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<title>Human Security Gateway: Conflict Prevention</title>
<link><![CDATA[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/browse.php?By=TOPIC&Selection=4]]></link>
<description>Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Conflict Prevention".</description>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:29 +0000</pubDate>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 16 May 2008 0:30:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<webMaster>robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel)</webMaster>


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	   <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 15:33:44 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>The Netherlands: Discrimination in the Name of Integration</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24391</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24391</guid>
		 <description>In the past three years the authorities in the Netherlands have introduced a series of measures with the stated aim of better integrating its migrant population. The two key measures are integration tests–one administered in the Netherlands that most foreign residents must take, and another that must be passed by would-be family migrants from some countries before they can join spouses or family members in the Netherlands. The policies were adopted during a period of heightened public concern about the impact that migrant communities have on social cohesion, with a particular criticism of the supposed lack of integration among Moroccan and Turkish migrant communities. 	   SOURCE: Human Rights Watch</description>
	 <source>Human Rights Watch</source>
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	   <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 13:00:56 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Indicators of Potential Conflict</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24385</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24385</guid>
		 <description>This paper focuses on the main factors that contribute to the dangers of violent internal conflict  erupting, or re-igniting after a peace has been concluded. The conflict literature has identified greed and grievance as the principle causes of conflict. But for either of them to take the form of large-scale violence there must be other factors at work, specifically a weakening of the ʻsocial contractʼ. Such a viable social contract can be sufficient to restrain opportunistic behaviour such as theft of resource rents and violent expression of grievance. The social contract, therefore, refers to the mechanisms and institutions of peaceful conflict resolution. Three main risk factors are considered in this briefing: The breakdown of redistributive mechanisms, democratic transitions and lack of economic progress. 	   SOURCE: Microconflict</description>
	 <source>Microconflict</source>
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	   <pubDate>Thu, 15 May 2008 12:37:54 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24383</guid>
		 <description>Hizbollah’s takeover of much of West Beirut began as a cost-of-living strike on 7 May 2008. Yet the course of events, their speed and ultimately violent turn exposed the true stakes. For almost four years, Lebanon has been in a crisis alternatively revolving around the government’s composition, its program, the international tribunal investigating Rafiq al-Hariri’s assassination, the choice of a new president and the electoral law. All attempts at peaceful resolution having failed, it has reverted, more dangerously than ever, to its origins: an existential struggle over Hizbollah’s arms. The government’s 14 May decision to reverse the measures – removal of the airport security chief and questioning Hizbollah’s parallel telephone system, a key part of its military apparatus, precipitated the crisis – is welcome as is the Arab League-mediated solution. The onus is now on all Lebanese parties to agree a package deal that breaks the political logjam and restricts how Hizbollah can use its military strength without disarming it for now. 	   SOURCE: International Crisis Group</description>
	 <source>International Crisis Group</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 13:35:49 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>The Politics of Confrontation in Bolivia</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24360</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24360</guid>
		 <description>The May 4 referendum in Bolivia's Santa Cruz region to approve an autonomy statute highlights the deep lack of consensus that permeates Bolivian politics and society. Under its terms, the statute establishes Santa Cruz as an “autonomous department” within Bolivia with many of the rights and privileges normally reserved for a national government. The referendum, denounced by President Evo Morales and his supporters as illegitimate and unconstitutional, in fact tracks closely with the overall course of Bolivian politics during the last five years, leading to a situation in which the exercise of political power and the rule of law are often at odds. If this tendency is not reversed, Bolivia’s already weak social, regional, ethnic, and political fabric will fray. 	   SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies</description>
	 <source>Center for Strategic and International Studies</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 12:38:00 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Moving towards sustainable security</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24352</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24352</guid>
		 <description>Since the horrific events of 9/11, Western leaders have held up international terrorism as the greatest threat to world security. However, it is not enough to simply insist that terrorism is the greatest threat to the world, when the evidence does not support this claim. In fact, our research paints a very different picture of the fundamental threats that we all face, with these threats coming from four interconnected trends:

    1) Climate change Displacement of peoples, severe natural disasters and food shortages, leading to much higher levels of migration, increased human suffering and greater social unrest.
    2) Competition over resources Competition for increasingly scarce resources, especially from unstable parts of the world – such as oil from the Persian Gulf.
    3) Marginalisation of the majority world Increasing socio-economic divisions and the marginalisation of the vast majority of the world’s population.
