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Abstract: The recent death of Corporal Sarah Bryant, the first British servicewoman to die on a "deliberate" operation in Afghanistan, attracted much attention from the UK print media [i] . Though killed alongside Corporal Sean Reeve, Lance Corporal Richard Larkin and Paul Stout, images and tributes to Corporal Bryant, the only woman casualty, have filled the most column inches. One explanation for this is that at least two of the servicemen who died in the same incident are suspected to have belonged to clandestine units and their families have requested privacy whilst they grieve [ii] . Another is that Bryant’s death is particularly newsworthy as a rare occurrence. Since the end of the Second World War, relatively few servicewomen have become combat causalities, and though overstretch means that the military increasingly claim to "select people on the basis of what they can do, not on the basis of their gender", until just over a decade ago servicewomen were generally confined to auxiliary roles [iii] . However, images of a smiling Sarah Bryant and tributes from a grieving mother, father, widower and colleagues - are more than individual reactions to the premature death of a young, bright loved one. They reveal wider cultural discomfort towards the death of a young, bright servicewoman as a direct result of conflict. They also demonstrate the significance of gender to the legitimation of the ‘war on terror’. Tributes to Corporal Sarah Bryant may vary from article to article but her death has elicited some clear, salient, gendered reactions.
Abstract: The Chechnya armed conflict affected stability and the security of communities across the North Caucasus region of Russia, and continues to do so. In Ingushetia, the republic into which Chechnya’s conflict overflowed, the grave conflict dynamics of its larger neighbor have arisen. For the past four years Russia has been fighting several militant groups in Ingushetia, which have a loose agenda to unseat the Ingush government, evict federal security and military forces based in the region, and promote Islamic rule in the North Caucasus. Beginning in summer 2007, insurgents’ attacks on public officials, law enforcement and security personnel, and civilians rose sharply. Human Rights Watch condemns attacks on civilians and recognizes that the Russian government has a duty to pursue the perpetrators, prevent attacks, and bring those responsible to account. Attacks on civilians, public officials, and police and security forces are serious crimes. Russia, like any government, has a legitimate interest in investigating and prosecuting such crimes and an obligation to do so while respecting Russian and international human rights law. Regrettably, Russia is failing to respect or to adhere to these laws. Law enforcement and security forces involved in counterinsurgency have committed dozens of extrajudicial executions, summary and arbitrary detentions, and acts of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
Abstract: In the heat of the Kenyan summer just a few miles north of the equator, a U.S. Navy Seabee detachment was working around the clock, digging a hole into the parched red clay earth. The place: a speck of a hamlet called Shidley. The mission: to provide deep, freshwater wells for marginalized nomadic communities. Few humanitarian activities in this remote part of the world are as important as providing clean drinking water for people and their livestock. In Shidley, water is life and American sailors had come ashore to find it. Between February and June 2007, these dedicated Seabees drilled two wells. The first, in a town called Rhea, struck brackish water and was unusable. The second, at Shidley, was still being explored after weeks of futile results. Engineers from the Kenyan army, dispatched to help the Americans find water for their countrymen, had abandoned hope that the Shidley well would be productive. From the shade of their field tent, they watched as the Seabees kept digging in the baking sun. While the Kenyans were concerned about the expense of drilling a “dry” hole, money was no object for the Americans. As the leader of the Seabee detachment said, “We’ll keep drilling ‘til we run out of steel.”
Abstract: The present report is the seventh report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). It provides a comprehensive assessment of the steps taken to implement resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report of the Secretary-General was issued on 28 February 2008 (S/2008/135) and highlights both the progress made in the implementation of the resolution and areas of concern that continue to impede the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution between the parties. The present report also proposes measures that could be undertaken by the parties in the coming months with a view to achieving a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution to the 2006 conflict. The reporting period was characterized for the most part by the continuation of the prolonged political crisis in Lebanon, which culminated early in May in an extremely serious deterioration of the domestic security situation. In protest of two Government decisions taken on 6 May 2008, Hizbullah and other opposition groups took control of and closed roads leading to Beirut International Airport as well as other key roads in parts of the capital. In response, pro-Government groups closed the main border crossing between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Those actions brought the country to a standstill. Armed clashes between opposition and pro-Government groups, which on occasion included the use of heavy weapons, spread rapidly in several parts of the country. During the clashes that occurred from 8 to 13 May 2008, 69 people died, including a number of civilians, and more than 180 were injured.
