary General Report United Nations Secretary General Report