    4) Global militarisation The increased use of military force and the further spread of military technologies (including weapons of WMD). 	   SOURCE: Oxford Research Group</description>
	 <source>Oxford Research Group</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 11:33:02 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>China's future water war with India</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24337</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24337</guid>
		 <description>Is there any end to Chinese ambitions in Asia? China wishes to dominate Asia with blockades, blockages, military diplomacy and political Machiavellism. China’s building of the port of Gwadar at the mouth of the Persian Gulf in fact is meant to blockade the oil supplies of the world. Its military diplomacy is on display at the Tibet-India border, where for the last ten years it has strengthened its military infrastructure to intimidate India. In its blockage diplomacy, it is planning to divert the flow of the River Brahmaputra, also called the Tsandpo in Tibet, toward China’s northeast, hence in the process starve 100 million people in India. 	   SOURCE: United Press International Asia</description>
	 <source>United Press International Asia</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2008 10:01:53 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>La résolution des conflits en Afrique</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24328</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24328</guid>
		 <description>L'adhésion des Africains au rejet de la guerre ne faisant aucun doute comme l'attestent le sens de leur vote à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, les dispositions de la charte de l'O.U.A ainsi que les autres normes élaborées à cette fin, ce document cherche à comprendre les facteurs explicatifs de la persistance des conflits, et pose la question de savoir comment résoudre les conflits sur le continent. 	   SOURCE: Université Cheikh Anta Diop. Faculté des Sciences juridiques et politiques. Dakar. Sénégal</description>
	 <source>Université Cheikh Anta Diop. Faculté des Sciences juridiques et politiques. Dakar. Sénégal</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 14:48:04 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Do nuclear weapons still have a role in international relations in the post-Cold War era?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24309</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24309</guid>
		 <description>The First Nuclear Age ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Walton and Gray, 2007: 210). The end of bipolarity, arguably the most peaceful period in European history (Howard, 2001: 136), raised new questions about national security: specifically, the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. During this period nuclear weapons were not actually used per se, but used tacitly; as a means of deterrence (Segal, 1988: 13). We are now in the Second Nuclear Age, and the role of the nuclear weapon is still contested. Should they be retained or should they (or can they?) be abandoned? Is deterrence still a plausible strategy? Can we actually engage in international discourse without them?  These questions, and many others, are debated by theorists, scholars, moralists, politicians and military commanders throughout the world; from Washington to Moscow, London to Beijing, and Paris to New Delhi.  This essay will question the role of nuclear weapons in international society; namely, nuclear weapons as a deterrent, nuclear terrorism and proliferation.  Before we embark on this analysis we must first ask the question: Why do states go ‘nuclear’? 	   SOURCE: E-International Relations</description>
	 <source>E-International Relations</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 13:49:37 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Preventing Terrorist Attacks: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24306</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24306</guid>
		 <description>Why do terrorist attacks frequently succeed, even though later investigations almost always show that warnings had been available but were either misunderstood or ignored?  Conventional wisdom, as seen in the 9/11 Commission Report, holds that disasters such as the 9/11 attacks have been caused by failures of analytical imagination, a lack of long-term strategic intelligence on the threat, and organizational limitations that prevent the U.S. intelligence community from being able to “connect the dots” of the existing intelligence. The conventional wisdom is reassuring, because it suggests that if we can fix these problems, the American intelligence community (IC) will be more likely to connect the dots next time and prevent the next major terrorist attack.  But the conventional wisdom is wrong, and this reassurance is misplaced.  The history of American efforts to prevent terrorist attacks suggests that more imagination, better strategic intelligence, and intelligence reorganization will not prevent future disasters. 	   SOURCE: Belfer center for Science and International Affairs // John F Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University</description>
	 <source>Belfer center for Science and International Affairs // John F Kennedy School of Government // Harvard University</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 13:42:07 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Islam in Africa</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24304</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24304</guid>
		 <description>The attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, coupled with the rise of militant transnational Islamism, have prompted both the Bush Administration and the U.S. Congress to reassess foreign policy in Africa and to begin to give considerable attention to Africa’s Muslim populations and it’s failed and failing states. Some experts have noted that Africa’s failing and failed states may serve as a breeding ground for
terrorists.1 In response to terrorist threats, the United States, in partnership with countries across Africa, has developed a range of strategies to help regional governments face the challenge of terror. Since September 11, 2001, the size of U.S. diplomatic missions in sub-Saharan African countries with large Muslim populations has increased. Presently, there are 45 active embassies in sub-Saharan Africa, including 16 new compounds built since 2001. Most recently, President Bush returned from a five-country visit to Africa, his second trip to the continent. Some observers view these trips as reflective of the Administration’s focus, which has seen increasing American engagement with the continent in recent years. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 13:20:18 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Expand the U.S. Agenda toward Pakistan: Prospects for Peace and Stability Can Brighten</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24302</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24302</guid>
		 <description>Many forces combine in Pakistan to threaten global peace and security, rendering it the most dangerous country in today’s world. Violence is a dominant feature of the political landscape—most notably in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. The February 2008 elections, however, may have put Pakistan on a tortuous path toward democracy. In most respects, the current administration’s policy toward Pakistan has not paid off. The next President must change the agenda and seek to alter the mood, by revamping Pakistani visions of America. Pakistani people must be persuaded that America supports democracy in their country and can be a long-term and reliable ally. They should feel that the struggle against Al Qa’eda and its allies is their war as well as ours. 	   SOURCE: The Brookings Institution</description>
	 <source>The Brookings Institution</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 12:42:14 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and US Policy [Updated 18 April 2008]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24291</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24291</guid>