Abstract: The present report is submitted in compliance with the request of the Security Council contained in the presidential statement dated 26 September 2001 (S/PRST/2001/25), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the situation in the Central African Republic and the activities of the United
Nations Peacebuilding Support Office (BONUCA) in that country. The report covers the period from January to June 2008 and focuses mainly on political, security, socio-economic, humanitarian and human rights developments during that period. Since my previous report, dated 5 December 2007 (S/2007/697), the political situation has continued to be dominated by intensified preparations for the inclusive
political dialogue aimed at ending the recurrent political and security crises in the country. The Dialogue Preparatory Committee, established by Presidential Decree of 30 November 2007, has completed its work and, on 25 April 2008, submitted its report, containing specifications on the organization of the dialogue, to President François Bozizé. In line with the Committee’s recommendations, President Bozizé, on 8 June, set up a 15-member committee to help organize the dialogue, in particular by mobilizing financial and material resources.
Abstract: In the last of our three-part series, our anonymous correspondent in Zimbabwe details what it is like to work as an independent journalist in one of the world's most repressive regimes. "By exposing the government's shortcomings journalists have become enemies of the state," says this writer. "I work in fear every day." Read her dispatch about the crackdown below. Since the latest round of election-related violence, our reporter has gone into hiding in the capital of Harare. From her safe house, she spoke with iWitness correspondent Joe Rubin and described the frightening conditions in the city over the last few days.
Abstract: Are peace and justice incompatible pursuits in responding to the Darfur crisis? Do efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to prosecute atrocity crimes in Darfur deserve robust international support or exhortations of caution? Is justice fundamental to a resolution of the crisis? or is it a luxury too costly, too threatening to the chances for peace? Would senior officials in the Khartoum regime be more or less likely to engage in meaningful peace talks if they faced forceful and compellingly researched indictments from the ICC? Would international support for the Court and for justice lead Khartoum to retaliate against civilians and humanitarians? Answers to these questions depend upon which of Darfur’s historical realities are accepted, which are denied or ignored. Many insist the most basic truth of Darfur is that senior members of the National Islamic Front (National Congress Party) are responsible for engineering the genocidal destruction and displacement most violently in evidence in 2003-2004, and that the regime remains deeply complicit---and where necessary actively engaged---in sustaining the human catastrophe in Darfur. Those so convinced, including this writer, will find grossly expedient the efforts to trade out the claims of justice for those of a peace that is nowhere in sight.
Abstract: After a run-off election marked by violence, Robert Mugabe was sworn in again as president of Zimbabwe in late June. Some African leaders voiced criticism, but the African Union as a whole did not seem prepared to rebut the autocrat. Five days before the run-off election, Morgan Tsvangirai, the chairman and presidential candidate of the opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), had announced his withdrawal. This was by no means a concession statement, but rather an urgent cry for help. A UN peacekeeping force was needed to protect the Zimbabweans, Tsvangirai said after seeking refuge at the Dutch embassy in Harare. The opinion of some who had still hoped to oust Mugabe in the election, however, was: “Five more days – we could have held out.”
Abstract: The European Union considers conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its foreign policy. It makes use of a number of policy instruments to promote conflict transformation through ‘constructive engagement’, which cover a range of sectors affecting conditions and incentives at the micro level. The EU has recognised the importance of engaging with civil society in situations of violent conflict, but needs to engage more with local civil society to make its policies more effective. This briefing aims to aid the understanding of the role of civil society organisations in situations of violent conflict, and the potential role of EU policies in enhancing CSOs’ conflict transformation efforts. The European Union, historically conceived as a peace project, has considered conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its fledgling foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that the EU aims to promote peace and that its role in the world would reflect the principles that have inspired its creation, development and enlargement. The EU views as critical “indicators” of conflict prevention and resolution issues such as human and minority rights, democracy, state legitimacy, dispute resolving mechanisms, rule of law, social solidarity, sustainable development and a flourishing civil society (Kronenberger and Wouters 2005). This suggests that the Union aims at transforming the structural features of violent conflict, eradicating
what Galtung (1969, 1994) defines as the seeds of structural violence: social injustice, unequal
development and discrimination. As such, many of its policy instruments can influence conditions and
incentives at the micro level.