		 <description>Although long a component of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening weak and failing states has increasingly emerged as a high-priority U.S. national security goal since the end of the Cold War. The past three U.S. National Security Strategy documents point to several threats emanating from states that are variously described as weak, fragile, vulnerable, failing, precarious, failed, in crisis, or collapsed. These
threats include providing safe havens for terrorists, organized crime, and other illicit groups; causing conflict, regional instability, and humanitarian emergencies; and undermining efforts to promote democracy, good governance, and economic sustainability. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 12:20:46 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>India: The Cost of Yellowcake</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24286</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24286</guid>
		 <description>The Indian government has been mining low-grade uranium on tribal lands for decades, but it plans to expand production so that nuclear power will eventually meet a quarter of India's energy needs. The risks of pursuing that policy made international headlines in 2006 when a uranium waste pipeline burst in the east of the country, creating a devastating spill. FRONTLINE/World reporter Sonia Narang travels to this remote area to find out how the mines are affecting the health and traditions of villagers, and forcing thousands off their lands. 	   SOURCE: Public Broadcasting Service // Frontline World</description>
	 <source>Public Broadcasting Service // Frontline World</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 12 May 2008 12:09:53 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Breaking the Failed-State Cycle</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24284</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24284</guid>
		 <description>Insecurity in the 21st century appears to come less from the collisions of powerful states than from the debris of imploding ones. Failed states present a variety of dangers: religious and ethnic violence; trafficking of drugs, weapons, blood diamonds, and humans; transnational crime and piracy; uncontrolled territory, borders, and waters; terrorist breeding grounds and sanctuaries; refugee overflows; communicable diseases; environmental degradation; warlords and stateless armies. Regions with failed states are at risk of becoming failed regions, like the vast triangle from Sudan to the Congo to Sierra Leone. For security, material, and moral reasons, leading states cannot ignore failed ones. Yet both the world’s leading states and the multilateral institutions they manage are struggling in their attempts to help failed states recover. Indeed, “[t]he complex problem of state failure may be much discussed, but it remains little understood.”1 Although the sheer magnitude and multitude of the problems that failed states face go a long way toward explaining such frustration, we find (as others have) that the linkages among these challenges are what make recovery so difficult—linkages that the international community is not organized to treat. 	   SOURCE: RAND Corporation</description>
	 <source>RAND Corporation</source>
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	   <pubDate>Fri, 09 May 2008 10:42:43 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>The United States and Iran: A Dangerous but Contained Rivalry</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24267</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24267</guid>
		 <description>Despite dangerously high tensions between the United States and Iran, which are rooted in the fundamentally different foreign policy objectives of each country, the risks of open hostilities between the two sides are kept in check by the realization of the catastrophic consequences involved. The conflict between the two sides is one of fundamental foreign policy visions and principles that often — especially since the start of President Bush’s second term — verge on the irreconcilable. The stakes of this dangerous rivalry are high, and the range of possible scenarios for moving beyond it is perilously limited. At the same time, however, both sides appear to be keenly aware of the catastrophic consequences of open hostilities between them, and thus seek to undermine the other’s interests without stepping beyond certain ill-defined red lines. High-level US-Iranian tensions are likely to continue for some time, therefore, without, however, spilling into open warfare. 	   SOURCE: Middle East Institute</description>
	 <source>Middle East Institute</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2008 13:30:18 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>A War of Words with Iran</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24216</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24216</guid>
		 <description>Accusations regularly fly between Washington and Tehran about their involvement in Iraq, but the past few weeks have seen these charges take a more specific turn. The U.S. military in recent weeks has accused Iran of arming Shiite militias inside the war zone. What’s more, an unnamed U.S. official told the New York Times that Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based terrorist group, has been training Iraqi fighters at a base near Tehran. The government of Iran, meanwhile, has pulled out of a fourth round of bilateral talks over Iraqi security to protest what Tehran calls the “massacre” (aj-Jazeera) of innocent civilians in Iraq by U.S.-led forces. The Pentagon says it is only bombing fighters suspected of receiving Iranian backing. 	   SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations</description>
	 <source>Council on Foreign Relations</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2008 12:30:23 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>La problématique destination et utilisation finales dans les exportations d'armement</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24213</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24213</guid>
		 <description>On estime que les armes légères et de petit calibre, au même titre que les armes conventionnelles, représentent aujourd'hui un danger majeur pour le
développement des pays touchés par des conflits internes ou externes et - fait nouveau - pour les pays dans lesquels l'autorité de l'État s'accompagne de
graves violations des droits de l'homme et de recours injustifiés à la violence. C'est ainsi qu'a émergé la notion de responsabilisation des pays exportateurs d'armes vis-à-vis de l'utilisation qui en est faite dans les pays importateurs. Cette notion est partielle, car elle ne s'impose pas partout et, là où elle est prise en compte, ses effets sont limités. Les difficultés
d'application sont en effet nombreuses, le contrôle du destinataire final est limité dans les faits, sinon dans le droit, et le contrôle de l'utilisation finale des armes est encore plus aléatoire. 	   SOURCE: Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité</description>
	 <source>Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2008 10:11:35 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>ONG canadiennes : Enjeux et défis de la diplomatie nongouvernementale</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24183</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24183</guid>
		 <description>Le 16 février 2003, au lendemain de la plus grande mobilisation pacifiste connue à ce jour, le New York Times titrait en première qu’il existait maintenant un véritable contrepouvoir à l’hégémonie américaine, celui de la société civile mondiale. Bien qu’il soit difficile de soutenir une telle thèse ce contrepouvoir reste immensément diffus et hétérogène il n’en reste pas moins qu’il existe aujourd’hui une variété d’acteurs nonétatiques qui prennent position souvent quotidiennement sur une vaste série d’enjeux qui affectent autant les pays du Nord que ceux du Sud. Parmi ces acteurs, trois grands ensembles, les organisations non gouvernementales internationales (ONG), les réseaux de militants et les mouvements sociaux transnationaux sont particulièrement importants autant par leur capacité de mobilisation que par les liens qu’ils créent à travers les frontières et la compréhension commune qu’ils apportent des grandes problématiques de l’heure, l’environnement, la pauvreté, la souveraineté alimentaire, la condition féminine, les droits de la personne et évidemment, la paix (Caouette 2007). 	   SOURCE: Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale</description>
	 <source>Groupe d'Étude et de Recherches sur la Sécurité Internationale</source>
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	   <pubDate>Tue, 06 May 2008 10:44:24 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>How Security System Reform Can Prevent Future Abuses</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24154</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24154</guid>
		 <description>Preventing future human rights violations to promote social reconstruction is a critical element of transitional justice. Police, military, and other security agencies, as well as nonstate security actors such as armed rebel groups, are often the most responsible for serious and systemic human rights violations. Reforming both the makeup and the operational foundations of an abusive security system is, therefore, of central concern to the ICTJ. A “justice-sensitive” approach to Security System Reform (SSR) is guided by the following overarching aims: to build the institutional integrity of the security sector to discourage abuses and increase its responsiveness; to promote the security sector’s legitimacy to overcome a fundamental crisis of trust characteristic of a situation marked by the legacy of serious abuse; and to empower all citizens, especially the victims of state oppression and conflict-related violence. 	   SOURCE: International Center for Transitional Justice</description>
	 <source>International Center for Transitional Justice</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2008 14:15:14 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Security Threats Facing India: External and Internal</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24129</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24129</guid>
		 <description>Threats are a matter of perception. Their assessments take into account capacities, not so much intentions, of a potential adversary. For an accurate reading, the short term and long term objectives of  all leading players in the world have to be judged. Applying this criterion will reveal that India is living in an environment of threat from many corners of the earth. Is there a threat from the United States? To answer the question one must first identify the basic interests of the US and then examine whether similar interests of India are supplementary or contradictory to those of the US. An objective study will lead to the conclusion whether the relation ship between the two countries is essentially benevolent or malignant. 	   SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group</description>
	 <source>South Asia Analysis Group</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2008 13:43:58 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Human Rights and the Basis for EU Sanctions against Iran</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24125</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24125</guid>
		 <description>When the UN Security Council approved the third round of sanctions against Iran by adopting Resolution 1803 in March 2008, U.S. policymakers anticipated that the European Union would follow past practice and enact additional punitive measures. Almost two months later, however, Europeans are still at loggerheads on how best to implement the resolution, with several countries -- mostly the ones with strong commercial interests in Iran -- still adamant that the EU should not go beyond the text of the resolution. The EU could resolve this internal dispute by refocusing its sanctions debate on Iran's human rights record, an issue on which it is often easier to build consensus in Europe. 	   SOURCE: Washington Institute for Near East Policy</description>
	 <source>Washington Institute for Near East Policy</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2008 13:16:03 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Time for a Revival of Disarmament?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24123</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24123</guid>
		 <description>On April 9, the Center on International Cooperation hosted a lecture at NYU by Dr. Hans Blix, chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, former Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and former Director General of the IAEA. Drawing upon his recently-published book, &quot;Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters,&quot; Dr. Blix gave a lecture before an audience of nearly 200 people entitled &quot;Time for a Revival of Disarmament?&quot; which was attended by students and faculty, members of the public and United Nations staff and diplomats. 	   SOURCE: Center for International Cooperation // New York University</description>
	 <source>Center for International Cooperation // New York University</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2008 11:25:55 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Assessing Nuclear Activity in Syria and Iran: The Elusive Smoking Gun</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24114</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24114</guid>
		 <description>On April 24, US officials briefed lawmakers on Syria's covert nuclear reactor. They explained their &quot;high confidence&quot; that what was destroyed last September in Syria was in fact a nuclear reactor for the production of plutonium, and that it was built with the long-term and sustained assistance of North Korea. In contrast to this certainty, a central aspect of their estimate regarding Syria's nuclear plans adopted a vaguer tone: when asked whether the material to be produced by the reactor would be used in a nuclear weapons program, the Intelligence officials accorded this only a &quot;low confidence&quot; level. Interestingly and rather surprisingly, the officials acknowledged that a low confidence estimate did not concur with what they actually believed to be the case. In fact, on the basis of their overall analysis of the situation, it was their belief that the reactor was intended to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, they found no other reasonable explanation for the reactor: it was clearly not for producing electricity, and it was ill-suited to be a research reactor. Moreover, Syria had acted suspiciously in other regards, such as rushing to destroy the remains of the reactor after the attack. But due to the lack of &quot;additional clinical evidence of other activities&quot; – most importantly, the absence of a reprocessing facility – they could not accord this assessment the level of confidence that they actually believed to be the case. As one of the Intelligence officials at the briefing tried to explain: &quot;there's a difference between evidence and an assessment.&quot; 	   SOURCE: Institute for National Security Studies</description>
	 <source>Institute for National Security Studies</source>
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	   <pubDate>Fri, 02 May 2008 10:58:36 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps and Effective Action</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24077</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24077</guid>
		 <description>Dr. David A. Hamburg, president emeritus of the Carnegie Corporation, discusses his new book,  &quot;Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps and Effective Action. 	   SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association</description>