Abstract: The Indonesian Supreme Court recently overturned the conviction of pro-government militia leader Eurico Guterres, who had been sentenced to 10 years in prison for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. Guterres was among 18 people indicted by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for crimes against humanity committed in East Timor in 1999. With his recent release, all 18 defendants have now been acquitted. In light of the stalled release of the bi-lateral Commission for Truth and Friendship's final report, and the recent commutations of sentence provided to prisoners convicted of serious crimes in Timor-Leste, the Indonesian Court's acquittal of Eurico Guterres is another set-back for justice. The ICTJ strongly criticizes the Court's decisions and urges the UN secretary-general to address the issue of justice for the 1999 crimes committed in East Timor at the UN Security Council.
Abstract: Lebanon is going through a critical period of its history. The security vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Syrian forces in 2005, the campaign of political violence and assassinations of leading public figures, the continued presence of armed militias operating from Lebanon outside the authority of the state and supported by external actors, and the recent war between Lebanon and Israel emphasize the necessity and importance of rebuilding Lebanon's security sector to address challenges that could fatally threaten stbility in Lebanon and its neighborhood. Most recently, the battle opposing the Lebanese Army to jihadi fighters in the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-Bared illustrated both the potential of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as a stabilizing actor and the structural challenges it suffers from: an overstretched force, poor managerial and strategic skills at the top, inadequate equipment and training, poor coordination among security agencies and perennial concerns about force cohesion.
Abstract: Human security is at a low ebb in the country. Zimbabweans are grappling with 1.reduced access to basic services, 2. the aftermath of several years of drought, 3.the economic meltdown and 4. the effects of Aids.
The government is thus struggling to provide the basics that are needed by all to participate in society: health, education, water, housing and employment. These are essential factors that make up the concept
human security. Many of the areas in Zimbabwe are now ‘spatial poverty traps’ (Bird et al 2002a:25) with low
geographic capital [the natural, physical, social and human capital of an area that limits the chances to escape from poverty. Recent policy developments, migratory patterns and dwindling resources, have all contributed to the rise in urban poverty. In the same way that the Millennium Development Goals (1990-2015) are interrelated, poverty is also a result of inter-related factors that cut across all the eight goals.
Abstract: In the absence of an electoral outcome, the best we can do is to come up with what should be the post
election agenda for Zimbabwe. Could this be the restoration of democracy or the consolidation of the ‘local version’ of democracy? and Is it a case of who governs or is it a case of being governed well? How do we explain the hesitancy in announcing electoral outcomes? Is it fear of power alternation or fear of the long awaited democratic transition? For the latter can take place without the former, What sort of power alternation in Zimbabwe would result in a democratic transition? Would it be ideological alternation or just leadership alternation?
Abstract: Most research to date on Islamic charities has given special attention to political aspects, which inevitably come to the fore in conflict zones and in areas of mixed religious affiliations (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, Ghandour 2002, Soares and Otayek 2007). But whereas we should not exclude the political dimension from analysis of any humanitarian aid, of whatever ideological provenance, it would be unjustified to lay so much stress on it in the Muslim case that the question of efficacity was sidelined. There is an increasing recognition of the importance of Faith Based Organizations and their role in the international aid system (Duriez et al. 2007, Clarke and Jennings 2008, Rakodi 2007). Few would question that Christian NGOs such as CAFOD and Christian Aid are often able to make advantageous use of their confessional networks in majority Christian areas such as southern Africa and Latin America. Islamic charities in general – apart from a few UK-based ones – have experienced considerable difficulties since 9/11 owing to suspicions on the part of some Western governments that they have been used as fronts for terrorist activities. Steps are being taken, for instance by the Swiss Government, to try to have obstacles from bona fide Islamic charities removed. No research as far as I am aware has been undertaken to evaluate, let alone quantify, the damage that this campaign against Islamic charities has done to the interests of their beneficiaries – such as the many thousands of orphans that they have sponsored – and potential beneficiaries. It must also remain a matter for speculation how powerful a force in the humanitarian movement the Islamic charities might become if they were encouraged to develop their potential as a vehicle for redistribution of resources and disaster response and preparedness in the Muslim world.
Abstract: This paper will assess the extent to which transnational terrorists, in particular global Jihadists associated with Osama bin Laden, have been interested in attacks against the global energy infrastructure. We then assess the extent to which terrorists have in fact targeted that infrastructure and with what effect. We then place these attacks in the context of other supply disruption events. Finally, we make suggestions about a viable way ahead. Western fears about the threat posed by transnational terrorists to energy supplies certainly seem warranted. al-Qaeda has repeatedly threatened to disrupt supplies and have followed up on those threats in a few cases. For example, following the attack on the French tanker Limburg in October 2002, al-Qaeda issued a statement that it "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker but...on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word." Moreover, al-Qaeda sees the U.S. intervention in Iraq as strongly linked to the supply of oil.