	 <source>Foreign Policy Association</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 02 May 2008 09:58:22 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Potential Flashpoints in South America</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24074</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24074</guid>
		 <description>The escalating verbal and diplomatic tensions from the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela, accompanied by the deployment of troops to their borders with Colombia, have made evident the existence of a clear risk of military conflict, with regional repercussions, in South America. Traditionally, the region had been considered one of relative peace and stability, and there had been promising, although not problem-free, sub-regional integration processes, such as the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) and Mercosur. However, in the last three or four years things have begun to change radically and today there are two potential flashpoints in the region. The first is Bolivia, which is located at the heart of the Andean region. It is a country that is rich in gas but dogged with political, regional and ethnic disputes which threaten, sometimes more openly than others, to trigger internal clashes. Should that be the case, if the violence finds a place to express itself clearly –and there are factions on both sides that are particularly interested in achieving just that–, the risk that it will spiral into an international conflict is high. The presence of Venezuelan military personnel in Bolivia and the remarks by President Chávez clearly backing his colleague Evo Morales and threatening to turn Bolivia into a new Vietnam are evidence of the risks. 	   SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano</description>
	 <source>Real Instituto Elcano</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 15:12:44 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>United States Africa Command: A New Way of Thinking</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24067</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24067</guid>
		 <description>Recent national security reviews have highlighted an emerging trend affecting U.S. vital interests: the importance of the African continent to America’s security. In response to this growing strategic challenge, the President and the Secretary of Defense have announced their intention to create a new unified combatant command for Africa. This new regional command will differ greatly from other regional combatant commands in its interagency approach and the unique, complex challenges facing the U.S. Army in the region. On 6 February 2007, the White House announced a presidential directive to create a new unified combatant command in Africa. The project was detailed in greater length on 9 February 2007 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) commenced official operations on 1 October 2007 and will remain a sub-unified command under U.S. European Command (EUCOM) until October 2008. 	   SOURCE: Association of the United States Army // National Security Watch</description>
	 <source>Association of the United States Army // National Security Watch</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 15:10:05 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Repositioning US Engagement in Southeast Asia: A Case for Non-traditional Security</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24066</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24066</guid>
		 <description>Southeast Asian officials and analysts have complained about the waning US interest in the region due to the US preference for a bilateral approach to Southeast Asia. This US approach is out of sync with the rapidly changing security environment of the region, which can be redressed by looking at non-traditional security threats. 	   SOURCE: S Rajaratnam School of International Studies // Nanyang Technological University</description>
	 <source>S Rajaratnam School of International Studies // Nanyang Technological University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 12:56:41 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>North Caucasus: Border Security</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24058</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24058</guid>
		 <description>Despite almost 14 years of conflict and migration of ethnic Russians away from the Muslim republics, there can be no doubting Moscow’s intention of staying put in the North Caucasus. For instance, the North Caucasus Military District boasts a strong military presence marked by 20 formations and military units in which at least 43,000 servicemen are serving on contract.4 The military presence is further underpinned not only by two newly formed specialist mountain motor rifle brigades in Botlikh (Dagestan) and Zelenchukskaya (Karachayevo-Cherkessia), but also through the implementation of Federal Special Programme “Transition to bringing formations and troop units up to strength with contract servicemen” (2004-2007).5 The programme also laid emphasis on the improvement of training: “New training areas will be fitted out and brought into use (Sernovodsk, Troitskiy – 19 Motor Rifle Division, Budennovsk – 205 Detached Motor Rifle Brigade, Buynaksk – 136 Detached Motor Rifle Brigade, Kalinovskaya, Shali – 42 Motor Rifle Division).6 	   SOURCE: Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy</description>
	 <source>Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 12:53:06 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Islam in Albania</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24057</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24057</guid>
		 <description>Historically Albanians have practised a traditional, tolerant form of Sunni and Bektashi Islam. Now a third more radical interpretation of Islam is gradually being introduced by young Albanians who have studied abroad in Islamic countries. This has the potential to undermine the current delicate balance of inter-faith and inter-religious co-existence in Albania’s multi-faith society. Albania's strong tradition of religious tolerance is widely recognised. However, it should be remembered that historically this was not always the case, when foreign influences endeavoured to intensify regional and sectarian differences. Today, Albania is still vulnerable from such influences. Given the known radical Islamic activity in some of Albania's near neighbours, there should be closer monitoring of religious activity in Albania's more remote border communities. 	   SOURCE: Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy</description>
	 <source>Conflict Studies Research Centre // Defence Academy</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 12:37:40 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>A World of Selfistans?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24053</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24053</guid>
		 <description>Reflecting on the absurdity of ever newer claims around the world for self-determination and separate statehood, novelist Salman Rushdie wrote sarcastically in Shalimar the Clown, “Why don’t we just draw a circle around our own two feet and call it Selfistan?” The recent Western-backed declaration of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia and its ramifications are making Rushdie sound prophetic. Despite Washington’s assertion that Kosovo is an exceptional case that does not set precedents, demands for self-rule have received a shot in the arm from this latest act of dissecting the Balkans. Sensing that the international climate is favorable, fresh demands based on reinvented identities may also crop up in the future among populations that feel alienated from their respective nation-states. 	   SOURCE: Foreign Policy in Focus</description>
	 <source>Foreign Policy in Focus</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 12:36:38 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Dealing with Iran's Hardliners</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24052</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24052</guid>
		 <description>Last month in Iran, supporters of a long-shot parliamentary candidate stuck campaign materials to a handful of chickens and set them loose in the village in what a local official called “a new way to campaign.” Though the chickens were an innovative way to remind voters that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad failed to deliver on his campaign promise to put a chicken in every pot, this candidate and others were forced to find obscure ways to reach voters because they were prohibited from putting their faces on campaign materials. Because of this and other arbitrary election rules, the large margins of victory by conservative hardliners in the March 14 election came as no surprise. 	   SOURCE: Foreign Policy in Focus</description>
	 <source>Foreign Policy in Focus</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 12:19:34 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq [Updated 9 April 2008]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24047</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24047</guid>
		 <description>Iran is materially assisting all major Shiite Muslim political factions in Iraq, most of which have longstanding ideological, political, and religious ties to Tehran, and their armed militias. The Administration notes growing involvement by Tehran in actively directing, training, and arming Shiite militiamen linked, to varying degrees, to hardline cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Some analysis goes so far as to see a virtual “proxy war” between the United States and Iran inside Iraq. This report will be updated. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 11:12:49 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>United Nations Security Council Resolution 1810 (2008) on the  Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (S/RES/1810) (2008)</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24044</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=24044</guid>
		 <description>The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004 and 1673 (2006) of
27 April 2006, Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council’s meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction. 	   SOURCE: United Nations Security Council</description>
	 <source>United Nations Security Council</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2008 10:13:21 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Update Report on Iran - 26 February 2008</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23983</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23983</guid>
		 <description>At press time Council members were discussing the draft of a third sanctions resolution on Iran, sponsored by France, Germany and the UK aimed at increasing pressure on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment activities. The sponsors said they hope to vote on the draft before the end of February, but because of a likelihood of abstentions and a desire to avoid them, negotiations may continue. A lack of unanimity – for the first time on the Iran issue – would weaken the Council’s message. 	   SOURCE: Security Council Report</description>
	 <source>Security Council Report</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 15:17:41 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Update Report on Zimbabwe</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23955</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23955</guid>
		 <description>On 29 April the Council is expected to be briefed by the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Lynn Pascoe, in private consultations on the situation in Zimbabwe. No formal statement or decision is expected at this stage. 	   SOURCE: Security Council Report</description>
	 <source>Security Council Report</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 14:32:54 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Iraq, Petraeus, Iran: Coming to Grips with Reality</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23947</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23947</guid>
		 <description>In his opening briefing to the Congress recently, US Gen David Petraeus, named Iran 105 times to emphasize how important the Islamic Republic has become to the future of the American occupation of Iraq. In doing so the general gave belated recognition to the reality everyone in the Middle East has known for years: Iran is the big winner of the American decision to invade and occupy Iraq. Iran is a big winner because it benefits from a weak and malleable Iraq. Its greatest enemy, Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Iraq, is dead and gone. Hussein’s Iraq fought an eight-year war to destroy the Islamic Republic, killing hundreds of thousands of Iranians and devastating its economy. In its place is a Shiite-Kurdish government in Baghdad filled with former exiles that spent that war in Tehran. Baghdad and Tehran have ever-closer relations: Iranian intelligence operates throughout the country; pilgrims visit the Shiite holy cities. Many believe it was Iran that vetoed Iraqi participation in US President George W Bush’s Middle East peace summit at Annapolis last fall. Iran has certainly pressed its friends in Baghdad not to have any serious contact with Israel. 	   SOURCE: The Brookings Institution</description>
	 <source>The Brookings Institution</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 14:31:10 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Hawkish Engagement Needed with Iran?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23946</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23946</guid>
		 <description>As Gen. Petraeus and Mr. Crocker underscored, Iran is a regime with the blood of hundreds of Americans and thousands of Iraqis on its hands. A sobering aspect of the recent battles in Basra and elsewhere, even for those hardened by years of close observation of Iran's behavior, is just how cynical it has been in arming all Iraqi groups, training hit squads to assassinate Iraqi politicians it does not like, providing rockets to &quot;special groups&quot; used to shell the Green Zone and other parts of Iraq — and then trying to appear the peacemaker at times to fool as many observers as possible about its true role in Iraq and keep the game going. Elsewhere in the region, Iran foments anti-Israeli terrorism, talks of wiping the Jewish state off the map, pursues a nuclear capability, and plays a less constructive role in Afghanistan than it once did. 	   SOURCE: The Brookings Institution</description>
	 <source>The Brookings Institution</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:44:08 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Tremors in the South Caucasus</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23938</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23938</guid>
		 <description>When Kosovo seceded from Serbia earlier this year, Russia opposed UN recognition of an independent Kosovar state on the grounds that it violated the sovereignty and wishes of Moscow’s ally, Serbia. Moscow also warned the move opened the door for Georgia’s separatist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which rely heavily on Russia, to seek independence. Now, just weeks after NATO leaders irked Russia by signaling a willingness to  expand ties with Georgia and Ukraine (AP), Moscow seems to have made its response. Much to the consternation of Georgian authorities, the Kremlin announced it might  increase trade relations (WSJ) with the breakaway Abkhazis and Ossetians. 	   SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations</description>
	 <source>Council on Foreign Relations</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:42:30 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Crisis Guide: The Korean Peninsula</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23937</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23937</guid>