Abstract: In early March 2008, an organization called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) announced on a Turkish website, that Cüneyt Çiftçi, a Turk born and living in Germany had carried out a suicide attack on American and Afghan troops in the Afghan province of Paktika. The website showed pictures of Çiftçi while training for and preparing the attack. This announcement marked the first peak of an intensive public relations campaign that the IJU began in September 2007. In April 2008, Çiftçi's video was followed by one of a German convert training in an IJU camp in Pakistan, Eric Breininger, who called for Muslims living in Germany to join the "Jihad" against the West. In a bid to gain access to new recruits and funds the organization tries to present itself on the Internet as a transnational organization with supporters in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Europe. Its main recruitment target, however, seem to be young Turks and Germans. This became evident after three of its members were arrested in the Sauerland town of Oberschledorn in the German state of North-Rhine Westphalia in September 2007. They were suspected of planning bomb attacks on American and possibly Uzbek targets in Germany. The planned attack in Germany sought to support the struggle of Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan by attempting to swing the German debate on extending the parliamentary mandates for the deployment of the German Army in Afghanistan (OEF and ISAF). The IJU leadership apparently calculated that high-profile attacks just before the Bundestag votes in October and November 2007 could prevent an extension and force the withdrawal of German troops. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have long regarded Germany as the weakest link in the chain of major troop providers and wanted to exploit growing criticism of the campaign in Afghanistan in the German public sphere.
Abstract: There is growing evidence that asymmetrical warfare has become a strategy of choice among dissident, extremist political groups and will be the most likely national and international security threat in the 21st century. Operating in small, covert groups, and having no recognized sovereign territory or population to defend, asymmetrical combatants can engage in violent, lethal activities with far less risk of being totally overwhelmed by reprisals that a nation-state might face. In addition, those killed in action can be portrayed as martyrs and used to recruit more converts to the cause. A great many lessons have been learned over the years on how to counter asymmetrical threats, and the breadth, complexity and international scope of the threat are now generally recognized. Moreover, much has been written on countering the threat, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and many corrective measures have been suggested and adopted. But as yet, there has as yet not been a grand strategic vision encompassing all the many, varied facets of the threat. It has not been a lack of understanding or of lessons learned about the many varied elements of asymmetrical warfare that has lead to the lack of progress in effectively countering threats in recent years. Rather it has been has been the lack of a new, comprehensive strategic vision against what is essentially a new and different type of armed conflict. The intention of this article is to help fill that gap.
Abstract: This article addresses the global environment, with a specific focus on U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) Area of Operations (AOR), and it contemplates the question: How can we avoid losing the next generation to Violent Extremists (VE)? It focuses on Islamic VEs, both Sunni and Shi’ia, addresses the Human Terrain and seeks to identify individual’s personal motivations. This article does not state official USCENTCOM policy or opinions. Today, the United States’ primary national security challenge centers around a problem that, should we “get it wrong,” will have transcendent implications. Terrorism and violence have plagued humankind throughout history, but now the world finds itself at yet another critical juncture. The terror challenge is the nexus of a multiplicity of issues that lead toward it, like the spokes on a wheel lead from the rim to the hub. Alternatively, terrorist vision can inform a multiplicity of issues and lead outward toward the rim, out to where the rubber meets the road. In contrast to ongoing efforts to understand the enemy’s extremist theological ideology, there has been less energy devoted to understanding the radicalization process or to understand what leads individuals to become radicalized and act out in violence or terror, or to understand the impact of U.S. foreign policy on this radicalization process.
Abstract: Conversion to Islam among native Europeans is on the rise. Many converts live at peace within their native societies; some convert only for marriage, and reject neither contemporary culture nor Europe's Judeo-Christian values. A minority, however, embraces radical interpretations of Islam and can pose a security risk. The involvement of Muslim converts in recent terrorist attacks has raised concern in Europe about these "converts to terrorism." While intelligence agencies and security services track international communications and guard borders, such homegrown terrorists pose just as potent a threat to the security of Western democracies. European security services and politicians remain unprepared to handle this growing phenomenon. In Europe, there is very little hard data on conversion to Islam due to the difficulty of gathering proper statistics. Because Muslim communities usually have an informal structure and no formal clergy, most do not keep records. In France, for instance, state agencies do not record citizens' religious affiliations; to do so, French officials say, would counter France's commitment to secularism. In German registration offices, Muslim residents are included in a pool of "diverse religious affiliations."German converts apparently account for only a small portion—between 12,000 and 100,000—of Germany's total Muslim population of 2.8-3.2 million, which itself comprises less than 4 percent of the total population of Germany. In 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior commissioned a study from the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv Deutschland (ZIIAD) to determine the number of converts, but amid suspicion over the ZIIAD's methodology, discounted as exaggerated its findings and ended its relationship with the institute.