		 <description>North Korea's testing of a nuclear weapon in October 2006 prompted international uproar and raised concerns about the erratic nature of negotiations with Pyongyang. While the United States and Japan worry about the isolated country's long-range missile developments, South Korea and China fear the economic implications of the collapse of Kim Jong-Il's regime. Behind these tensions lies a frozen conflict: Over half a century since the end of the Korean War, the peninsula remains divided between the communist North and capitalist South. The United States continues to maintain tens of thousands of troops in South Korea in case the conflict reignites, and North Korea's long-range artillery and rocket-launch batteries keep Seoul in Pyongyang's crosshairs. 	   SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations</description>
	 <source>Council on Foreign Relations</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:34:39 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>US Policy on Iran - Testimony by Jeffrey Feltman</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23935</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23935</guid>
		 <description>From its location at the crossroads of the Middle East and South Asia, a nuclear-armed Iran would threaten countries on three continents, and potentially even the U.S. homeland directly sometime late next decade.  A nuclear-armed Iran would also intimidate moderate states in the region and embolden Iran’s support for Hizballah, certain Iraqi Shia militants, the Taliban, and Palestinian terrorist and rejectionist groups.  The international community’s failure to prevent Iran’s acquisition of such weapons would additionally imperil the international nonproliferation regime by casting into doubt our collective ability and commitment to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and spurring Iran’s neighbors and others to develop nuclear weapons.  Meanwhile, the influence of former and current Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members in Iranian society has grown over the past five years.  The IRGC, the military vanguard of the Iranian revolution, is a key actor in Iran’s ballistic missile program and in Iranian support for terrorism.  IRGC affiliates in national security related agencies have sought greater control of Iranian strategic policy, while the IRGC and IRGC-owned companies have acquired millions of dollars in government contracts.  Iran’s disregard for international law and ongoing support for terrorism highlight the necessity of continuing pressure to undercut the Iranian regime’s ambitions and to limit its destabilizing activities throughout the region. 	   SOURCE: United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia // Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade</description>
	 <source>United States House of Representatives // Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia // Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 13:24:36 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Denuclearizing North Korea</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23932</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23932</guid>
		 <description>Pyongyang agreed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the September 19, 2005, Six-Party Joint Statement, but elimination of its nuclear weapons program remains elusive. The Six-Party Talks have called for North Korea to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear production complex; disable its facilities; declare its entire nuclear program; dismantle its facilities; and eliminate all nuclear weapons, materials, and weapons
infrastructure—all in concert with compensating measures from the other five parties—South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Yet the process is at an impasse, primarily regarding North Korea’s declaration of its entire nuclear program. 	   SOURCE: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists // Stanford University</description>
	 <source>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists // Stanford University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2008 10:32:25 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Carrot or Stick? Redistributive Transfers Versus Policing in Contexts of Civil Unrest</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23922</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23922</guid>
		 <description>Recurrent episodes of civil unrest significantly reduce the potential for economic growth and poverty reduction. Yet the economics literature offers little understanding of what triggers civil unrest in society and how to prevent it. This paper provides a theoretical analysis in a dynamic setting of the merits of redistributive transfers in preventing the onset of (and reducing) civil unrest and compare it with policies of more direct intervention such as the use of police. We present empirical evidence for a panel of Indian states, where conflict, transfers and policing are treated as endogenous variables. Our empirical results show, in the medium term, redistributive transfers are both a more successful and cost-effective means to reduce civil unrest. Policing is at best a short-term strategy. In the longer term, it may trigger further social discontent. 	   SOURCE: MICROCON</description>
	 <source>MICROCON</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2008 11:51:54 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>The Problem of Pakistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23892</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23892</guid>
		 <description>Fifteen minutes outside Islamabad, Pakistan, surrounded by nonmechanized farms and poor villages, is a U.S.-funded police training school. It boasts a target range suitable for anything from pistols to high-powered sniper rifles; a mock-up of an apartment building to be used for training exercises; a bomb-disposal practice area; and classrooms for studying civil rights, sex-crimes response, humane and effective interrogation techniques, and other basics of law enforcement. The facility is similar to those found in almost every county in America. In Pakistan, a country of 168 million people, it is the only training center of its caliber. If any nation needs highly trained, superbly equipped police, it is Pakistan. Almost all the world’s arrests of important Al-Qaeda leaders have taken place there, with Pakistani police facing down exquisitely dangerous men. In Karachi, police are expected to keep the peace in a city in which gangs of political thugs are better equipped than some armies. Police protecting politicians at rallies throughout Pakistan do so without radios, sniper cover, or body armor. A typical constable, when issued his weapon, is allowed only six practice rounds at a makeshift firing range. 	   SOURCE: Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution</description>
	 <source>Hoover Digest // Hoover Institution</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2008 11:27:39 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Conflict Prevention and Transformation: Women’s Vital Contributions</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23890</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23890</guid>
		 <description>Inclusive Security: Women Waging Peace and the United Nations Foundation hosted a consultation on the role of women in conflict prevention on February 23, 2005. The presentations and discussion highlighted examples and strategies regarding women's conflict prevention activities and generated policy recommendations for the international community/ Based on the day's discussions, this conference report makes a more compelling case for the inclusion of women and gender perspectives in peace processes and offers practical recommendations, guidelines, and models to assist and encourage policymakers to include women and gender perspectives in their program designs. 	   SOURCE: The Initiative for Inclusive Security // Hunt Alternatives Fund // Women Waging Peace</description>
	 <source>The Initiative for Inclusive Security // Hunt Alternatives Fund // Women Waging Peace</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 17:09:59 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>La gestion par la France de la crise en Côte d'Ivoire, de septembre 2002 à avril 2005 : La nouvelle politique d'engagement de la France sur le continent africain mise à l'épreuve</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23851</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23851</guid>
		 <description>Ce mémoire analyse la politique d'engagement de la France en Côte-d'Ivoire à travers deux grandes parties. Dans un premier temps, il étudie pourquoi l’intervention française en Côte d’Ivoire a été une nécessité, d’une part, en raison des liens existant entre les deux pays, et d’autre part, pour éviter une guerre civile qui aurait entraîné des milliers de morts et sans doute la partition du pays. Dans un deuxième temps, il explique pourquoi la politique mise en oeuvre par la France a montré ses limites, plaçant les forces françaises d’interposition dans un bourbier et mettant en danger les nombreux ressortissants résidant en Côte d’Ivoire. 	   SOURCE: Institut d'études politiques, Lyon, France</description>
	 <source>Institut d'études politiques, Lyon, France</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 13:11:29 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Will the Real Serbia Please Stand Up?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23837</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23837</guid>
		 <description>Kosovo’s independence declaration on 17 February 2008 sent shock waves through Serbia’s politics and
society, polarising the former in a manner not seen since the Milosevic era. Rioting led to attacks on nine
Western embassies, destruction of foreign property and massive looting. The government fell on 10 March, split over whether to pursue a nationalist or pro-Western path. Belgrade’s efforts to create a de facto partitioning of the north of Kosovo threaten the new state’s territorial integrity and challenge deployment of European Union (EU) missions there, and Serbian parliamentary and local elections on 11 May are unlikely to change the basic policy towards the new state, even in the unlikely event a pro-Western government comes to power. They may, however, well give Serbia’s nationalist parties new leverage. 	   SOURCE: International Crisis Group</description>
	 <source>International Crisis Group</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 10:46:12 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Resource Scarcity: Responding to the Security Challenge</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23818</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23818</guid>
		 <description>For over two centuries, the social effects of natural resource scarcity have been the subject of lively debate. On one side are those who contend that the planet’s resource endowment cannot support increased consumption indefinitely. In 1798, for example, Thomas Malthus wrote An Essay on the Principle of Population, in which he argued “that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man.” The imbalance between human needs and food availability, Malthus predicted, would lead to famine, disease, and war. Writing 150 years later, Fairfield Osborn (1948: 200-201) reiterated this concern: “When will it be openly recognized that one of the principal causes of the aggressive attitudes of individual nations and of much of the present discord among groups of
nations is traceable to diminishing productive lands and to increasing population pressures?” More recently, updated versions of the “scarcityconflict thesis,” developed by scholars such as Paul Ehrlich (1968), Donella Meadows (1972) and Thomas Homer-Dixon (1999), have been influential in both academic and policy circles around the world. 	   SOURCE: International Peace Institute</description>
	 <source>International Peace Institute</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 10:41:50 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal Court: America's New Priorities</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23817</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23817</guid>
		 <description>The December 2007 conference on “The Responsibility to Protect and the International Criminal
Court: America’s New Priorities” was the most in-depth discussion to date on how the Responsibility to
Protect Doctrine (R2P) can be advanced with greater American participation in the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Much attention has been paid to advancing the diplomatic, economic and military aspects of
R2P, but this conference was the first of its kind to consider the judicial element of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The conference also focused discussion on the development of an international
framework to empower the International Criminal Court with a mechanism to enforce its judgments – an
International Marshals Service. This is a capacity that the Court currently lacks and that gap in
enforcement has greatly strained the ability of the Court to achieve custody of indicted fugitives,
particularly where States fail to cooperate with the Court’s requests. 	   SOURCE: Carr Center for Human Rights Policy // Northwestern University</description>
	 <source>Carr Center for Human Rights Policy // Northwestern University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 11:22:00 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Changing the Frame of the International Debate over Iran's Nuclear Programme: Iran's Role in Moving Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23804</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23804</guid>
		 <description>This last year there has been a renewed Western interest in the vision of a nuclear-weapon free world. This has included the majority of former Secretaries of State and Defense in the US, and in UK government speeches. This is remarkable not because it is a new idea - many diplomats in international fora have referred to the legal commitment to negotiate towards this objective under Article 6 of the NPT - but who is saying it, and the urgency of their call for action. It arises largely from a recognition that the current discriminatory practices are unsustainable: the nuclear haves are realising their monopoly will not last forever, and they view the prospect of nuclear proliferation and the increasing dangers of nuclear terrorism with alarm. 	   SOURCE: British American Security Information Council</description>
	 <source>British American Security Information Council</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 11:07:00 -0700</pubDate>
	 <title>Brazilian Perspectives on Human Security</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23801</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=23801</guid>
		 <description>This paper aims to advance discussions on human security and how the concept serves as a tool for approaching new (and longstanding) issues of internal and external security in the Latin American context, more specifically in the Brazilian context. It begins by examining the concept of human security, considering its links and practical applications to the problem of violence. It is argued in this paper that human security is more than a normative framework and must be reformulated into an operational and analytical tool. Human security-oriented analysis needs to be more clearly focused on armed violence, a growing phenomenon in Latin America and other parts of the Southern hemisphere. A short review of the current problems in Brazil is undertaken and a case study of Viva Rio, a NGO that works within the human
security framework, is discussed. Finally, the paper provides some recommendations for increased cooperation among organizations of civil society, government and private enterprise within and among southern nations. It also makes recommendations for the consolidation of a common international agenda. 	   SOURCE: Centre for Policy Studies</description>
	 <source>Centre for Policy Studies</source>
		 </item>
	

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