Abstract: On December 17, 2007, eighty-seven countries and international organizations met in Paris and pledged to provide $7.4 billion over three years to the Palestinian Authority (PA), an amount far in excess of any previous level of U.S. or European aid to the Palestinians. The conference participants justified the aid as a means of providing "immediate support to the entire Palestinian population," and as a reward intended to strengthen those Palestinians who favor peaceful coexistence with Israel. In the midst of the effort in Paris to bestow unprecedented sums of foreign aid on the Palestinians, there was little discussion of the unintended consequences — often deadly ones — of previous aid regimens. The recent history of foreign assistance shows a distinct correlation between aid and violence. Perhaps aid itself does not cause violence, but there is strong evidence that it contributes to a culture of corruption, government malfeasance, and terrorism that has had lethal consequences for both Israelis and Palestinians over the past decade.
Abstract: This issue of FMR aims to help bring the crisis of forced displacement of Burmese people back into the
international spotlight. With the ‘Saffron Revolution’ of September 2007, Burma was catapulted into the centre of international attention. It was briefly headline news as people monitored the regime’s response and watched for hints of progress towards democracy and the restoration of rights. With little action on either front (and no visible resurgence of violence or protest), interest has since waned. The September protests, led by Buddhist monks, were sparked by a sudden increase in oil prices which had a serious impact on the already impoverished population. After a few days, the government violently ended what it called
the “disruption of stability”. Governments around the world condemned the crackdown and the UN Secretary-General sent Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari to negotiate with the Burmese rulers.
At the same time, however, China and Russia used their right of veto in the UN Security Council to block discussion of matters which they considered to be internal to Burma, no ‘threat to international
security’ – and therefore outside the mandate of the Security Council.
Abstract: Political thought in Sudan generally avoids the issue of reform, since the very notion falls short of the political and developmental ambitions the country has harboured since independence, in 1956. This paper examines Sudan's system of governance and its attitude to reform. Sudan has a governance system which does not necessarily use crude repressive methods, but rather a well-measured carrot and stick approach that helps them do both, manage and entrench the current political vacuum in the country. The security services are the most modern and well-run institution in the country, as well as the richest, given its open-ended budget that knows no parliamentary or legal accountability. It is therefore able, more than any other government or partisan institution in the country, to control every aspect of civil service and society and thus play, to a certain extent, the traditional role that armies usually play in Arab politics.
Abstract: In the lead-up to Nigeria’s April 2007 national and presidential elections, numerous signs emerged of growing popular discontent with the national political system and indications that the 2007 elections would mirror the violence of 2003. The shadow of the 2003 elections hung heavily over the country, while the 2007 electoral process faced a number of challenges. Problems with voter registration raised concerns about disenfranchisement, whether intentional or not. The efforts of Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to modify the Constitution to enable him to run for a third term drew accusations of authoritarianism. Tensions between the north and the south of the country persisted, as they have for years, and reflected the normal tendency of increasing in an election year. Growing unrest in the Niger Delta brought a rise in violent incidents and kidnappings. Although not as violent as many had predicted, the elections exacerbated political divides due to widespread accusations of fraud from voters and national and international observers alike. The elections did little to resolve the political tensions in the country.
Abstract: This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts for postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuild structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
Abstract: The 1992 Agenda for Peace was a landmark development in the conflict management field, but it did also produce side-effects. The UN, AU, EU and others have developed conflict management capacities that have encouraged the bureaucratic compartmentalization of the 4Ps across different units and departments. This report introduces an integrated conflict management model that is, instead, focussed on the multi-dimensional (political, security, socio-economic, rule of law and human rights) nature of conflict systems, and the need to coherently combine the collective efforts of a wide range of internal and external actors to build momentum towards peace. The report argues that, in the AU context, such an integrated confl ict management model would be more effective and efficient than the existing 4Ps model. The AU, being smaller, newer and more open to further development and capacity building than the UN and EU, has a better chance of breaking free from the inadequacies of the bureaucratic 4Ps model, and adopting an integrated conflict management model.
